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Abstract 
 
 
Throughout history, warring parties have contravened norms or laws that prescribe the 
protection of noncombatant civilians, and wars have often wreaked tremendous havoc 
on civilian populations.  In this dissertation, I investigate conditions under which state 
leaders embroiled in civil war perpetrate extensive mass killing against their own 
populations.  Extant literature on mass killing does not sufficiently address civilian 
support for insurgents, which can influence the government’s strategies for subduing 
the insurgency.  Mass killing scholars take civilian support as given, not examining what 
makes civilians buttress the rebels.  My dissertation fills this gap by theorizing and 
testing the linkage between factors that generate civilian support for insurgents and 
extensive mass killing committed by the government.  I claim that secessionist war, 
external support for insurgents from their ethnoreligious brethren and the 
government’s rival states, severe political and economic marginalization, and history of 
intense armed conflict are likely to trigger extensive mass killing, whereas rebels’ 
exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain extensive mass killing.  I verify my 
theoretical argument by conducting large-N statistical analyses and comparative case 
studies (Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992)).  
The analyses reveal that ethnoreligious support for insurgents, severe political 
marginalization, and a history of intense armed conflict account well for the outbreak of 
state-sponsored extensive mass killing.   The effect of economic marginalization and 
rival support for rebels hinges on research methods or model specifications.  Insurgent 
aim and lootable resources exercise little influence on variation in mass killing.  My 
study suggests that civilian support for insurgents affects the behavior or strategies of 
embattled rulers and some factors that produce strong civilian support for rebels 
explain and predict the occurrence of the government’s extensive civilian killings.  
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1 Introduction 
Regardless of time and place, norms or laws of war have inhibited savagery against 
civilians not engaged in war, compelling belligerents to safeguard these civilians.  In the 
ancient Islamic world, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammad’s death, enforced the 
rules of warfare that forbade 1) the killing of children, women, aged men, and monks, 2) 
the mutilation of dead bodies, and 3) the wanton killing of livestock and animals and the 
burning or destruction of trees and orchards (Aboul-Enein & Zuhur, 2004).  Just War 
theory, originating from Roman philosophical and Catholic traditions, instituted jus in 
bello, standards of conduct during warfare.  Acts of war were not to be directed against 
non-combatants caught in war.  Belligerents were forbidden from bombing civilian 
residential areas that include no military target and from perpetrating acts of terrorism 
or reprisal against ordinary civilians (Steinhoff, 2007; Walzer, 1977).  Even military 
targets should not be attacked if warring parties anticipate that the offense would yield 
excessive civilian deaths and injuries (Steinhoff, 2007; Walzer, 1977).  The contemporary 
Geneva Conventions system crystallizes the principle that people who do not actively 
engage in warfare should be treated humanely (Shaw, 1997).  The Fourth Geneva 
Convention (1949) pertains to the protection of civilians in time of war.  It proscribes 
torture, illegal executions, reprisals, and other cruel or inhumane treatments against 
civilians (Shaw, 1997; Roberts & Guelff, 2000; Chesterman, 2001).   
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Throughout history, however, warring parties have sometimes flouted and 
contravened norms or laws that prescribe the protection of noncombatant civilians, and 
wars have often wreaked tremendous havoc on civilian populations.  Ancient wars of 
conquest epitomize savagery against civilians.  During the Crusades, the Crusaders 
sought to conquer the Holy Land and wipe out its non-Catholic populations.  While 
laying siege to Antioch and Jerusalem in the late 11th century, the Crusaders ruthlessly 
massacred Muslims, Jews, and Eastern Orthodox Christians (Riley-Smith, 2003; Peters, 
1998).  In the 13th century, rulers of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan and his 
descendants, besieged and razed cities in the Middle East, Central and East Asia, and 
Europe.  During the invasions, Mongol troops murdered urban populations that had 
refused to capitulate (Roux, 2003; Turnbull, 2004).  Rummel (1997b) estimated that 
approximately thirty million civilians perished when the Mongol Empire waged wars of 
conquest.  Beyond the Crusades and Mongol’s conquest, other ancient wars such as the 
Thirty Years War, wars against Native Americans, and the Taiping rebellion generated 
rampant violence against civilian populations.   
In the modern or so-called civilized world, warfare savagery has continued.  
During the Second World War, both the Axis and the Allies perpetrated atrocities.  The 
Nazis engineered the Holocaust, Japanese troops massacred the Chinese, and the Allies 
indiscriminately shelled cities in Germany and Japan.  Western colonialists liquidated 
indigenous populations who demanded liberation and challenged the colonial rule.  In 
the early 20th century, Germans killed 200,000-300,000 natives in Tanzania and 60,000-
65,000 Hereros and Namas in Namibia (Valentino, 2004).  Ruling Ethiopia and Libya, 
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Italian colonialists eliminated thousands of indigenous populations (White, 2005; 
Rummel, 1997b).   
After the end of the Second World War, France and Portugal massacred 
Algerians, Angolans, Madagascans, and Vietnamese.  In addition, some state leaders in 
the Third World projected massive violence against their own populations.  During the 
Cold War, some ideological wars resulted in carnage.  For instance, in Afghanistan, 
Mujaheddin insurgents waged a jihad (holy war) against the communist government 
and the Soviet Union.  Combating the Mujaheddin, Afghan and Soviet forces conducted 
indiscriminate aerial bombings and massacres, which claimed the lives of at least one 
million Afghan civilians (Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 1988).  Some wars 
between rival ethnic groups also triggered rampant violence against civilians.  For 
example, in Sudan, two civil wars between the government dominated by northern Arab 
Muslims and insurgents composed of southern black Christians and animists inflicted 
grave sufferings on southern Sudanese populations.  Between one and two million 
civilians died as a result of the government’s aerial bombardments, torture, summary 
executions, and denial of access to humanitarian aid (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Thyne, 
2007; Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003).  Since 2003, the Sudanese government has been 
accused of attempting to eradicate the civilian population in Darfur, which led the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict current Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, 
on charge of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (BBC, 2010).   
Why do some wars generate rampant violence against noncombatant civilian 
populations, while others do not?  In this dissertation, I will restrict my attention to civil 
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war and state-sponsored mass killing defined as the deliberate killing of a large number 
of civilians or noncombatants perpetrated by the government.  The scale of mass killing 
during civil war varies widely.  During the Biafran War (1967-1970), the government’s 
blockade and aerial bombings resulted in over one million Ibo civilian deaths.  In the 
1980s, 180,000-300,000 Iraqi Kurds perished as a result of the government’s chemical 
attacks, air strikes, and extrajudicial executions.  Combating FMLN guerillas, leaders in El 
Salvador murdered 40,000-70,000 civilians.  In contrast, some civil wars did not yield a 
large number of (or any) intentional civilian deaths.  Waging a war against LTTE rebels, 
the Sri Lankan government slew 8,000-18,750 Tamil civilians.  During the first civil war in 
Ivory Coast (2002-2004), government forces murdered only a few hundred northern 
Muslims.  Confronting the Dhofar rebellion, Omani rulers eschewed civilian killings.  I 
will explain and predict variation in the scale of the government’s mass killing during 
civil war.  That is, I will investigate the conditions under which state leaders embroiled in 
civil war orchestrate extensive mass killing.  
 
1.1. Contribution 
1.1.1. Theoretical Contribution 
My dissertation contributes to sharpening the understanding of state-sponsored mass 
killing during civil war.  Earlier studies do not tackle this subject in a sophisticated 
manner.  Civil war scholars have not paid much attention to the government’s strategies 
for defeating insurgents.  The bulk of the existing literature addresses civil war onset 
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(e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004 & 2001; Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1993; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004 & 1998), duration (e.g., Fearon, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & 
Söderbom, 2004), termination & consequences (e.g., Collier, 1999; Walter, 1997 & 2004; 
Licklider, 1995), and international dimension of civil war (e.g., Gleditsch, 2007; Regan, 
2002 & 2000; Salehyan, 2009, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008).  Scholars who 
study genocide have formulated theories linking factors such as ethnic division (e.g., 
Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1993), regime type (e.g., Rummel, 1997c, 1994a; Harff, 2003), and 
ideology (e.g., Harff, 2003) to genocide.  A wealth of the genocide literature, however, 
jumbles atrocities that occur during war and those during peace.  In other words, 
researchers have not explicated the causes of genocide that are specific to war.  
Only a fraction of earlier works grapples with mass killing in the context of civil 
war.  For instance, Harff & Gurr (1998) propose various conditions that can lead to 
genocide and politicide (e.g., strength of group identities, leaders’ commitment to 
exclusionary ideology, increase in external support for political active groups).  Valentino, 
Huth & Balch-Lindsay (2004) suggest guerilla warfare as the main cause of mass killing 
perpetrated by the government.  Scholarly works on mass killing during civil war, 
however, do not sufficiently take into account one of the key elements in civil war: 
civilian support.  
Renowned revolutionaries (e.g., Fanon, Mao, and Lenin) claimed that insurgents 
should strive to build civilian support in order to prosecute the war well and secure 
victory.  The importance of civilian support in insurgency’s success implies that the 
government may be willing to employ brutal and reprehensible strategies including 
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mass killing to fracture insurgents’ civilian support bases.  Observing massacres of 
Algerians, Madagascans, and Vietnamese by French troops, Sartre (1968) maintained 
that colonialists committed genocide when anti-colonial guerillas mustered staunch 
civilian support.  Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) confirm that a high level of 
civilian support for rebels can trigger state-sponsored mass killing.  Kalyvas (2006) and 
Azam & Hoeffler (2002) argue that state leaders resort to indiscriminate violence in an 
attempt to terrorize civilian populations and to deter them from supporting insurgents.  
The existing literature, however, has not systematically addressed civilian support for 
insurgents.  These scholars take civilian support as given, not examining what makes 
civilian populations bolster insurgency.  This signifies that they have not explored the 
linkage between the sources of rebels’ civilian support and state-sponsored mass killing.  
My research fills this gap by synthesizing factors that generate staunch civilian support 
for insurgents and the extent of mass killing committed by the government.  I identify 
seven factors germane to insurgent aim, external support for insurgents, lootable 
resources, and grievances.  I theorize on how these factors trigger or restrain extensive 
mass killing and then empirically test my theory.   
 
1.1.2. Policy Contribution  
Mass killing gravely impairs human dignity and thus constitutes crimes against humanity.  
This type of atrocity claims the lives of civilians including women, children, and aged 
men.  Mass killing also traumatizes surviving civilians who witnessed the deaths of their 
siblings, parents, relatives, and friends.  International humanitarian law proscribes this 
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crime against humanity, obligating civil war belligerents to endeavor to minimize the 
suffering of noncombatant civilians.  Throughout history, however, some contenders 
blatantly violated this law and orchestrated extensive mass killing.  International actors 
such as the UN, regional organizations (e.g., African Union, NATO), and major states 
have not enforced the protection of noncombatants effectively.  They have failed to 
prevent or halt mass killing and to punish the perpetrators.  Hence, the scourge of mass 
killing inflicted severe suffering on Angolans, Bosnian Muslims, Cambodians, Iraqi Kurds, 
and many others.  Rummel (1998) claims that from 1945 to 1999, around 80,000,000 
civilians were murdered by states or quasi-states (non-state actors operating like states).  
Recently, the Sudanese government masterminded atrocities against local populations 
in Darfur without evoking viable intervention from the international community.  In 
spite of this record of failure, international actors are able to project their clout to stave 
off extensive mass killing and thus to alleviate the agony of civilians trapped in war.   
Understanding the origins of mass killing is the first step to protect civilians and 
forestall serious attacks on human dignity.  Therefore, my dissertation is relevant to 
policymakers who are concerned about mass killing.  By suggesting factors or contexts 
that pave the way for extensive mass killing, my study can alert international actors to 
civil wars that run the risk of triggering atrocities against civilians.  In other words, my 
research can contribute to establishing an early warning system for shielding civilians 
from the scourge of war.  Through this system, the UN, regional bodies, and major 
states can assess in which wars the government is likely to massacre civilians and then 
intervene in these wars before many civilians perish.   
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The next section addresses what state-sponsored mass killing is.  I will review 
extant definitions of mass killing and concepts relevant to mass killing, such as 
geno/politicide and democide.  Then, based on these definitions, I will conceptualize 
state-sponsored mass killing.   
 
1.2. Conceptualizing Mass Killing 
In 1944, Raphael Lemkin originated the term ‘genocide,’ a combination of the ancient 
Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing) (Lemkin, 1944; Rummel, 
1994a).  Genocide refers to ‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves’ (Lemkin, 1944: 79).1  Lemkin’s concept of genocide 
laid the foundation for the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (hereafter referred to the UN Genocide Convention) (Rummel, 1994a; 
Valentino, 2004).  In 1951, this treaty went into force, affirming that genocide is a 
punishable crime under international law (Rummel, 1994a).  The UN Genocide 
Convention defines genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’  These acts encompass ‘(a) killing 
members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
                                                 
1
 The destruction of essential foundations of the life of national or ethnic groups comprises ‘disintegration 
of the political and social instructions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and 
even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups’ (Lemkin, 1944: 79). 
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its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group’ (OHCHR, 2009).  
This definition has several limitations.  First, it includes non-killing means, going 
beyond the etymological meaning of genocide.  The methods of destroying an 
ethnonational group cover both killing and non-killing tactics such as preventing births 
within the group and transferring children of one group to another group.  Conditions 
leading to killing, however, could depart from those leading to the use of non-killing 
methods.  For example, incumbents bogged down in war might liquidate civilians 
suspected of supporting insurgents in a desperate attempt to secure victory.  In contrast, 
incumbents who do not face imminent severe threat like intractable war might resort to 
non-killing tactics to neutralize their nemeses.  Placing killing and non-killing under one 
rubric jumbles different factors or conditions that result in the use of different tactics.  
Furthermore, encompassing non-killing means begets acute conceptual obfuscation, 
which makes genocide a normative term.  Any episode pertinent to physical and/or 
psychological damage upon an ethnonational group could be viewed as genocide.  For 
instance, some might argue that Botswana’s government policy of resettling ethnic Sans 
(Bushmen) and the denial of ethnic Hawaiian culture by the US public school system are 
genocide because these policies ruined the cultural bases of Bushmen and Hawaiians.  
These two events, however, obviously diverge from the Rubber Terror in colonial Congo 
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and the persecution of Iraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein in terms of scale, tactics, and 
perpetrators’ motives.2     
Second, the UN Genocide Convention focuses exclusively on ethnonational 
groups, not addressing political groups victimized by the government’s brutal actions.  
By excluding political groups, this treaty overlooks that throughout history, some 
incumbent rulers ruthlessly liquidated their political opponents (Harff, 2003).  In France, 
the Reign of Terror (1793-1794), a period of violence that flared up after the onset of 
the French Revolution, was fraught with mass executions and political purges.  
Robespierre and other Jacobin leaders killed thousands of workers, peasants, clergy, 
bourgeois, and aristocrats branded as anti-revolutionaries (Kerr, 1985; Andress, 2006).  
In the twentieth century, some ideological confrontations between communism and 
anti-communism escalated into carnage.  During the Spanish Civil War, both Nationalists 
and Republicans massacred civilians suspected of backing their enemies (Kalyvas, 2008; 
Herreros & Criado, 2009; Balcells, 2010).  In Indonesia, right after aborting an alleged 
communist coup in 1965, Suharto murdered up to one million communist supporters 
(Vickers, 2005; Harff & Gurr, 1988).  From 1974 to 1979, Mengistu and his Derg 
                                                 
2
 The Rubber Terror in colonial Congo is one of the most outrageous atrocities in human history.  In 1885, 
King Leopold II of Belgium acquired the Congo, a territory 80 times larger than his country (BBC, 2001).  
He viewed the Congo only as a source of lucrative raw materials and thus aggressively exploited rubber, a 
highly valued commodity at that time.  Indigenous Congolese were coerced to collect this resource.  
Systematizing forced labor, Belgian colonialists perpetrated heinous atrocities against the indigenous 
population (Hochschild, 1998; Forbath, 1977).  The colonial authority set the quota for Congolese workers 
and killed or maimed those who failed to meet the quota.  To rein in indigenous laborers, the authority 
held their family members as hostages.  When the workers resisted or fled from rubber farms, the 
colonialists murdered, raped, or mutilated the hostages (Hochschild, 1998; Forbath, 1977).  The Rubber 
Terror produced a massive number of Congolese deaths.  Estimates of the fatalities range from two 
million to ten million (Rummel, 1997b; White, 2005).   
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comrades in Ethiopia brutally cracked down on political dissidents, which resulted in 
about 30,000 deaths (Kissi, 2006; Harff & Gurr, 1988).  
Third, the UN Genocide Convention is state-centric.  That is, it does not consider 
the possibility that non-state actors can and do wipe out rival ethnic and political groups 
(Harff, 2003).  Of course, most of geno/politicide perpetrators are states or state-
sponsored actors.  Harff (2003) documented that out of thirty-nine geno/politicides 
from 1955 to 2002, states were involved in thirty-seven cases.  Non-state actors 
(insurgents) were implicated in only five events: Angola 1975-1994, Angola 1998-2002, 
Bosnia 1992-1995, Burundi 1965-1973, and Congo-Kinshasa 1964-1965 respectively.  
This, however, does not suggest that the ability of non-state actors to perpetrate 
atrocities can be underestimated.  Some non-state actors operating like states can and 
do engineer genocide or politicide.  During the Russian civil war (1917-1921), for 
instance, the White Army composed of various anti-Bolshevik forces massacred 
communists, Jews, and Ukrainians (Kenez, 1991; Rummel, 1997b).  In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbian nationalists backed by the Yugoslavian government sought to 
eradicate Bosnian Muslims, which provoked an international outcry (Shewfelt, 2007; 
Burg & Shoup, 1999).   
Scholars attempted to redress the drawbacks of the UN Genocide Convention by 
either developing the concept of genocide further or formulating new concepts relevant 
to genocide.  Harff (2003) criticized the Genocide Convention for not tackling political 
victims and non-state actors.  Because the term genocide etymologically centers on 
ethnoreligious victims, she used the term politicide for political victims along with 
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genocide.  Harff (2003: 58) defined genocide and politicide as ‘the promotion, execution, 
and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents- or, in 
the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities- that are intended to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.’  By identifying 
either of the contending parties of civil war as a potential perpetrator, she took into 
account the possibility of non-state actors committing genocide and politicide.  Similar 
to the UN Genocide Convention, however, Harff’s definition does not strictly conform to 
the etymological meaning of geno/politicide.  She did not restrict her definition to the 
destruction of a group by killing, which suggests that her definition can also engender 
conceptual confusion and normativize geno/politicide.   
Dissimilar to Harff, Rummel (1994a) framed a new concept germane to genocide.  
He claimed that the UN definition of genocide mixes the elimination of a group through 
killing and non-killing methods, which causes acute conceptual obfuscation.  Thus, 
focusing exclusively on killing, he devised the term democide, a combined word of the 
Greek demos (people) and the Latin cide (killing).  Democide refers to ‘the intentional 
government killing of an unarmed person or people’ (Rummel, 1994a: 36).  The 
government encompasses not only security machinery commanded by governing elites 
(military, police, and secret service) and private (non-state) actors abetted by these 
elites (e.g., paramilitaries, vigilantes, criminal gangs), but also de facto governance by 
rebels, warlords, or multinational corporations (Rummel, 1994a).3  With regard to 
                                                 
3
 Rummel called de facto governance quasi-state and identified eleven quasi-states.  They are Amazon 
rubber companies in the early 20
th
 century, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Nationalists and warlords 
during the Chinese civil war, warlords during the Mexican Revolution, the Mozambican National 
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methods of killing, democide covers both direct and indirect killings.  Governments can 
orchestrate democide not only by shooting or bombing people but also by creating 
horrendous conditions that result in the death of people.4  By conceptualizing democide, 
Rummel rectified the limitations of the UN and Harff’s definitions of genocide.  
Concentrating on killing mitigates the conceptual confusion.  Similar to Harff’s definition, 
the concept of democide redresses the pitfalls of the UN Genocide Convention by 1) 
recognizing political victims and addressing politically motivated murder and 2) 
regarding de facto governance by rebels or warlords as a government and tackling 
intentional killing of civilians by these non-state actors.   
 Valentino (2004) also formulated a new concept relevant to genocide.  He 
observed that the UN and Harff’s definitions stress the intentionality of perpetrators, 
but not establishing a numerical death toll threshold.  In other words, regardless of the 
number of victims, all episodes in which political actors resort to violence with the 
intent to wipe out a certain ethnic or political group are considered as geno/politicide.  
On the other hand, Valentino (2004) emphasized the magnitude of intentional killings, 
arguing that events with a small number of victims are tragic but not comparable to the 
most outrageous atrocities of the twentieth century.  Furthermore, the UN and Harff’s 
definitions place a great emphasis on underlying motive of destroying a certain ethnic or 
political group.  Thus, the two concepts tend to disregard intentional killings of civilians 
                                                                                                                                                 
Resistance (RENAMO), Bengali rebels in Pakistan, White armies in Russia, Nationalists (Falangists) in Spain, 
and Chetniks (Serbian nationalist guerillas) and Partisans in former Yugoslavia (Rummel, 1997b; Rummel, 
1994a).   
4
 Democide includes deaths of unarmed people that result from the government’s intentionally or 
knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for life.  Hence, deaths caused by deadly prisons, 
concentration or recruitment camps, forced labor or enslavement, torture or beatings, famines and 
epidemics, and forced deportations or expulsions constitute democide (Rummel, 1994a).   
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during war that did not result from the intent to eradicate a specific group, even if the 
size of civilian fatalities was large (Fein, 1994; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  
For example, some genocide scholars (e.g., Fein, 1993; Dawidowicz, 1981) do not view 
the strategic bombings by the Allies during the Second World War as genocide, because 
Allied forces did not intend to wipe out civilians residing in the Axis countries.   
Instead of the term genocide, Valentino adopted the term mass killing and 
conceptualized it in such a way as to emphasize the magnitude of killing and address 
diverse intentions.  He defined mass killing as ‘the intentional killing of a massive 
number of noncombatants’ (Valentino, 2004: 10; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004: 377-378).  Mass killing must be intentional, but does not necessarily aim to 
eliminate a certain ethnic or political group.  Accidental deaths caused by natural 
disasters, outbreak of diseases, or crossfire during war do not constitute mass killing 
(Valentino, 2004).  A massive number means ‘at least 50,000 intentional deaths over the 
course of five or fewer years’ (Valentino, 2004: 11-12; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004: 378).  Valentino (2004) justified the selection of this relatively high threshold by 
arguing that it helps to confirm that large-scale intentional violence did break out 
despite the generally poor quality of the data pertaining to civilian deaths.  Similar to 
Rummel’s democide, political actors can perpetrate mass killing by employing both 
direct and indirect methods.  Direct methods include execution, gassing, and bombing.  
Indirect killing signifies that perpetrators deliberately manufacture conditions that beget 
widespread death among civilians (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004).  Examples of indirect methods of killing are food blockade, forced labor, and 
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forced relocation.  A noncombatant is ‘any unarmed person who is not a member of a 
professional or guerilla military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities 
by intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property’ (Valentino, 2004: 
13; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 378-379).  Civilians who simply sympathize 
with belligerents, provide food or other non-lethal supplies to them, or are involved in 
nonviolent political activities in support of them should be considered as 
noncombatants, because these activities do not inflict immediate physical harm on 
combatants (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).   
I conceptualize state-sponsored mass killing by utilizing Valentino’s mass killing 
and Rummel’s democide definitions because these two concepts focus on killing of 
noncombatants or civilians.  State-sponsored mass killing is defined as the deliberate 
killing of a large number of civilians perpetrated by the government.  The government 
includes security apparatus commanded by governing elites (military, police, and secret 
service) and private actors sponsored by these elites (e.g., paramilitaries, vigilantes, 
criminal gangs) (Rummel, 1994a).  Dissimilar to Rummel, I confine the government to 
actors directed or abetted by state rulers.  In other words, I do not consider de facto 
governance by insurgents, warlords, or multinational corporations as government, even 
though they perform state tasks such as mobilizing soldiers, collecting taxes, and 
administering justice.  The target of mass killing is civilians.  A civilian is any unarmed 
person who is not a member of armed forces and who does not actively engage in 
hostilities that aim to inflict physical harm on enemy personnel or property (ICRC, 2005; 
Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Passive and non-lethal forms 
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of support, such as participating in nonviolent political activities and supplying shelter, 
food, or other non-lethal materials, do not transform a civilian into a combatant 
because these actions do not immediately afflict enemy soldiers (Valentino, 2004; 
Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).   
The government can orchestrate mass killing in both direct and indirect ways.  
Direct killing contains shooting, bombing, beating, stabbing, and gassing (Rummel, 
1994a; Valentino, 2004).  Indirect killing signifies that the perpetrators deprive target 
civilians of items essential to human life, which generates widespread death among 
these populations (Rummel, 1994a; Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004).  Denying access to food or medicine breeds severe famine or disease, which can 
cause the death of the targets.  For instance, during the Biafran War (1967-1970), the 
Nigerian government enforced a tight blockade of the Biafran region in an attempt to 
cripple insurgent combatants (Rubenzer, 2007a).  This embargo produced an appalling 
humanitarian catastrophe.  Famine and diseases resulting from the blockade claimed 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of Biafran civilians (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; 
Rubenzer, 2007).   
Rummel (1994a) and Valentino (2004) maintained that forced relocation and 
forced labor constitute indirect methods of killing.  These two policies, however, might 
not be designed to kill the target population.  Two examples illustrate this: the 
deportation of Koreans to Central Asia by Soviet leaders in 1937 and the conscription of 
Asians into forced labor by Japan during the Second World War.  In 1937, Stalin 
executed the transfer of at least 250,000 Koreans living in the Russian Far East to Central 
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Asia, alleging that they would be likely to engage in espionage for Japan (Kim, 2004; 
Rummel, 1997b).  The Koreans were transported by overcrowded and squalid trains.  
During the one-month excruciating journey, several hundreds died of diseases, fatigue, 
and hunger (Kim, 2004).  Prosecuting the war against the Allies, the Japanese military 
forced millions of Koreans, Chinese, Indonesians, and other Asians to work in 
construction sites, factories, and mines (Rummel, 1997b).  Rummel (1997b) estimated 
that at least 600,000 Asian conscripts perished as a result of poor working conditions.  
The perpetrators in these examples did not intend to liquidate their targets.  Soviet 
leaders calculated that resettling the Koreans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan far away 
from the Far East would forestall them from spying for Japan.  Furthermore, this 
population transfer would help to reinvigorate agricultural production in these Soviet 
regions (Kim, 2004).  Japanese leaders coerced a large number of Asians into labor force 
in order to build basic infrastructure and produce war materials.  Of course, Soviet and 
Japanese leaders exhibited a blatant disregard for human life by neglecting those who 
suffered from hunger, diseases, and exhaustion.  This, however, is not murder but 
negligent homicide because the immediate intention of the perpetrators was not killing 
their targets.  Therefore, dissimilar to Rummel and Valentino, I do not view forced labor 
and forced relocation as indirect methods of killing.     
To recapitulate, state-sponsored mass killing refers to the deliberate killing of a 
large number of civilians perpetrated by the government.  The government comprises 
security apparatus commanded by governing elites and private actors abetted by these 
elites.  A civilian is any unarmed person who is not a member of armed forces and who 
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does not participate actively in hostilities that aim to inflict physical damage on enemy 
personnel or property.  The government can engineer mass killing in both direct and 
indirect ways.  Direct killing includes shooting, bombing, beating, stabbing, and gassing.  
The government indirectly kills civilians by denying them access to food, medicine, or 
other items essential to human life.   
In Chapter 2, I evaluate existing literature on mass killing, which sets the stage 
for my research.  Mass killing scholars have not sufficiently addressed civilian support 
for insurgent groups.  My dissertation fills this void by synthesizing factors that make 
civilians buttress insurgency and mass killing perpetrated by the government.  In 
Chapter 3, I generate a theoretical model on state-sponsored mass killing during civil 
war and derive several hypotheses from this model.  I claim that factors that engender 
staunch civilian support for insurgents can propel embattled rulers to engineer 
extensive mass killing as a strategy for neutralizing insurgent forces and staving off 
future insurgency.  I identify seven variables that account for the occurrence or non-
occurrence of extensive mass killing.  Chapter 4 explicates how I operationalize variables 
and test hypotheses.  To verify my theoretical model, I employ statistical analyses and 
comparative case studies.  In Chapter 5, I present statistical results and discuss them.  
Statistical analyses reveal that in general, ethnic support for insurgents, severe political 
marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict are likely to instigate extensive 
mass killing.  In Chapter 6, I analyze the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and 
the Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992) for comparative case studies.  Chapter 7 summarizes 
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the previous chapters, address policy implications of my dissertation, and then suggest 
future direction of mass killing study.        
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2 Literature Review 
Mass killing has been understudied.  Only a small number of scholars have addressed, in 
any way, conditions under which state leaders orchestrate extensive mass killing against 
their own populations.  The extant literature on mass killing can be broadly categorized 
into two approaches based on structure and leadership (See Table 2.1 for summary.).  
The structural approach suggests that certain political, economic, or social structures 
account for the occurrence or non-occurrence of mass killing.  Scholars who emphasize 
structure have grappled with the relationship between ethnic cleavages, regime type, 
political opportunity, or economic and political interdependence and mass killing.  The 
leadership approach explains the causes of mass killing by focusing on political elites.  
Some scholars claim that leaders’ psychological conditions affect the outbreak of mass 
killing.  Others stress leaders’ rational choice, maintaining that mass killing is a 
calculated strategy by which political elites seek to achieve their important goals 
(Valentino, 2004).  Still another group of scholars argues that leaders who are 
committed to exclusionary ideologies are likely to perpetrate mass killing (Harff, 2003; 
Harff & Gurr, 1998).  In this chapter, I discuss the existing literature and suggest what it 
omits, which influences my research direction.    
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2.1. Structural Approach 
2.1.1. Ethnic Cleavage 
Investigating the causes of genocide, some scholars zero in on ethnic division.  They 
claim that deep persistent cleavages between different ethnic, cultural, or religious 
groups are likely to trigger genocide (Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1993).  Sharp ethnic division can 
lead to genocide by 1) sparking virulent intergroup conflict and 2) facilitating the 
identification of enemies and undermining moral scruples (Charney & Rapaport, 1982; 
Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993; Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003).  Further, Kaufmann 
(1996) explains why wars reflecting ethnic polarization (ethnic war) are bloodier than 
those reflecting ideological polarization (ideological war).  The government and 
insurgents enmeshed in ideological war share the mobilization base (Kaufmann, 1996).  
Individual loyalties are quite fluid.  Thus, ideological war tends to generate intense 
competition for civilian support.  To obtain this support, belligerents refrain from 
atrocities and strive to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilians (Kaufmann, 1996).  In 
contrast, individual loyalties in ethnic war are rigid and immutable.  Each side’s 
mobilization base is limited to members of its own group, which implies that victory in 
ethnic war hinges on physical control over the enemy territory, not on appeals to 
members of the other group (Kaufmann, 1996).  In order to capture this territory and 
secure full control over it, belligerents are willing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing through 
massacres and forced expulsion.   
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The emphasis on deep ethnic cleavages, however, is open to certain critiques.  
Sharp ethnic division does not necessarily degenerate into genocide.  During the 
apartheid era, black South Africans were afflicted by extremely high levels of 
discrimination and repression for several decades without becoming victims of genocide 
(Valentino, 2004).  The apartheid regime did not employ mass killing in an attempt to 
neutralize the African National Congress (ANC) insurgents, because 1) white leaders did 
not feel threatened militarily by black violence and 2) the racist government understood 
that widespread aggression against black civilians would exacerbate political problems 
(Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  
Genocide can also occur in countries without substantial ethnic divisions.  In the 
1970s and 80s, Cambodia, a relatively homogenous country, suffered a series of mass 
killings.  During the first civil war (1970-1975), the Lon Nol government and its main 
supporter, the United States, massacred civilians suspected of backing Khmer Rouge 
(KR) guerillas (Lee, 2007; Becker, 1998).  After seizing power in 1975, Pol Pot and his KR 
comrades ruthlessly murdered one to two million citizens, which is one of the bloodiest 
mass killings in modern history (Kiernan, 2002; Chirot, 1994).  From 1979 to 1991, the 
government and Vietnam unleashed massive violence against civilians in a bid to crush 
Khmer Rouge guerillas (Lee, 2007).   
Furthermore, a glance at history reveals that some ideological conflicts escalated 
into mass killing.  In contrast to Kaufmann’s argument, individual allegiances can be rigid 
and immutable in ideological war, thus this type of war can produce atrocities (Kalyvas, 
2008).  The Spanish Civil War epitomizes ideological war inundated with bloodshed.  
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Ideological polarization was entrenched in the Spanish society during the war.  Hence, 
Republicans and Nationalists projected relentless violence to eliminate their rivals 
(Kalyvas, 2008; Herreros & Criado, 2009).  Changing ideological stance was impossible 
for many people, thus hundreds of thousands of Republicans fled the country after 
Nationalists won the war (Kalyvas, 2008).   
 
2.1.2. Regime Type 
The democratic peace theory has been applied to understand mass killing.  Rummel 
(1997c) asserts that absolute power at the center is the primary cause of mass killing; in 
other words, highly autocratic leaders are likely to orchestrate mass murder.  The tight 
grip on power removes the checks-and-balances system and norms of tolerance and 
compromise, which makes it easier for dominant rulers to employ coercive measures 
and further to exterminate groups that resist their rule (Rummel, 1994a; 1995).  
Furthermore, leaders who hold absolute power tend to fear that opponents are always 
plotting to usurp power from them.  This paranoia impels the rulers to liquidate 
(potential) dissents and challengers (Rummel, 1995).  By contrast, democracy obviates 
the risk of mass murder because 1) norms of tolerance, compromise, and non-violence 
are deeply embedded in democratic societies and 2) the system of checks-and-balances 
operates well in these societies (Rummel, 1994a & 1994b; Harff, 2003).  Further, Heger 
& Salehyan (2007) reveal that large government coalitions constrain the rulers 
embroiled in civil war from projecting unbridled force, which signifies that democratic 
leaders are not likely to engineer genocide and politicide.   
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Regime type arguments, however, encounter theoretical and empirical 
challenges.  Theoretically, in contrast to Rummel’s argument, the erosion of power can 
give rise to genocide.  By analyzing genocides in Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan, 
Straus (2006) demonstrates that national elites might choose to mastermind genocide 
as their power wanes or is on the verge of waning.  Empirically, many dictatorial regimes 
did not commit mass killing.  Communist leaders in Cuba and Vietnam and monarchs in 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, for instance, have exercised unfettered power without killing a 
large number of their citizens.   
Regime arguments imply that democratization reduces the likelihood of the 
outbreak of geno/politicide.  Democratization, however, can set the stage for 
geno/politicide.  In democratizing countries, contending elites fiercely jockey for power.  
In an attempt to win this power competition, governing elites might be willing to 
unleash extreme violence (Gurr, 1994; Shaw, 2003).  In addition, democratic rulers 
might employ mass killing when they feel threatened by war.  Valentino, Huth, and 
Balch-Lindsay (2004) contend that although democratic states are less likely to 
orchestrate mass killing during war than autocratic ones, the former might resort to this 
egregious strategy when confronting popular and strong guerilla insurgents.  Addressing 
interstate war, Downes (2008) maintains that democratic rulers are likely to massacre 
civilians in their enemy countries in a desperate attempt to lower the costs of war and 
secure victory.  An eyeballing of history shows that democratic regimes perpetrated 
mass killing, which can dispute the pacifying effect of democracy on geno/politicide.  
Democratic rulers ruthlessly slaughtered domestic populations treated as second-class 
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citizens and indigenous populations in their own colonies (Valentino, 2004).  In the 19th 
century, the U.S. government conducted relentless military operations against Native 
Americans, which resulted in the drastic reduction of their population.  In Madagascar, 
combating anti-colonial insurgency, French troops murdered 10,000 - 100,000 native 
civilians (Rummel, 1997b; Harff & Gurr, 1988; White, 2005).  Furthermore, democratic 
leaders engaged in mass killing during war against other countries (Valentino, 2004; 
Downes, 2008).  For example, during the World War II, U.S. and British forces 
indiscriminately bombed cities in Germany and Japan.  At least 500,000 German and 
Japanese civilians died as a result of these bombing campaigns (Valentino, 2004; 
Downes, 2008).       
 
2.1.3. Political Opportunity 
The political opportunity argument suggests that major political upheavals give rise to 
state-sponsored mass killing (Melson, 1992; Krain, 1997; Harff, 2003).  Major political 
turmoil prompts political elites to gravitate toward power consolidation, which can 
spark genocide and politicide (Harff, 1986; Melson, 1992; Krain, 1997).  Focusing on 
revolution, Melson (1992) argues that revolution yields the opportunity for radical 
groups to seize state machinery and to impose their ideology, which makes it easier for 
them to legitimize mass murder against their opponents.  Krain (1997) contends that 
political upheavals, such as interstate or civil war, extra-constitutional regime change, or 
decolonization, generate windows of political opportunity during which new elites 
capturing power or old elites trying to retain their grip on power must consolidate 
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control quickly and efficiently.  Leaders who fail to secure power are not efficient in 
performing key tasks such as protecting their country from foreign aggression and 
extracting taxes from the population, which results in the emergence of challengers 
within the regime who call into question its legitimacy (Tilly, 1978; Krain, 1997).  
Therefore, elites strive to capitalize on windows of political opportunity to solidify 
power as quickly and efficiently as possible, which propels them to suppress their 
opponents brutally (Krain, 1997; Harff, 1986; Harff & Gurr, 1988).   
The political opportunity argument, however, has two notable pitfalls.  First, the 
majority of political upheavals did not bring about mass killing (Valentino, 2004).  The 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) database substantiates this.  The PITF identified 148 
state failure events comprising ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides and 
politicides, and adverse regime changes from 1955 to 2006.5  Out of these episodes, 
thirty-five involve genocide or politicide.  In other words, genocides and politicides 
account for only about 23% of total state failure events.  Second, the political 
opportunity argument overlooks that different types of political turmoil can produce 
different outcomes.  Investigating mass killing during wars, Valentino, Huth, & Balch-
Lindsay (2004) reveal that 1) most of mass killings occurred during civil war (27 out of 30 
                                                 
5
 According to PITF, ethnic war refers to ‘sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious or 
other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in their status.’  Revolutionary 
war is defined as ‘sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers 
that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.’  
Genocide and politicide refer to ‘sustained policies by states or their agents-- or, in civil wars, by either of 
the contending authorities-- that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political 
group.’  Adverse regime change is defined as ‘major adverse shifts in patterns of governance, including 
total or near-total collapse of central state authority, revolutionary change in political elites and the mode 
of governance, contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial area of a state by 
extrajudicial means, and substantial shifts away from democratic toward authoritarian rule.’  
   Source: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfpset.htm  
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mass killing episodes) and 2) guerilla warfare is more likely to generate mass killing than 
non-guerilla warfare.  In the 1940s and 1950s, anti-colonial wars against France were 
bloodier than those against Britain.  After the end of the World War II, France engaged 
in six anti-colonial wars, whereas Britain was embroiled in two wars.  France prosecuted 
wars in Algeria, Cameroon, Madagascar, Morocco, Tunisia, and Vietnam.  Britain waged 
wars in Kenya and Malaysia.  Three out of six wars by France (wars in Algeria, 
Madagascar, and Vietnam) produced over 50,000 intentional civilian deaths, whereas 
none of the wars by Britain yielded over 50,000 deaths.     
 
2.1.4. Economic & Political Interdependence 
Neoliberal scholars place a great emphasis on interdependency by arguing that it often 
determines political actors’ behavior (Keohane, 1984; Moravcsik, 1997).  Using 
neoliberalism as a fulcrum, Harff (2003) posits that the outbreak of genocide and 
politicide is contingent upon the degree of economic and political interdependence.  A 
high level of economic interdependence minimizes the likelihood of geno/politicide 
occurring.  Geno/politicide can bring tremendous economic costs to a perpetrating 
country that has open economic system, because exhibiting brutality can provoke 
economic sanctions that disrupt its economic ties with foreign states.  In contrast, 
leaders of an isolated country are likely to commit geno/politicide because they 
perceive that their ruthless behavior will have few international repercussions (Harff, 
2003).  For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, governments in Uganda and Burundi 
whose economic status was very low massacred their own citizens while the 
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international community did not intervene to stop the killing (Harff, 2003).  A high 
degree of political interdependence also reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of 
geno/politicide.  Countries that join many regional and intercontinental organizations 
are subject to greater international scrutiny and obtain more political support when 
confronting domestic challenges (Harff, 2003).  This restrains the government from 
orchestrating geno/politicide.  
Realists might dispute the inverse relationship between interdependency and 
geno/politicide.  They insist that states strive to maximize their own national interests 
and interdependency does not hamper states’ pursuit of interests (Grieco, 1988; 
Mearsheimer, 1994/95).  This argument suggests that a high level of economic and 
political interdependence does not constrain states from perpetrating mass killing if 
state leaders believe that this brutal strategy will help to achieve their national interests.  
The First Chechen war (1994-1996) illustrates the irrelevancy of interdependency.  A few 
years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia with a high level of political and 
economic interdependence combated Chechen insurgents.  To suppress the insurrection 
and preserve territorial integrity, Russian forces conducted indiscriminate air and 
ground raids and massacred Chechen civilians in spite of worldwide condemnation 
(Karaman, 2007; Politkovskaia, 2001).    
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2.2. Leadership Approach 
2.2.1. Psychological Arguments 
Some scholars have investigated the causes of geno/politicide by focusing on leaders’ 
psychological conditions.  They argue that political leaders do not always commit mass 
murder in a premeditative manner (Fein, 1993).  Elites’ mental and emotive states can 
influence the outbreak of geno/politicide.  A few researchers underscore leaders’ 
mental pathology.  They claim that elites usually do not lean toward mass killing 
because their conscience deters them from infringing severely upon human dignity.  
Mental disease or deviation eliminates this qualm, which makes it easier for the elites to 
perpetrate mass killing (Decalo, 1989).  For instance, in the 1970s, then Equatorial 
Guinean dictator, Francisco Macías Nguema, routinized atrocities and as a result, at 
least 50,000 citizens were murdered under his rule (White, 2005).  Decalo (1989) 
maintains that Nguema’s mental derangement accounts for his barbarous behavior.   
The emphasis on leaders’ mental pathology is subject to certain critiques.  First, 
the fact that mentally ill rulers perpetrated extensive mass killing does not necessarily 
indicate a causal linkage between mental disorder and mass killing.  Second, scholars 
who support this argument have not proposed clear criteria for ‘mentally ill’ leaders.  
Thus, determining which leaders had mental disorder is highly arbitrary.  Third, the 
mental pathology argument disregards that elites who do not suffer from mental 
disease or deviation might be willing to jettison their moral scruples and undertake 
savage actions in order to achieve their goals.  Finally, any human rights violations can 
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be attributed to mental pathology.  That is, leaders’ mental disease can account for not 
just mass killing, but also any actions that do not entail killing but impinge on human 
dignity.   
Other scholars contend that leaders’ feeling of revenge rather than mental 
pathology triggers mass killing.  The desire for revenge, sought for honor and pride 
against a collective entity, eradicates whatever moral scruples the avenger may have 
against committing atrocities (Chirot & McCauley, 2006).  In other words, political 
leaders who think that their honor and pride have been gravely besmirched are willing 
to take aggressive and cruel retributive actions in an attempt to restore their damaged 
honor and pride.  The obliteration of Hereros by German colonialists in German 
Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) epitomizes genocide instigated by feeling of 
revenge (Chirot & McCauley, 2006).  In 1904, Hereros launched rebellion against abusive 
German colonizers and initially succeeded in beating German troops.  The defeat 
enraged German ruling elites and made them perceive that Hereros tarnished the honor 
of the German Empire.  In order to retrieve the sullied honor, German leaders sought 
ruthless reprisal by orchestrating genocide against Hereros (Chirot & McCauley, 2006).  
It is estimated that around 65,000 Hereros, at least 75 percent of the total Herero 
population, were deliberately slain or starved to death in 1904 and 1905 (Pakenham, 
1991; Chirot & McCauley, 2006).         
Furthermore, Midlarsky (2005) incorporates prospect theory into the study of 
genocide.  Genocide tends to occur within the domain of loss that is created by ‘the 
experience of either (1) transfer of territory, population, authority, or some combination 
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thereof to another political entity, or (2) military defeat or significant casualties in 
political violence (e.g., war) that either are about to be or have already been incurred’ 
(Midlarsky, 2005: 83).  The domain of loss generates fear, vulnerability, resentment, and 
a desire for revenge, which increases the probability of leaders’ perpetrating genocide 
(Midlarsky, 2005; Straus, 2007).    
 
2.2.2. Rational Choice Arguments 
Those who view genocide from rational choice angle criticize psychological arguments, 
claiming that psychological factors, such as mental pathology, revenge, and emotion, do 
not account well for the outbreak of mass killing.  Mass killing occurs when political 
leaders realize that it is the best option to accomplish certain political and military 
objectives (Valentino, 2004).  In other words, mass killing is a rationally calculated 
strategy to achieve important goals.  Two situations can provide political leaders with 
the strong incentive to engineer mass killing.  The first one is when elites attempt to 
disfranchise segments of their population and to deprive these citizens of their homes 
and possessions or their way of life.  Mass killing can be the best option for these 
leaders because this reprehensible strategy helps to annihilate the influence of the 
dissent groups and to overcome or prevent resistance by these groups (Valentino, 2004).  
Valentino (2004) suggests that radical communist reform (e.g., agricultural 
collectivization in the Soviet Union), ethnic cleansing (e.g., partition of Bangladesh in 
1971), and territorial expansion (e.g., German colonial expansion in Namibia from 1904 
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to 1907) entail the deprivation of some domestic or indigenous populations, thus giving 
rise to mass killing.   
The second situation is when political leaders are embroiled in war.  Kalyvas 
(1999; 2006) contends that indiscriminate violence operates as a deterrent to civilian 
defection.  Indiscriminate violence collectively penalizes suspected enemy collaborators 
and those related to them, thus deterring civilians from defecting to the rival actor.  In 
other words, indiscriminate violence is a rational strategy to maximize civilian support 
(Kalyvas 1999; 2006).  Sartre (1968) and Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue 
that incumbent rulers6 are likely to perpetrate mass killing when they confront guerilla 
combatants.  Guerillas eschew decisive battles and engage in prolonged campaigns 
through hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, terror bombing, and other tactics.  Guerilla 
forces also rely heavily on the local population for food, shelter, supplies, and 
intelligence (Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Valentino, Huth, & 
Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Therefore, it is extremely difficult for government forces to defeat 
guerilla combatants directly.  This predicament incentivizes embattled rulers to 
slaughter a great number of civilians suspected of supporting insurgents.  The 
government orchestrates mass killing in a desperate attempt to destroy rebels’ support 
bases and thus to squelch the insurgency (Sartre, 1968; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004).    
 
                                                 
6
 On Genocide, Sartre underscores (neo) colonialism as the main cause of genocide.  Thus, in the context 
of his argument, incumbent rulers are Western (neo) colonialists who encountered fierce resistance by 
the colonized.    
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2.2.3. Ideological Perspective 
Constructivists assert that intangible elements such as identity, idea, and culture shape 
state preferences and actions (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).  
Constructivism lays the basis for ideological perspective on geno/politicide.  Harff (2003) 
posits that genocide and politicide are likely to break out when political leaders seek to 
materialize ideologies that advocate an extreme view of the world and the 
establishment of an idealistic society.  These ideologies encompass strict variants of 
communism, rigid anti-communism, religious extremism, and strict secular nationalism 
or ethnonationalism.  To facilitate the materialization of the ideologies, leaders 
eradicate certain ethnonational or political groups that they regard as irreconcilable 
enemies, even if these groups do not pose a real threat to the leaders.  After seizing 
power in 1975, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge comrades who idealized a perfect agrarian 
communist society relentlessly pursued the radical transformation of the Cambodian 
society.  In an effort to stimulate this process, the Khmer Rouge ruthlessly killed up to 
two million citizens many of whom were city dwellers, business owners, landlords, 
intellectuals, and students (Chirot, 1994; Kiernan, 2002).    
Some scholars refute ideological perspective.  Those who criticize constructivism 
maintain that ideology is not an independent variable, but an intervening one.  
Education, socialization, political turmoil, or other factors shape elites’ ideology.  Thus, 
in explaining geno/politicide, these factors are far more important than ideology.  
Kalyvas (1999) also debunks the role of ideology, charging that 1) one ideological tenet 
can beget multiple courses of action, 2) political leaders often take advantage of 
34 
 
ideology for the ex-post facto justification of their actions, and 3) ideology accounts little 
for the temporal and spatial variations of massacres.  Midlarsky’s criticism is milder than 
the previous two.  Although acknowledging that utopian belief can be an element in 
sparking genocide, he claims that it alone cannot capture the whole story of genocide 
(Midlarsky, 2005).  Therefore, scholars must delve into variables that link the belief 
system to genocide in order to comprehend the origins of genocide fully (Midlarsky, 
2005).  
 
2.3. Limitation of Literature on Mass Killing 
The bulk of extant literature on mass killing pays scant attention to the behavior of 
civilians caught in civil war.  Leadership arguments focus on leaders themselves, 
addressing psychological, rational, and ideological dimensions of leaders’ savage 
behavior.  Structural arguments zero in on various structures encircling political leaders, 
discussing how ethnic cleavages, regime type, political opportunity, and economic & 
political interdependence affect leaders’ decisions to resort to or refrain from mass 
killing.  Only a fraction of the literature tackles the behavior of civilians, but in a 
superficial manner.  For instance, Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) contend that 
a high level of civilian support for insurgents is likely to produce state-sponsored mass 
killing.  They, however, consider civilian support as given and do not extend their focus 
to what makes civilians back the rebels.   
Of course, political leaders decide to commit or eschew mass killing.  Thus, I 
acknowledge that it is important to inquire into political leaders and structures 
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surrounding them.  Civilian populations, however, play a key role in civil war.  They can 
help belligerents conduct military operations by supplying young recruits, information, 
food, shelter, and so forth.  Therefore, civilian support can influence how well the 
contenders prosecute the war and which strategies the government exercises to subdue 
the insurgency.  Civilian support is not given.  Something leads them to jeopardize their 
lives and support insurgents.  Therefore, to comprehend the origins of state-sponsored 
mass killing, it is essential to addressing factors that can generate staunch civilian 
support for insurgency.     
Some civil war scholars have examined why civilians risk their lives and 
participate in rebellion.  Gurr & Moore (1997) and Gurr (1993) emphasize grievances as 
the main cause of civilians’ joining the insurgency.  Discontent about unjust treatment 
agitates people for the change of the status quo and drives them to back insurgent 
groups (Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1993).  Wood’s study on the Salvadoran Civil War 
corroborates the ‘grievance’ argument.  She (2003) finds that during the war, peasants 
supported leftist guerillas not for material gain but for moral and emotional reasons.  By 
participating in the insurrection, indigent farmers sought to redress injustice, defend or 
restore their dignity, and write a new history for their descendants (Wood, 2003).  On 
the other hand, Gates (2002) and Kalyvas (2006) stress the complexity of civilians’ 
motives.  Exploring the microfoundations of rebellion, Gates (2002) argues that civilians 
join insurgent groups for a mixture of pecuniary rewards (e.g., money, land) and non-
pecuniary rewards of fighting the “good fight.”  Kalyvas (2006) suggests various reasons 
for civilian support for the insurgency.  Civilians back rebel groups in a bid to obtain 
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public goods or individual material benefits, secure their survival, acquire higher status, 
settle personal or local disputes, take revenge, and/or vent their anger (Kalyvas, 2006).  
In the next chapter, I theorize on the linkage between factors that affect civilian 
support for insurgents and the extent of mass killing orchestrated by the government.  I 
identify seven factors that stimulate or inhibit rebels’ civilian support.  Three of them 
are pertinent to grievances, as the extant literature suggests.  Others pertain to 
insurgent aim, external support, and lootable resources.  I synthesize these factors and 
the scale of state-sponsored mass killing.     
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3 Theoretical Model 
Earlier works on mass killing do not sufficiently address civilian support for insurgents, 
which can impact leaders’ strategies for suppressing insurgent groups.  I rectify this 
limitation by investigating how factors that engender civilian support for insurgents can 
propel embattled rulers to unleash massive violence against civilian populations.  
I contend that when combating insurgents who garner staunch civilian support, 
state leaders are likely to engineer extensive mass killing.  Civilians or people tend to 
play a crucial role in civil war, which is reflected in prominent revolutionaries’ thoughts 
and strategies.  Lenin (1969 [orig. 1902]; 1993 [orig. 1917]) asserted that the proletariat 
class is the pivot of revolution against capitalists.  In order for this revolution to succeed, 
a vanguard party consisting of intellectual elites must direct workers because otherwise, 
the proletariat would be merely satisfied with trade unionism (Lenin, 1969 [orig. 1902]).  
Agitating for war of national liberation, Fanon (2004 [orig.1961]) emphasized the role of 
the lumpenproletariat defined as the colonized who are not engaged in industrial 
production (e.g., landless peasants, the unemployed, hooligans).  Because industrial 
workers and town dwellers are susceptible to manipulations by colonialists, nationalist 
groups should rally support from the lumpenproletariat to subvert the colonial rule 
(Fanon, 2004 [orig. 1961]; 1988 [orig. 1964]).  Mao (2000 [orig. 1961]) and Guevara 
(1998 [orig. 1961]), the most famous guerilla leaders, claim that without support from 
the masses, guerillas cannot win the war.  Insurgent groups often do not have regular 
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armies, so they recruit combatants from the civilian population.  Rebels also rely heavily 
on civilians for intelligence, shelter, food, medicine, and other supplies (Mao, 2000 [orig. 
1961]; Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Therefore, 
the guerillas must institute mass support systems to defeat government troops.   
The importance of civilian support is also applied to the government.  Of course, 
state leaders have standing professional armies and thus depend on civilian support to a 
lesser extent.  Support from civilians, however, can help states precipitate victory.  The 
civilian support for the government can deprive insurgent groups of recruitment pools, 
basic amenities, and shelter.  Civilians can also provide information on the rebels, which 
helps incumbents’ military operations.  For example, the Peruvian government 
succeeded in fracturing the Shining Path because peasants offended by the rebels’ 
disrespect for indigenous culture, imposition of rigid regulations, and harsh punishment 
formed militias called rondas and lent support to governmental troops (Gorriti, 1999).  
In a nutshell, civilian support is crucial for civil war belligerents in that war outcomes can 
be contingent upon the level of this support.  Therefore, rebels and the government 
tend to vie for civilian support (Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Kalyvas, 1999).  
When insurgent groups succeed in obtaining staunch civilian support, they are 
able to combat the government effectively (Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Guevara, 1998 [orig. 
1961]).  The insurgents can receive young recruits, logistical items, and information 
pertaining to incumbent forces.  The rebel forces can evade detection by vanishing into 
the civilian population (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Confronting people’s 
war, state leaders might come to fear that they will fail to defeat the rebels and in 
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worst-case scenario, the insurgents will win the war.  In this situation, the embattled 
rulers might conclude that in order to subdue the insurgency, they need to dismantle 
rebels’ civilian support bases.   
The government has diverse strategic options for undermining civilian support 
for insurgent groups.  It can incentivize civilians to abandon their allegiance to the rebels.  
State leaders might give pecuniary rewards or execute land reform.  The incumbents 
might elevate political and social status of suspected or potential rebel supporters.  
Embattled rulers can also resort to coercion.  The government might dispatch a large 
number of troops to areas in which insurgents operate actively and monitor and restrict 
the activities or movements of residents.  The rulers might imprison (potential) rebel 
supporters or relocate them to designated territories or camps in an attempt to sever 
rebel combatants from the civilians.  Furthermore, the government might massacre 
civilian populations suspected of rebel supporters and those related to them.   
Embattled rulers might consider or implement counter-insurgency strategies 
that do not involve extensive mass killing.  Under certain conditions, however, these 
strategies fail to stimulate mass civilian defection to the government and to fracture 
insurgent support bases.  Certain factors make civilians intransigent supporters of 
insurgency and thus non-mass killing strategies are not sufficient to deter civilians from 
sponsoring the rebellion.  Ardent rebel supporters do not waver when the government 
offers material incentives.  They even perceive that the government is attempting to 
bribe them and is thus insulting them.  Forced relocation and massive troop deployment 
exacerbate animosity toward the rulers.  Thus, despite the government’s close 
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surveillance, intransigent civilians strive to grab every opportunity to assist insurgent 
forces.   
Conditions that vitiate non-mass killing strategies can lead embattled rulers to 
consider extensive mass killing as an attractive strategy.  Extensive mass killing can bring 
both immediate and long-term benefits to the government.  By massacring (potential) 
rebel supporters, the government can sabotage insurgent support bases and debilitate 
insurgent combatants.  Killing youths, children, and women can shatter future 
recruitment pools and thus prevent rebellion from recurring.  Of course, mass killing can 
engender negative consequences.  By committing extensive mass killing, the 
government flagrantly contravenes international norms of civilian protection during 
warfare.  The international community might seek to punish the perpetrator by 
imposing economic and arms embargoes and/or launching military intervention on the 
rebel side.  Mass killing might also instigate a fervent desire for revenge among the 
victimized, which makes the government bogged down in an endless cycle of violence.  
Combating popular insurgents, however, state leaders become overwhelmed by fear of 
losing the war and thus disregard the potential costs of mass killing.  Furthermore, the 
government might judge that extensive mass killing drains insurgent recruitment pools, 
which prevents international intervention from translating into the enhancement of 
rebels’ military capacity.  Staunch civilian support for rebels can drive government 
supporters who might otherwise object to extensive mass killing to uphold or acquiesce 
in this heinous strategy, which removes an obstacle to the use of extensive mass killing. 
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Because civilian support for insurgents is related to state-sponsored mass killing, 
scholars need to examine factors or contexts that generate civilian support so strong as 
to make futile strategies that do not involve extensive mass killing.  Some scholars 
address sources of rebels’ civilian support.  For instance, Weinstein (2007) maintains 
that insurgents with social endowments (ethnic, religious, or ideological ties) develop 
internal structures that yield strong civilian support, whereas insurgents with economic 
endowments (external patronage and natural resource) do not.  Gurr (1970; 1993; 1997 
with Moore) stresses deep-seated grievances as a source of staunch civilian support for 
rebel groups.  These scholars, however, do not explore how factors that give rise to 
ardent civilian support for insurgents account for state-sponsored mass killing.  In this 
chapter, I theorize on the linkages between sources of rebels’ civilian support and 
extensive mass killing perpetrated by the government.  I suggest seven factors as 
potential predictors of mass killing during civil war: insurgent aim, external support for 
insurgents from their ethnic brethren and the government’s rivals, lootable resources, 
political and economic marginalization, and armed conflict history.   
 
3.1. Insurgent Aim 
Insurgent aim can be broadly categorized into secession and regime change.7  Insurgent 
groups may aim to dislodge the government from their territory and to institute self-
governance in the form of either an independent country or an autonomous region.  For 
                                                 
7
 I focus my attention on insurgent aim at the macro level.  At the micro level, rebels’ goals often pertain 
to the distribution of local political power and economic resources (e.g., Violence between Muslims and 
Christians in Nigeria and Indonesia).         
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example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Angolans and Mozambicans engaged in war against 
Portugal in a bid to achieve independence.  Kurdish insurgents aim to establish an 
independent state of Kurdistan comprising Kurdish territories in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria (e.g., PKK in Turkey) or greater autonomy within existing borders (e.g., KDP and 
PUK in Iraq) (Strakes, 2007; Finn, 2007).  Rebels may aim to overthrow the current 
government and seize political power.  For instance, communists or leftists in El 
Salvador, Greece, and the Philippines launched rebellion to usurp power from their anti-
communist governments.  In Chad, Lebanon, and South Africa, insurgent ethnic groups 
staged uprisings, aiming to subvert the rule by dominant groups.      
In secessionist war, violence tends to be localized.  In other words, the 
battlefields in secessionist war are restricted to certain remote regions over which 
ethnic minority insurgents want to exercise authority in the future.  The localization of 
violence might motivate secessionists to concentrate on local populations most of 
whom share ethnic ties with them, which makes it easier for the insurgents to solidify 
civilian support.  Appealing to common heritage or grievances and distributing a 
significant amount of resources to locals could help secessionist rebels garner civilian 
support.  In this situation, the government might judge that the ardent support for 
insurgents will foil strategies that do not involve extensive mass killing, such as 
disbursing material rewards and enforcing population transfer (resettlement).  
Therefore, embattled leaders might engage extensively in mass killing in an attempt to 
wipe out rebel support bases and thus to paralyze rebel combatants and stave off future 
insurgency.  The Second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) illustrates how secessionist war 
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begets relentless violence against civilians.  Although initially advocating the creation of 
a “new” united Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) sought 
the secession of southern Sudan (Sambanis, 2004; Thyne, 2007; Ali, Elbadawi & El-
Batahani, 2005).  The secessionist agenda incentivized SPLA/M leaders to focus on their 
ethnic brethren and rally support from them.  The insurgents capitalized on deep-seated 
grievances, such as religious persecution and economic discrimination, and nurtured 
nationalist sentiments (Ali, Elbadawi & El-Batahani, 2005; Thyne, 2007).  The solid 
support for the SPLA/M propelled the government to kill one to two million southern 
Sudanese in an attempt to cripple rebel combatants and forestall future insurgency 
(Harff, 2003; Thyne, 2007).       
In contrast, in a regime change war, rebel groups try to expand battlefields and 
to capture regions adjacent to the capital.  In order to prosecute the war effectively in 
broad areas and lay the foundation for future rule, these insurgents need to receive 
strong support from a wide range of civilian populations.  Rebel leaders, however, might 
have difficulty in constructing extensive civilian support systems.  It can be very 
cumbersome to convince highly diverse populations to converge around the insurgent 
cause.  Targeting a broad range of civilians can constrict the amount of resources that 
the rebels offer.  In this situation, the government might be able to curtail civilian 
support for insurgents by applying material or nonmaterial incentives.  As a result, 
combating insurgents who aim to seize power, the rulers might not have the incentive 
to perpetrate extensive mass killing as a strategy for destroying rebel support bases.  
The Contra war (1982-1990) in Nicaragua epitomizes how regime change war restrains 
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state-sponsored massive violence against civilians.  The Contra rebels strove to topple 
the Sandinista government without widespread civilian support.  Although sponsored by 
some segments of the society (e.g., former elites, the Catholic Church, Miskito Indians), 
the Contras failed to induce the majority of the population to join them because many 
Nicaraguans harbored bitter animosity toward the ousted Somoza regime (Valentino, 
Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Simon, 2007).  By contrast, the Sandinista government 
succeeded in mustering widespread support by implementing policies that aimed to 
redress social and economic inequalities, which inhibited embattled Sandinistas from 
orchestrating extensive mass killing (Simon, 2007).      
H1 (Insurgent aim): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive in secessionist war 
than in regime change war.     
Secessionist war 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regime change war 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Insurgent Goal and State-sponsored Mass Killing 
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3.2. External Support for Insurgents 
In civil war, actors are not necessarily restricted to insurgent groups and the 
government.  A civil war can elicit external intervention, becoming internationalized.  
Outside actors may intervene in the war on rebel’s side (Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch, 
Salehyan & Schultz, 2008; Regan, 2000 & 2002).  This external support assumes various 
forms.  Third party states favoring insurgency may carry out direct support or 
intervention, dispatching their own troops to fight alongside insurgents (Regan, 2000 & 
2002; Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008).  For instance, during the recent civil war in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda deployed their 
soldiers inside the Congolese territory to support Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) 
and Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) insurgents.  The Rwandan and 
Ugandan armies joined forces with these rebels and battled the Congolese army 
(Ndikumana & Emizet, 2005; Wilson, 2007a).  Insurgent-friendly states may exercise 
indirect support or intervention (Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008; 
Salehyan, 2009).  They may supply weapons, money, food, and other war materials to 
the insurgents.  The intervening states may help train rebel combatants, and allow 
insurgent groups to use their territories as safe havens (Salehyan, 2009 & 2007).  After 
initiating an armed struggle in 1961, the African National Congress (ANC) succeeded in 
obtaining significant support from various African states (Holland, 1990; Byman et al., 
2001).  Fighting against racism inspired these countries to sponsor the ANC.  Zambia 
channeled Soviet and Chinese weapons to ANC combatants.  The ANC also established 
its main political headquarters in Zambia (Rubenzer, 2007b).  Leaders of Angola and 
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Tanzania allowed the ANC to install military and non-military bases in their territories 
(Meli, 1988; Rubenzer, 2007b).  In addition, non-state actors such as diasporas or 
refugees may lend support to insurgents.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 
Sri Lanka, for example, fostered fundraising networks among Tamil communities 
residing in Western Europe, North America, and Australia (Horowitz & Jayamaha, 2007).  
It is estimated that Tamil diasporas in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia 
donated up to 1.5 million dollars a month to the LTTE rebels (Byman et al., 2001).   
The bulk of extant research on civil war intervention has addressed the effects of 
external support or intervention on civil war onset, duration, and outcomes (e.g., Regan, 
2000 & 2002; Gleditsch, 2007; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000).  Only a few scholars 
explored the relationship between external support and belligerents’ behavior during 
civil war.  Harff & Gurr (1998) identify increases in external support for politically active 
groups as an accelerator of genocide and politicide.  Weinstein (2007) argues that 
natural resources and external support make rebel groups less dependent on civilian 
support, which deprives the insurgents of the incentive to treat civilians well.  Thus, 
rebels with economic endowments tend to rule the civilian population through coercive 
measures (Weinstein, 2007).  Harff & Gurr, however, does not elaborate on the causal 
linkage between external support and geno/politicide.  Weinstein’s argument revolves 
around rebel violence, not state violence.  This indicates that the existing literature has 
not sufficiently tackled the linkage between external support for insurgents and state-
sponsored mass killing.  Here, I examine how external support for insurgents accounts 
for variation in the scale of mass killing.  Sources of external support are diverse.  
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Insurgent groups may receive support from their ethnoreligious brethren.  Rebels may 
obtain support from the government’s rivals.  Interveners may be major states or 
former colonial masters.  Different sources of external support might exercise different 
influences on variation in the extent of mass killing.  In this section, I consider rebels’ 
external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states 
and explain how these sources of external support can instigate state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing.   
Insurgent groups may obtain support from their ethnoreligious brethren.  For 
instance, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) insurgents garnered support from Uganda in 
which president Museveni was a Tutsi and Tutsis wielded significant political influence.  
Tutsi diasporas also sponsored the RPF (Asselin, St-Pierre & Carment, 2007; Prunier, 
1995).  In Afghanistan and Bosnia, insurgent groups rallied support from their Muslim 
brothers. Countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia supplied money and weapons to the 
insurgents and thousands of Muslim volunteers battled alongside the rebels.  Rebel 
groups may also receive support from the government’s rival states.  For example, when 
Jordan engaged in a war against the PLO in 1970, Syria, Jordan’s rival, intervened on the 
PLO side (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004).  Combating French colonialists, the Viet Minh 
guerillas gained support from China, France’s rival.   
Ethnoreligious and rival supports tend to be tenacious, which signifies that 
ethnoreligious brothers and the government’s rivals are not likely to reduce or withdraw 
their support for insurgents.  Blood or religious ties impose a sense of duty on 
intervening actors.  That is, the interveners believe that it is their obligation to uphold 
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their brothers’ struggle.  For instance, a sense of Jihad duty (Muslim’s duty of protecting 
Islam and other Muslims) accounts partly for why Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya have 
backed various Muslim insurgents around the world.  Furthermore, witnessing plights of 
those with the same ethnicity, domestic constituents in foreign states might urge their 
political leaders to intervene on the side of their brethren (Davis & Moore, 1997; 
Saideman, 1997).  Rivalry entails feelings of threat and hostility between external states 
and the conflict state (Goertz & Diehl, 2000).  Third party states engage in their rival’s 
war on the side of rebels in an attempt to debilitate the rival and gain some leverage 
(Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008).  Feelings of threat and hostility can make the 
interveners resolute and intransigent.  In other words, rival support for insurgents is not 
likely to abate or evaporate.   
Insurgents with external support might be able to rely less on civilians for 
intelligence, weapons, shelter, food, and other supplies.  Civilians, however, are still a 
valuable asset in that local youths who are familiar with battlefields are the backbone of 
rebel armies.  Even if foreign troops engage in combat on the rebel side, the insurgents 
cannot prosecute the war effectively without the locals.  External support might help 
insurgent groups build civilian support.  By capitalizing on external support, they can 
deliver the message that their brothers and/or enemy’s enemies consistently back 
them; therefore they are able to beat government forces.  Furthermore, foreign 
sponsors might monitor insurgent groups and constrain them from abusing civilians.  A 
sense of brotherhood could drive ethnoreligious interveners to regulate rebel leaders’ 
behavior.  Rival interveners calculate that their help could project image of rebels as 
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foreign puppets and thus antagonize civilian populations, which hampers rebel 
recruitment.  To assuage civilians’ animosity, the rival sponsors might urge insurgent 
leaders to treat civilians well.          
The rigidity of ethnoreligious and rival supports could make embattled rulers 
judge that it is very difficult to stop foreign actors from bolstering insurgencies.  In other 
words, diplomatic or military efforts to vitiate external support would be futile.  
Therefore, the government might turn its attention on civilian populations and massacre 
them.  Of course, this strategy runs the risk of increasing outside support for insurgents.  
Infuriated by the government’s flagrant behavior, external actors might intervene 
deeper in the war by dispatching (more) troops and/or channeling more munitions and 
supplies to the rebels.  Embattled rulers, however, could accept this risk, judging that 
without extensive mass killing, rebels would continue both to receive external support 
and to mobilize local youths, which could inflict defeat on the government.  By 
eliminating potential rebel soldiers (youths or even children), the government can wreak 
havoc on insurgent recruitment pool.  This can be detrimental to rebel groups because 
despite (increasing) foreign support, insurgents cannot conduct the war effectively 
without competent local fighters.8  In short, the destruction of the local recruitment 
pool can offset the increase of external support.  To justify their heinous action, the 
incumbents might take advantage of the ‘foreignness’ of rebel support.  Branding the 
                                                 
8
 Some military strategists emphasize the importance of manpower in war.  For instance, Mao (2000 [orig. 
1961]) claims that man is the basic element of guerilla war.  Man is more complex than military machines 
in that he or she possesses intelligence, emotions, and will.  Man’s qualities determine how well or poorly 
guerilla warfare is performed (Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]).   
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insurgents as foreign puppets could foment nationalistic sentiment and thus mitigate 
domestic opposition to the employment of extensive mass killing.   
H2a (Ethnoreligious support): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when 
insurgents receive support from their ethnoreligious brethren than when insurgents 
obtain non-ethnoreligious support or do not gain any external support.   
H2b (Rival support): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents 
receive support from the government’s rival states than when insurgents obtain non-
rival state support or does not gain any external support.   
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.2: External Support for Insurgents and State-sponsored Mass Killing 
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reliance on primary commodities increases the probability of civil war onset.  Fearon 
(2004) claims that rebels’ exploitation of contrabands such as diamonds, opium, or coca 
tends to prolong civil wars.  Ross (2004) tests various resource-conflict nexuses by 
analyzing thirteen civil wars and finds that various mechanisms are interposed between 
resource wealth and the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war.  The bulk of the 
existing literature, however, has not explored how rebels’ exploitation of natural 
resources affects the government’s behavior or strategies.  Weinstein (2007) contends 
that rebels with natural resources tend to depend less on civilian support, which can 
lead them to abuse civilian populations.  He, however, does not address how rebel 
violence exercises an influence on the government’s behavior.  In this section, I posit a 
theoretical argument linking lootable resources and the extent of state-sponsored mass 
killing.   
Insurgent groups can exploit lootable resources, such as diamonds, opium, and 
timber.  They extract or cultivate these resources, sell them in international markets, 
and generate huge profits.  For instance, during the Sierra Leone civil war (1991-2000), 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels engaged in the production of diamonds.  It is 
estimated that they earned at least thirty million dollars per year from the exploitation 
of diamonds.9  Insurgents can also delegate the development of lootable resources to 
multinational or local producers and collect ‘tax’ from them.  During the Liberian civil 
war (1989-1996), Charles Taylor who led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
rebel group conceded multinational corporations the right to produce timber in return 
                                                 
9
 http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm 
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for money and weapons.  The Oriental Timber Company that ran the largest logging 
business remunerated Taylor about three to five million dollars for control of the 1.6-
million-hectare forest area (United Nations, 2001; Wei, 2007).  Furthermore, some 
insurgent groups engage only in trafficking of lootable resources.  For example, 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgents in Turkey transported illicit narcotics produced 
in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan to European markets (Finn, 2007).  This activity 
brought a substantial amount of money to the PKK.10   
The exploitation of lootable resources is labor intensive in that it does not 
require technology, a skilled workforce, or a large amount of capital (Snyder & Bhavnani, 
2005).  To produce or smuggle these resources, rebel groups can take advantage of 
civilian populations.  In other words, civilians can provide a labor force to the insurgents.  
Rebel leaders also enlist combatants from among local youths.  This indicates that 
resource-rich insurgents still need the civilian population, even though they rely less on 
civilians for money, food, and other supplies.  Resource wealth might restrain rebel 
groups from incentivizing civilians.  Exploiting lootable resources easily generates huge 
revenues, which could spoil the rebel leadership.  That is, insurgent leaders become 
greedy and prioritize their own affluence.  Therefore, the rebels might be reluctant or 
unwilling to disburse resource wealth to civilians.  Instead, to mobilize labor force and 
combatants, resource-rich insurgents resort to coercion, abusing civilian populations.  
Furthermore, to maximize resource profits, insurgent leaders frequently abstain from 
regulating multinational companies and local producers, which paves the way for 
                                                 
10
 http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/mfa-t-pkk.htm 
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rampant civilian abuses.  The rebels’ outrageous behavior can spawn deep resentment 
among civilians residing in rebels’ territories.  In Sierra Leone, for instance, RUF leaders 
who exploited diamonds and timber and amassed a vast fortune monopolized their 
wealth and perpetrated flagrant human rights abuses, such as summary execution, 
torture, and the amputation of limbs, which provoked widespread animosity toward the 
RUF (Nimbus, 2003; Keen, 2005).  The presence of disaffected civilians might make 
embattled rulers conclude that it is possible to stimulate mass defection to the 
government by offering tangible benefits, which helps to subdue the insurgency.  The 
possibility of triggering mass civilian defection could rid the government of the incentive 
to eradicate the civilian population.    
H3 (Lootable resources): State-sponsored mass killing is less extensive when rebels 
exploit lootable resources than when rebels do not exploit these resources.   
    
      
  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Lootable Resources and State-sponsored Mass Killing 
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3.4. Grievances 
Grievance has been emphasized as the primary cause of violence or war.  For instance, 
Fanon (2004 [orig. 1961]), an influential revolutionary theorist, insists that political, 
economic, and cultural oppression by racist colonial authorities enrages colonized 
populations, which steers them to violence.  Violence is a means of physical and 
psychological liberation.  By unleashing violence, aggrieved natives can not only subvert 
colonial rule and achieve physical freedom, but also obliterate their inferiority complex 
and servile attitude implanted by colonial masters (Fanon, 2004; 2008).  Galtung (1969; 
1990) also addresses grievance in the form of structural violence.  Structural violence 
signifies that a certain social structure or institution inflicts damage on people by 
preventing them from meeting their basic needs or developing their potentials (e.g., 
racism, ethnocentrism, classism) (Galtung, 1969).  Unequal power distribution and social 
injustice are embedded in the concept of structural violence.  Galtung (1969; 1990) 
contends that structural violence often kindles direct violence, such as racial clashes, 
terrorism, war, and genocide.  In addition, Gurr constructs the linkage between 
grievance and violent conflict.  He (1970; 1993; & Moore, 1997) stresses relative 
deprivation or grievance as the primary cause of rebellion.  A communal or political 
group harbors a deep sense of relative deprivation or grievance when the government 
perpetrates systematic discrimination and repression against the group members.  
Profound grievances prompt the disaffected group to gravitate toward insurrection 
(Gurr, 1970; 1993; & Moore, 1997).     
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The extant literature focuses on grievance as a predictor of civil war onset.  
Grievance, however, may account for not only the outset of civil war, but also the 
government’s behavior or strategies during the war.  Harff & Gurr (1998) posit that 
economic hardship that is relevant to grievance could increase the risk of 
geno/politicide.  Other factors pertinent to grievance, however, have not been 
examined.  Furthermore, there are few studies on grievance and mass killing in the 
context of civil war.  In this section, I fill these voids by identifying diverse sources of 
grievances and investigating how they can generate state-sponsored extensive mass 
killing during civil war.  The gist of my argument is that severe political and economic 
marginalization and the history of intense armed conflict breed or exacerbate 
grievances and thus yield civilian support for insurgents, which can propel embattled 
rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing as a strategy for defeating rebel combatants 
and staving off future insurgency.       
 
3.4.1. Political Marginalization 
During civil war, embattled rulers might marginalize the majority of or a certain segment 
of their citizens from political process.  Dictators often enforce their favorite policies and 
suppress political rights.  Political marginalization is not confined to autocratic rulers.  
Some democratic leaders have disfranchised those whom they treat as second-class 
citizens or indigenous populations in their colonies.  Democratic Israel, for instance, has 
severely repressed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Democratic France 
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restricted political rights of native populations in its colonies, such as Algeria, 
Madagascar, and Vietnam.   
Governments’ attempts to impose severe political marginalization spawn or 
exacerbate grievances among target populations.  This could urge the victims to accept 
the risk of physical harm and join an insurgency to achieve political liberation.  In other 
words, political grievance enables rebel leaders to muster civilian support.  Civilian 
supporters supply insurgent groups with young recruits, shelter, financial resources, and 
information pertaining to government troops, which helps the rebels prosecute the war 
effectively.    
To drive a wedge between aggrieved citizens and insurgent combatants, 
incumbent rulers might ponder or implement the distribution of pecuniary rewards.  
Applying material incentives, however, can fail to stimulate mass defection to the 
government because civilians enraged by severe political marginalization could perceive 
that the government is attempting to buy them off and is thus insulting them.  
Simultaneously, these civilians might judge that if they accept the government’s offer, 
they will keep suffering, which deters them from defecting to the government side.  
Therefore, combating insurgents who acquire staunch civilian support, the government 
has an incentive to engineer extensive mass killing.  This strategy wipes out rebels’ 
civilian support bases, thus helping to suppress the insurrection.  Further, by massacring 
noncombatants including youths, children, and women, incumbent rulers can fracture 
the future recruitment pool and ward off future insurgency.  During the first civil war in 
Somalia (1988-91), Said Barre who had imposed a despotic rule revolving around his 
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Marehan clan sought to maintain the political status quo.  He continued to exclude Isaaq, 
Hawiye, Majerteen, and other clans from politics and to suppress their political rights 
(Wilson, 2007b; Adam, 1995).  This policy antagonized members of marginalized clans 
further, which propelled them to back various insurgent groups, such as the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC), and the Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM).11  Solid civilian support for the rebels drove Barre to massacre enemy 
clan members.  His military and paramilitary forces not only shot and bombed those 
civilians, but also denied them water and food by destroying water reservoirs and 
grazing lands (Metz, 1992; Adam, 1995).  It is estimated that 50,000-60,000 citizens died 
as a result of the government’s brutal campaigns (Valentino, 2004).  By orchestrating 
extensive mass killing, Barre attempted not only to cripple the insurgent forces but also 
to forestall insurgency from recurring.          
H4 (Political marginalization): The more severe political marginalization is, the more 
extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.  
 
3.4.2. Economic Marginalization 
During civil war, state leaders might marginalize the majority of or a certain segment of 
their citizens in terms of economic well-being.  While themselves enjoying affluence, a 
small group of elites may not disburse wealth to the populations plagued by the war.  
                                                 
11
 The Somali National Movement (SNM) consisted of Isaaq clan members and operated in northern 
Somalia (Wilson, 2007b; Sambanis, 2004).  The United Somali Congress (USC) was composed of Hawiye 
clan members and combated government forces in central and southern Somalia including Mogadishu.  
The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) was formed by Ogaden clan soldiers and officers who defected 
from Barre’s army and active in southern Somalia (Wilson, 2007b; Sambanis, 2004).   
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The government may even deny its citizens the opportunity to enhance their economic 
status.  Severe economic marginalization can prompt the pauperized to support violent 
activities that aim to overthrow the established political system (Fanon, 2004; Gurr, 
1970).12   The wretched living conditions breed or exacerbate grievances on which 
insurgent leaders can capitalize to rally public support for their actions.  Under this 
circumstance, the aggrieved citizens might be willing to jeopardize their lives and back 
insurgent groups, anticipating that the rebels will change the economic status quo 
(Walter, 2004).  To sever disaffected civilians from rebel combatants, state leaders 
might consider or employ coercive measures that do not involve extensive mass killing, 
such as forced relocation, massive troop deployment, and close surveillance.  This 
coercion, however, can antagonize the civilians further and thus increase support for 
insurgents.  Therefore, the government might perpetrate extensive mass killing in an 
attempt to neutralize insurgent combatants and to prevent the rebellion from resurging 
in the future.   
The Salvadoran civil war (1979-1992) epitomizes the effect of severe economic 
marginalization on state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  Since the colonial period, a 
small group of ruling elites had retained a large portion of fertile land and monopolized 
profits generated by the export of coffee.  The government had refused the demand for 
redistributing economic resources and improving working conditions (Rosenblum, 2007; 
Talentino, 1999).  Leaders’ greed for wealth had engendered profound economic 
                                                 
12
 Fanon analyzes violence in the context of colonialism.  He claims that severe economic exploitation 
under colonial rule impels the colonized to unleash violence against colonialists. 
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inequality and impoverished the majority of Salvadorans.  Severe economic 
marginalization continued unabated during civil war.  After the war erupted in 1979, the 
government sought to execute land reform in a bid to mitigate poverty and restrain 
peasants from supporting Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels.  
Wealthy landowners, however, impeded the implementation of land redistribution, thus 
the reform eventually foundered (Rosenblum, 2007).  Persistent economic 
marginalization exacerbated grievances, which produced ardent civilian support for the 
insurgents.  Combating popular FMLN guerillas, Salvadoran rulers projected massive 
violence against their own populations.  The government’s relentless campaign claimed 
the lives of 40,000-70,000 civilians (Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003).   
H5 (Economic marginalization): The more severe economic marginalization is, the more 
extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.   
 
3.4.3. History of Armed Conflict 
   
Belligerents in civil wars sometimes have history of armed conflict against one another.  
That is, prior to the current war, the rebel side may have engaged in armed conflict 
against the government.  A history of intense armed conflict will help insurgents build 
civilian support.  By evoking prior intense violence, they are able to foment deep 
animosity toward the government and agitate the population for the purposes of 
revenge or the accomplishment of their ‘unachieved’ goals.  The profound hostility 
provoked by the prior violence can breed or exacerbate grievances against the status 
quo among populations who supported the insurgent side during the previous conflict.  
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Hence, these citizens rally around the rebel leadership.  Confronting insurgents who 
garner strong civilian support, state leaders calculate that offering material incentives 
and resorting to ‘non-mass killing’ coercion would not facilitate mass civilian defection 
to the government.  This can propel the rulers to commit extensive mass killing as a 
strategy aimed at both crushing insurgent forces and warding off future rebellions.   
The Madagascan War of Independence (1947-1948) illustrates how a history of 
intense armed conflict produces extensive mass killing at the hand of embattled rulers.  
During the war, Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renovation (MDRM) insurgents 
capitalized on previous wars against France to elicit support from indigenous 
populations (Aldrich, 1996; Thompson & Adloff, 1965).  In the late 19th century, France 
attempted to conquer Madagascar in which the Merina dynasty reigned.  Queen 
Ranavalona III and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony vehemently resisted French troops, 
but France ultimately won the war, deposed the Merina rulers, and colonized 
Madagascar (Aldrich, 1996).  MDRM leaders such as Joseph Raseta and Joseph 
Ravoahangy evoked bitter memory of the French invasion and subsequent abolition of 
the Merina dynasty (Aldrich, 1996; Thompson & Adloff, 1965).  By doing that, the 
insurgent leadership attempted to instigate profound resentment toward the French 
and generate grievances against the colonial rule.  This contributed to solid civilian 
support for insurgents, which prompted French rulers to massacre indigenous 
populations.  It is estimated that 10,000 – 80,000 Madagascan civilians were killed by 
French forces (White, 2005; Aldrich, 1996).   
61 
 
H6 (History of armed conflict): The more intense previous armed conflict is, the more 
extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.  
 
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
Figure 3.4: Grievances and State-sponsored Mass Killing 
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external support, 3) state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents 
receive support from the government’s rival states than when insurgents obtain non-
rival state support or do not acquire any foreign support, 4) state-sponsored mass killing 
is less extensive when rebels exploit lootable resources than when rebels do not exploit 
these resources, 5) the more severe political marginalization is, the more extensive 
state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is, 6) the more severe economic 
marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is, 
and 7) the more intense previous armed conflict is, the more extensive state-sponsored 
mass killing during civil war is (See Table 3.1 for summary.).   
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4 Research Design 
I theorize on the linkage between factors that affect civilian support for insurgents and 
the extent of state-sponsored mass killing.  I hypothesize that secessionist war, 
insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s 
rival states, severe political and economic marginalization, and history of intense armed 
conflict are likely to trigger extensive mass killing at the hands of embattled rulers, 
whereas rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain extensive mass 
killing.  In this chapter, I discuss how I operationalize my variables and test my 
hypotheses.  
 
4.1. Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis in my dissertation is civil war.  The spatial domain covers all major 
regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Americas, and Europe) and the temporal domain 
spans 1945 to 2007.   
To identify civil wars, I employed Correlates of War (COW) database, which was 
updated in 2010.  COW defines civil war as ‘any armed conflict that involves (1) military 
action internal to the metropole, (2) the active participation of the national government, 
(3) effective resistance by both sides, and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle deaths 
during each year of the war’ (Small & Singer, 1982; Sarkees, 2000; Sarkees & Wayman, 
2010).  COW distinguishes civil war from extrastate war.  According to COW, extrastate 
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war refers to ‘war between a member of the system and a colony, dependency, or 
protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located at some geographical 
distance from the given system member’s central government’ (Small & Singer, 1982; 
Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Some scholars, however, point out that the distinction 
between civil war and extrastate war is murky.  Gleditsch (2004) argues that judging 
whether a war occurs within or outside the core territory of a state is subjective.  For 
example, France insisted that its colonies were an integral part of France.  Based on this 
view, one may consider anti-colonial wars against France as wars inside the French 
empire or the core territory of France (Gleditsch, 2004).  Furthermore, colonialism is not 
restricted to aggression and brutal rule by Western states.  Secessionists in the non-
Western world tend to perceive themselves as the colonized and the central 
government as colonizer.  For example, Eritrean and Somali insurgents blamed the 
Ethiopian government for seeking ‘black’ colonialism, suppressing their political rights 
and ruining their economy and culture.  The Polisario Front charges that after Spain’s 
withdrawal, Morocco has attempted to colonize Western Sahara.  This claim was 
endorsed by the Organization of African Unity (currently the African Union) (Shelly, 
2004; Jensen, 2005).  Therefore, extrastate war can be categorized as civil war or, more 
narrowly, secessionist war.  Coinciding with Gleditsch, Fearon and Laitin (2003) count 
anti-colonial wars as civil wars within the colonial empire.  They remark that excluding 
anti-colonial wars would be similar to dropping secessionist wars, such as war in 
Chechnya (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  Taking into account that the distinction between civil 
65 
 
war and extrastate war blurs, I included anti-colonial wars13 in the list of civil wars.  For a 
robustness check, I will also analyze civil wars without anti-colonial wars.      
COW lists 196 civil and extrastate wars from 1945 to 2007 and records many 
cases of multiple wars in one country.  For some multiple wars, it is very difficult to 
estimate the number of intentional civilian deaths respectively.  For instance, COW 
divided complex violence in Lebanon that raged in the 1970s and 1980s into four civil 
wars (1975-1976, 1978, 1983-1984, and 1989-1990).  Although this classification is 
reasonable, secondary sources suggest only fatalities of the entire war period (1975-
1990) and give little clue on the number of deaths in each war.  To address this problem, 
I have no alternative but to merge separate civil wars in a country if 1) the wars had the 
same belligerents fighting over the same agenda and 2) information on civilian fatalities 
is not available for each war.14  Furthermore, I dropped the Afghan Resistance of 2001-
present and the Iraqi Resistance of 2003-present because the number of deaths in these 
                                                 
13
 Extrastate war consists of anti-colonial war and imperial war.  Anti-colonial war is defined as war 
occurring in colonies between colonial masters and independence movements.  The adversary in this war 
was ‘already a colony, dependency, or a protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located 
at some geographical distance from the given system member, or at least peripheral to its center of 
government’ (Sarkees, 2000: 121).  Imperial war erupts when a member of the international system 
mobilizes military forces to colonize territories that are not ruled by another member and faces violent 
resistance from the indigenous population in these territories.  Imperial war involves an adversary that 
‘was an independent political entity, that was seeking to maintain that independence, and that did not 
qualify as a member of the interstate system’ (Sarkees, 2000: 121).     
  
14
 I combined separate wars in Afghanistan (1978, 1978-1980, 1980-1989), Angola (1976-1991, 1992-
1994), Burundi (1993-1998, 2001-2003), Cambodia (1979-1989, 1989-1991), Chad (1980-1984, 1989-
1990), China (1967, 1967-1968), Ethiopia vs. Eritreans (1972-1974, 1975-1978, 1982-1991), Ethiopia vs. 
Somalis (1976-1977, 1978-1980), Guatemala (1966-1968, 1970-1971), Indonesia vs. West Papuans (1965-
1969, 1976-1978), Indonesia vs. East Timor (1976-1976, 1976-1979), Iraq (1961-1963, 1965-1966, 1969-
1970, 1974-1975), Laos (1960-1962, 1963-1968, 1968-1973), Lebanon (1975-1976, 1978, 1983-1984, 
1989-1990), Liberia (1992-1995, 1996), Myanmar (1948-1951, 1958-1960), Nepal (2001-2003, 2003-2006), 
Nigeria (1999-2000, 2004), Philippines (2000-2001, 2003, 2005-2006), Rwanda (1997-1998, 2001), Sierra 
Leone (1991-1996, 1998-2000), Turkey (1984-1986, 1991-1999, 1991-1992, 1997), and Yemen (2004-2005, 
2007).  
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ongoing wars keeps changing.  Regarding extrastate war, the Sino-Tibetan War of 1950 
and the Indo-Hyderabad War of 1948 are not anti-colonial but imperial, thus I excluded 
them.15  Therefore, the number of civil wars included in my dataset boils down to 157 
(Appendix). 
 
4.2. Dependent Variable       
My dependent variable is the extent of state-sponsored mass killing, defined as the 
deliberate killing of a large number of noncombatants or civilians perpetrated by the 
government.  I evaluated severity of mass killing by using the number of intentional 
civilian deaths.  For some civil wars, experts (e.g., Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003; Rummel, 
1997b; Eck & Hultman, 2007) estimated the number or range of intentional civilian 
deaths over the duration of war and in many cases, the numbers or ranges converge 
(e.g., civil war in Rwanda (1994), civil war in Pakistan (1971)).  For other wars, I found 
only information on total civilian deaths or total civilian plus military deaths, from which 
I inferred the range of intentional civilian deaths.  At first, I conjectured how many 
civilian deaths were intentional.16  If I locate any evidence of massacres, indiscriminate 
violence, or egregious human rights violations, I consider 50% of the deaths as 
                                                 
15
 The Indo-Hyderabad war of 1948 and the Sino-Tibetan war of 1950 are imperial because India and 
China invaded and conquered Hyderabad and Tibet whose independence had not been recognized by the 
international community.   
16
 If only information on total deaths is available, I surmise how many deaths are civilian.  If sources state 
that civilians account for ‘most or many’ fatalities, I consider 75% of the total deaths as civilian.  If sources 
provide little clue on the proportion of civilian deaths, I consider 50% of the total deaths as civilian.   
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intentional.17  Otherwise, the number of intentional deaths is zero.  After estimating the 
scale of intentional deaths, I judged how many fatalities the government holds 
accountable for.  Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) claim that government forces 
are more likely to commit mass killing than insurgent combatants.  Some rebel groups, 
however, did project massive violence against civilian populations (e.g., RENAMO in 
Mozambique, RUF in Sierra Leone, communist insurgents in China).  If I do not find any 
evidence of rebels’ atrocities, I posit that the government holds responsible for all 
intentional deaths.  If there is evidence of both government and insurgent atrocities, 
50% of all intentional deaths are attributed to the government.  With evidence of only 
rebel violence, I suppose that the government does not hold accountable for any 
intentional deaths.  To infer the range of intentional civilian deaths, I consulted 
secondary sources, such as White 2005, Sambanis 2004, Bercovitch & Fretter 2004, 
DeRouen Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007, and Collier & Sambanis (eds) 2005.  
   
4.3. Independent Variables 
4.3.1. Insurgent Aim 
Insurgent aim can be broadly categorized into secession and regime change.  Rebel 
groups may aim to eject the government from their home territory and achieve 
independence or greater autonomy.  Insurgents may aim to topple the current 
government and capture political power.  Secessionist war is coded as one (1) and 
                                                 
17
 I set the 50% criterion because during war, military operations often cause unintentional civilian deaths 
(collateral damage).        
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regime change war as zero (0).  To judge what goal rebel groups pursued, I used the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which contains information on what warring parties 
are (or claim to be) fighting over (UCDP/PRIO, 2009).  For wars that this database does 
not address, I evaluated insurgent aim by relying on Ploughshares’ Armed Conflicts 
Report.  This source categorizes types of armed conflict into state control and state 
formation.  State control wars revolve around ‘struggles for control of the governing 
apparatus of the state’ and state formation wars ‘center on the form or shape of the 
state itself and generally involve particular regions of a country fighting for a greater 
measure of autonomy or for outright secession’ (Ploughshares, 2010).               
 
4.3.2. External Support 
I posit that insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren 
(ethnoreligious support) and the government’s rival states (rival support) can propel 
embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing.  To assess whether rebel groups 
received external support and, if so, to identify sources of this support, I consulted the 
Non-State Actor (NSA) data compiled by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).  
This dataset contains information on both state and non-state support for insurgencies.  
Rebel support is ethnoreligious if insurgent groups share ethnoreligious heritage with 
their patrons.  Ethnicity encompasses a wide range of physical and cultural attributes, 
such as common ancestry, history, religion, language, kinship, shared territory, 
nationality, and physical appearance (Horowitz, 2000; Smith, 1987).  Rwanda’s support 
for Tutsi RCD rebels in the Congo (Kinshasa), African states’ support for ANC in South 
69 
 
Africa, and Iran’s support for Shia insurgents in Iraq epitomize ethnoreligious support.  
Ethnoreligious support is not restricted to states.  Non-state actors such as diasporas, 
refugees, or foreign volunteers can sponsor rebel groups.  During the Kosovo war, for 
instance, Albanian diasporas bankrolled Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgents and 
volunteers from Muslim countries fought alongside the rebels.  I assigned a 1 to a civil 
war in which insurgents obtained external support from their ethnoreligious brethren 
and a 0 to a civil war in which insurgents did not receive this kind of support.   
To determine whether foreign states that buttressed insurgency were the 
government’s rival, I utilized Klein, Goertz, & Diehl’s 2006 rivalry dataset.  Enduring 
rivals experienced three or more militarized interstate disputes (MID).  Rivalry starts 
from the initiation of the first dispute and ends in 10-15 years after the termination of 
the last dispute (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006).  For rivalries that emerge after the start of 
war, it is possible for external support to engender a rivalry relationship.  In order to 
mitigate this endogeneity problem, I considered rivalries that arose before war or in two 
or less years after the initiation of war.  One (1) is coded if the government engaging in 
civil war had a rivalry relationship with foreign rebel supporters and zero (0) is coded 
otherwise.   
For civil wars that the NSA dataset does not cover, I judged the presence or 
absence of external support by using Regan’s 2002 intervention dataset.  For civil wars 
in which foreigners intervened on the rebel side, I identified sponsors and evaluated 
whether they shared ethnoreligious heritages with the insurgents and they were the 
government’s rival states.  To identify rebel supporters, I referred to multiple sources 
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including Bercovitch & Fretter 2004, Brogan 1998, Collier & Sambanis (eds) 2005, and 
DeRouen, Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007. 
 
4.3.3. Lootable Resources 
I hypothesize that rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain state-
sponsored extensive mass killing.  Lootable resources are defined as natural resources 
that ‘have low economic barriers to entry and can be profitably exploited by small-scale 
artisans’ (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005: 568).  In other words, lootable resources are 
exploited with little cost, and with huge profits.  These resources encompass mineral 
resources (e.g., alluvial diamonds, gemstones, gold), agricultural resources (e.g., opium, 
coca, cocoa), animal products (e.g., ivory, game meat), and timber.  One (1) is coded if 
rebels exploited lootable resources and zero (0) if not.  There are two forms of resource 
exploitation.  Insurgent groups may engage in both production and smuggling of 
lootable resources (e.g., New Forces (FN)’ exploitation of cocoa and diamonds in Ivory 
Coast).  Rebels may not produce resources but engage in the trafficking of the resources 
(e.g., drug trade operated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey).  To 
determine whether insurgents exploited lootable resources or not, I used various 
sources.  I referred to Fearon’s (2004) indicator of contraband financing of rebels, which 
shows whether rebels gained access to funds from opium, diamonds, or coca.  Because 
the Fearon indicator is confined to these three resources, I also consulted Collier & 
Sambanis (eds) 2005, DeRouen, Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007, news articles, and Global Witness 
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reports to find out whether insurgent groups exploited resources other than diamonds, 
opium, and coca.   
 
4.3.4. Grievances 
Independent variables pertaining to grievances consist of political marginalization, 
economic marginalization, and history of armed conflict.  I claim that severe political and 
economic marginalization and previous intense conflict breed or exacerbate grievances 
and thus engender civilian support for insurgents, which can prompt embattled rulers to 
massacre civilian populations.  To gauge variation in political marginalization, I 
employed the political competition score from the Polity IV dataset (version 2007).  The 
political competition score combines ‘the degree of institutionalization or regulation of 
political competition and the extent of government restriction on political competition’ 
and ranges from 1 (suppressed) to 10 (institutionalized open electoral) (Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2009).  Because my dataset is not longitudinal but cross-sectional, I recorded 
the score of the first year of a war.18  This coding rule does not take into account the 
possibility of significant improvement or deterioration of political environment over the 
duration of war, but in most civil wars, the scores do not change much.19  The political 
competition indicator, however, does not cover pre-independence years of Third World 
                                                 
18
 For some civil wars, the score of the first year is -66 (interruption period), -77 (interregnum period), or -
88 (transition period) (e.g., the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990, the Somalia War of 1991-1997).  I 
addressed these cases by using the score of t-1 (one year before the start of war) or a score closest to the 
start year if the score of t-1 is -66, -77, or -88.   
19
 Some civil wars manifest sharp score changes.  For instance, over the duration of the Second Sudanese 
war, the political competition score is 1 for 1983-1984, 6 for 1986-1988, 1 for 1989-2001, 2 for 2002-2004, 
and 3 for 2005.  Although the scores fluctuate significantly in the 1980s, most of the conflict years record 
1 or 2.   
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countries.  The scores of European colonial states in those years are not adequate for 
anti-colonial wars, because these states guaranteed political rights of their own citizens, 
but disfranchised indigenous populations in their colonies.  Therefore, I determined the 
values of political competition for anti-colonial wars against Europeans, based on the 
Polity IV score adjusted to the empire by Fearon & Laitin (2003).  The Fearon & Laitin 
score demonstrates how democratic or autocratic the colonial rule was and thus 
captures the political grievance of the colonized.  Because the colonial authority 
disfranchises native populations and restricts their political rights, the political 
competition score for European colonies is either 1 (suppressed) or 2 (restricted).  I 
equated 1 with the Fearon & Laitin scores of -10 to -6 and 2 with the scores greater than 
-6.   
To operationalize economic marginalization, I utilized GDP per capita.   This 
indicator captures the level of economic underdevelopment or poverty in a country and 
thus reflects economic marginalization.  GDP per capita data are available and reliable 
for most countries.  I derived the GDP data from Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade and GDP 
dataset (5.0 beta).  Because of the cross-sectional analysis, I reported the value of the 
first year of a war.  Gleditsch did not document GDP per capita for pre-independence 
years of Third World countries.  For anti-colonial wars, applying the GDP of European 
colonial states for those years ignores that these states systematically exploited and 
pauperized their colonial subjects in order to enrich their own citizens.  Thus, I inserted 
the GDP of independence years of colonies into anti-colonial wars against Europeans 
because these values reflect the legacy of colonialism.  Furthermore, because the 
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temporal domain of Gleditsch’s dataset spans 1950 to 2004, I imputed GDP of 1950 to 
wars that broke out before 1950.       
History of armed conflict signifies that prior to the current war, belligerents had 
engaged in armed conflict against one another.  The insurgent side may have combated 
the government not long before the current war.  For example, secular Republicans and 
conservative Royalists, contenders of the Yemeni war of 1962-1969, waged a war 
against each other in 1948.  Armed conflict(s) may have erupted long before the current 
war.  Prior to the Rhodesian War of 1972-1979 (the Second Chimurenga), black Africans 
composed mainly of Shonas and Ndebeles staged an uprising against white settlers in 
1896 (the First Chimurenga).  I confined the temporal domain of previous armed conflict 
to the 19th century and thereafter, which conforms to COW’s domain (1816-2007).  I 
operationalized history of armed conflict in an ordinal manner.  Intense previous conflict 
is coded as 2, minor conflict is coded as 1, and no conflict is coded as 0.  Intense armed 
conflict results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year and minor armed conflict 
results in at least 25 battle deaths but less than 1,000.20  Armed conflict does not 
require the involvement of government.  In other words, both belligerents can be non-
state actors (e.g., the 1959 conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda under Belgian 
colonial rule).  The absence of violence should be interposed between the end of 
previous armed conflict and the start of current war.  Thus, I do not consider minor 
                                                 
20
 These thresholds correspond to UCDP/PRIO criteria for distinguishing war from minor conflict.  For 
further information, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, 
& Håvard Strand. 2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39 (5): 
615-37; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook (Version 4-2009) 
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm>. 
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armed conflict that escalates into war as previous armed conflict.  In the Eritrean region 
of Ethiopia, for instance, minor armed conflict that started in the 1960s culminated in 
war in 1972 (Sambanis, 2004; Gleditsch et al., 2002).  Because this conflict is an 
extension of the 1972 war and history of conflict does not exist before the 1960s, I 
assigned a 0 to the Eritrean War of Independence.  I examined whether belligerents had 
engaged in armed conflict prior to the current war and assessed the intensity of 
previous conflicts by consulting COW’s list of wars, UCDP/PRIO database, Rummel 
1997b, and White 2005.  I relied on COW to find out whether contending parties had 
waged an intense armed conflict against each other.  Because COW does not address 
armed conflicts that yielded less than 1,000 battle-related deaths, I employed 
UCDP/PRIO database to inspect whether belligerents had engaged in minor armed 
conflict prior to the current war.  UCDP/PRIO, however, deals only with post-1945 
conflicts.  Thus, I consulted Rummel 1997b and White 2005 to investigate whether 
contenders had been embroiled in minor armed conflict before 1945.     
 
4.4. Control Variables                    
Factors other than independent variables may account for variation in mass killing 
perpetrated by the government.  I selected level of civilian support, ethnic polarization, 
state military capacity, population size, and the cold war as control variables.  
Incorporating these variables into the statistical equation helps to isolate the effect of 
my independent variables on variation in mass killing.  I argue that factors or contexts 
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that generate strong civilian support for insurgents can trigger state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing.  To verify the relationship between rebels’ civilian support and 
mass killing, I controlled for the level of civilian support. The data for this level come 
from Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004.  Level of civilian support is assigned a 1 if a 
rebel group enjoyed a high level of civilian support, defined as having more than 
100,000 active supporters, and is assigned a 0 if the rebel group enjoyed a low level of 
support (having less than 100,000 supporters) (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 
390-391).  For civil wars that these scholars did not address, I evaluated the level of 
insurgents’ civilian support by consulting multiple qualitative sources.21  These sources 
do not provide information on the number of rebel supporters, but hint whether 
insurgent groups rallied civilian support.  I coded 1 only when I detected information 
that indicates insurgents’ high popularity (e.g., increase of the number of rebel 
combatants, mass protests in support of insurgents).      
I also controlled for ethnic polarization.  Some scholars have emphasized sharp 
ethnic divisions as the main cause of massive violence unleashed by state.  For example, 
Kuper (1981) argues that deep ethnic cleavages are likely to produce genocide.  
Kaufmann (1996) contends that states embroiled in ethnic conflict tend to perpetrate 
atrocities.  As a proxy for ethnic polarization, I employed the ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) index from Fearon & Laitin 2003, which spans 1945 or year of 
independence to 1999.  This indicator exhibits the probability that two people chosen at 
                                                 
21
 Sources include Bercovitch & Fretter 2004, DeRouen Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007, Collier & Sambanis (eds) 
2005, Sambanis 2004, Ploughshares’ Armed Conflict Report 2010, and BBC.   
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random are from different ethnic groups, ranging from 0 (highly homogeneous) to 1 
(highly heterogeneous) (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  The ELF value of a country is constant 
throughout years, which makes me infer that a country’s score can be extended to post-
1999 years and pre-independence years.           
State military capacity can affect variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that states with inferior military capacity are likely to 
wreak havoc on civilians because weak states are not able to distinguish combatants 
from non-combatants nor to rein in local commanders who are eager to pillage.  I 
assessed state military capacity by using the total number of military personnel in a 
country, percentage of mountains in regions affected by war, and distance between a 
war zone and the capital.  Geographical features such as mountains and distance can 
represent state military capacity in that if conflict areas are mountainous and/or far 
from the capital, the state is not likely to project its military force effectively (Buhaug, 
Gates, & Lujala, 2009).  I acquired the data for troop size from COW’s National Material 
Capabilities (NMC version 4.0) and for mountains and distances (logged) from Buhaug, 
Gates, & Lujala (BGL) 2009.  NMC 4.0 documents the total number of ‘active, regular 
military units of the land, naval, and air components’ in a country, excluding irregular 
forces such as civil defense units and gendarmerie (COW, 2010).  Buhaug, Gates, & 
Lujala employed GIS tools to generate percentage of mountains in conflict zones.  They 
estimated the distance between the conflict center and the capital by using a geodesic 
distance calculator (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009).  The BGL dataset does not contain 
information germane to 31 civil wars that UCDP/PRIO database does not cover.  To fill in 
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mountain values for these wars, I relied on Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) indicator of 
percentage of mountainous terrain in a country.  Regarding distance, I recorded 0 if 
insurgents aim at toppling the government and seizing political power, because regime 
change war tends to engulf the entire country.  For a secessionist war, I located the 
major city of conflict zones and calculated the geodesic distance between the major 
conflict city and the capital.22   
During war, countries with large populations might have a large number of 
civilian fatalities (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Thus, I controlled for 
population size (logged), the data for which is derived from Valentino, Huth, & Balch-
Lindsay 2004.  For wars that this dataset does not address, I utilized COW’s National 
Material Capabilities (NMC version 4.0) for population data.  In addition, I controlled for 
the Cold War.  One may argue that after the end of the Cold War, chauvinistic 
ethnonationalism emerged and fueled conflicts among ethnic groups in the Third World 
from which superpowers retreated.  Some of these conflicts produced extensive mass 
killing without triggering viable interventions from the international community.  I 
created a dummy variable coded 1 for civil wars that occurred during the Cold War 
(1945-89) and 0 for those that erupted after the Cold War.23         
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 I found a geodesic distance calculator at http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/latlong-vincenty.html. 
23
 I determined 1989 as the final year of the Cold War because the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
symbolizes the end of the Cold War.       
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4.5. Research Methods 
To verify my theoretical model, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Large-N statistical analysis and comparative case studies complement each other, thus 
employing both ensures credibility of outcomes.  Quantitative studies address all 
observations within a specific temporal and spatial domain, which eliminates selection 
bias (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).  Further, statistical analysis can help to detect the 
general dynamics of a given phenomenon.  Qualitative studies scrutinize a few selected 
cases, thus helping to capture intervening processes interposed between independent 
and dependent variables (Tarrow, 2004; Van Evera, 1997).  Therefore, case studies 
provide more nuanced insights into findings generated by quantitative investigation 
(Tarrow, 2004).   
 
4.5.1. Statistical Analysis   
For quantitative analyses, I employed both a negative binomial regression model 
(NBRM) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  The number of intentional civilian deaths is 
widely scattered and its variance far exceeds the mean.  King (1989) and Long (1997) 
claim that a negative binomial model is suitable for overdispersed dependent variable.  
By addressing unobserved heterogeneity and contagion that generate overdispersion, 
NBRM produces consistent and efficient parameter estimates (King, 1989; Long, 1997).24  
                                                 
24
 Heterogeneity means that the probability of events occurring varies among observations.  Contagion 
signifies that the occurrence of events in one observation is contingent upon whether they occurred in 
other observations (King, 1989; Long, 1997).     
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On the other hand, Valentino, Huth, & Croco (2006) argue against using count models.  
The number of civilian fatalities by single attacks exhibits great variation, ranging from a 
few deaths resulting from execution to thousands killed by indiscriminate aerial 
bombardment or scorched earth strategy (Valentino, Huth, & Croco, 2006).  War 
duration also varies widely from a few days (e.g., Anti-Ceausescu rebellion in Romania in 
1989) to several years (e.g., First Angolan Civil War (1976-1994)).  Therefore, instead of 
count models, Valentino, Huth, & Croco advocate the use of Ordinary Least Squares.   
Taking into account arguments for and against the use of count models, I applied 
both NBRM and OLS to estimate models on the number of intentional civilian deaths.  
For OLS, I transformed raw numbers into logged ones in order to reduce the 
overdispersion of the dependent variable.  Because I did not pinpoint the number of 
intentional deaths but suggested the range, I performed the same analyses with lowest, 
middle, and highest estimated numbers.25 I will analyze negative binomial and OLS 
models, ascertaining whether they substantiate my hypotheses and exhibit some 
consistency.  Furthermore, I conducted two analyses for robustness check.  Achen 
(2007) claims that when performing statistical analyses on a small number of 
observations, researchers should avoid injecting too many variables into an equation.  
Otherwise, they would fail to capture how explanatory variables account for the 
dependent variable.  Because my model estimation is based on 157 civil wars, I 
considered Achen’s argument and conducted analyses only with control variables that 
                                                 
25
 For instance, the deaths of civilians in Afghan civil war (1979-1989) range from 162,000 (lowest) to 
1,800,000 (highest) and the middle number is 981,000.  In Zimbabwe, from 1983-1987, the Mugabe 
government massacred 20,000 (lowest) – 30,000 (highest) ethnic Ndebeles (25,000 is the middle number.).   
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are statistically significant.  By doing this, I want to observe whether models with all 
control variables are consistent with those only with statistically significant variables.  I 
also ran regressions with all civil wars and using a definition of civil war that does not 
include anti-colonial wars to see whether excluding anti-colonial wars makes any 
difference.   
 
4.5.2. Case Studies     
In conducting case studies, I eschewed a thick description of historical events, which 
makes it very difficult to capture the causal process between independent and 
dependent variables.  Therefore, I relied on process tracing that is a method of building 
a causal linkage between explanatory factors and outcomes through the careful analysis 
of sequences of episodes (Van Evera, 1997; George & Bennett, 2005).  Process tracing 
urges researchers to ponder how intervening factors connect independent variables to 
the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005).  By tracing the process that leads to 
the outcome, scholars can also spot alternative causal paths to the same outcome and 
thus check for the spuriousness of the relationship (George & Bennett, 2005).   
Because my dependent variable is variation in mass killing, I will examine civil 
war episodes that manifest different levels of mass killing.  A large portion of extant 
studies on mass killing dealt exclusively with cases of extensive mass killing or genocide, 
not taking into account variation (Straus, 2007).  Scholars have focused on several 
prominent cases, such as the Rwandan genocide, the Cambodian genocide, and the 
Holocaust.  Without addressing episodes of small-scale mass killing, researchers cannot 
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test hypotheses nor discover variables that can account for extensive mass killing.  
Considering variation in mass killing, I selected cases by employing a ‘most different’ 
design that tackles cases of a given phenomenon that diverge as much as possible 
(Przeworski & Teune, 1970; George & Bennett, 2005).  Qualitative studies with this 
design conform to large-N quantitative studies in two ways.  First, both compel 
researchers to extract from highly diverse cases common factors that bring about a 
certain outcome.  Second, both methods are predicated on the logic of falsification 
holding that science progresses by dismissing plausible causes for observed phenomena 
(Popper, 1959; Peters, 1998).   
In my dissertation, I will analyze the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) 
and the Peruvian civil war (1982-1992).  These two cases exhibit diversity on several 
dimensions (See Table 4.1 for summary.).  First, the scale of violence diverges.  The 
Algerian War of Independence yielded a massive number of intentional civilian deaths.  
France ruthlessly massacred indigenous Algerians suspected of backing National 
Liberation Front (FLN) insurgents by wielding indiscriminate bombing raids, summary 
executions, and torture.  According to Valentino (2004), 70,000 – 570,000 Algerians 
perished as a result of France’s heinous counter-insurgency operations.  In contrast, the 
civil war in Peru did not produce large-scale civilian deaths.  The government committed 
human rights violations against civilians whom it suspected of supporting Shining Path 
rebels (Cunningham, 2007).  These violations, however, did not translate into massive 
civilian fatalities.  Rummel (1997b) estimated that 8,000 - 15,000 civilians were 
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deliberately killed by the government, which is far smaller than mass killing scale in 
Algeria.  
Second, spatial and temporal domains of the two cases vary.  Algeria is located in 
North Africa and Peru in South America.  The Algerian War of Independence erupted 
during the Cold War in which the influence of European colonialists waned in the Third 
World and the United States and the Soviet Union strove to fill this void.  Dissimilar to 
the Algerian war, the war in Peru straddles the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  It 
escalated in the 1980s and subsided after the arrest of rebel leadership in 1992 
(Cunningham, 2007; Gorriti, 1999).   
Third, I take into account the ethnic dimension.  Ethnic vs. ideological war is one 
of the main classification distinctions for civil war.  Sambanis (2001) stresses the 
differences between ethnic war and non-ethnic (ideological) war, suggesting that ethnic 
wars result from political grievance rather than lack of economic opportunity.  The 
Algerian War of Independence is considered as ethnic, whereas the Peruvian civil war 
ideological.  Belligerents in Algeria were polarized along ethnic lines.  Insurgents 
consisted of indigenous Algerians most of who were Arab and Berber Muslim.  The 
government side was composed of French colonial rulers and pieds-noirs, Algerians of 
European or Jewish descent.  Of course, some natives called Harkis fought alongside 
French troops and intra-ethnic violence among Muslim Algerians intensified (e.g., the 
Café wars) (Horne, 2006; Hutchinson, 1978).  Despite this complexity, I claim that the 
Algerian war is an ethnic one because the majority of the war was waged between 
ethnically distinct populations: indigenous Algerians vs. French and pieds-noirs.  
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Conversely, contending parties in Peru were sharply carved along ideological lines.  The 
Shining Path espoused a strict idiosyncratic variant of communism, whereas the 
government denounced this kind of communism and pursued center and later rightist 
policies (McClintock, 1998; Cunningham, 2007).  It cannot be denied that ethnic division 
is reflected in the Peruvian war to a certain degree.  Many Shining Path supporters were 
Amerindians or mestizos, while governing elites were predominantly descendants of 
Spanish conquerors and European settlers (Rochlin, 2003; Gorriti, 1999).  This ethnic 
cleavage, however, is eclipsed by the ideological one.  Shining Path rebels attempted to 
rally public support by promoting their communist ideology and capitalizing on 
economic grievances.  Thus, rebel leaders often enforced ideology-driven policies that 
disrespect or offend indigenous culture (Rochlin, 2003; Gorriti, 1999).  The government 
attempted to suppress the insurgency by mustering support from Amerindians and 
mestizos.  Therefore, I view the Peruvian civil war as primarily ideological rather than 
ethnic.      
Finally, variations in insurgent goal and war outcome are ensured.  In Algeria, 
FLN insurgents aimed to eject French colonialists and obtain independence.  Their 
armed struggle bore fruit.  In 1962, after eight years of internecine war, indigenous 
Algerians succeeded in defeating French forces and achieving national liberation.  In 
Peru, on the other hand, the Shining Path aimed to usurp political power.  The rebels, 
however, lost the war and their influence has declined sharply since the 1990s.   
While diverging on several dimensions, the Algerian War of Independence and 
the Peruvian Civil War share some characteristics, which enables me to draw 
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conclusions about my key variables.  First, these two wars epitomize guerilla warfare.  
Avoiding direct battles, the FLN and the Shining Path engaged in hit-and-run attacks, 
terror bombings, assassinations, and sabotage.  By resorting to guerilla tactics, they 
attempted to wear down their enemies and win the war.  Second, the FLN and the 
Shining Path launched insurgency in rural areas and expanded it to urban areas.  In 
Algeria, violence started in the Aurès, a mountainous inland area, and diffused to urban 
areas including Algiers (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  The Battle of Algiers illustrates 
fierce urban conflict between the FLN and France.  In Peru, the Shining Path initiated 
rebellion in remote highlands of Ayacucho.  As the war progressed, the insurgents 
penetrated Lima and strove to destabilize the government by mounting terror attacks 
and abetting strikes and protests (Smith, 1994b; Burt, 1998).  Third, Algeria and Peru 
experienced colonial rule characterized by sharp cleavages between indigenous 
populations and European settlers.  After conquering Algeria in 1830, France 
encouraged the settlement of Europeans and Jews in the Algerian colony (Naylor, 2000).  
French colonial rulers enforced discriminatory policies, favoring settlers (pieds-noirs) 
and alienating native Arabs and Berbers (Fanon, 2004; Fanon, 1988).  In 1532, Spanish 
troops subverted the Inca Empire and colonized Peru.  During the Spanish rule, a large 
number of Spaniards settled in Peru.  Since independence in 1824, descendants of 
Spanish and other European settlers have wielded political and economic power, 
whereas Amerindians, mestizos, and Afro-Peruvians have been marginalized (Radcliff, 
1995).  Finally, the durations of the two wars are similar.  The war in Algeria broke out in 
1954 and terminated in 1962, enduring for eight years.  The Peruvian Civil War (1982-
85 
 
1992) persisted for 10 years.  I explored cases with similar durations in order to remove 
the effect of duration on mass killing scale.        
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5 Statistical Analysis 
I identified seven factors that can predict the extent of mass killing perpetrated by the 
government: insurgent aim, ethnic and rival support for insurgents, lootable resources, 
political and economic marginalization, and a history of armed conflict.  In this chapter, I 
perform statistical analyses to observe whether the expected relationships between 
these factors and state-sponsored extensive mass killing are substantiated or not.  I 
estimated four models of mass killing.  First, the Insurgent Aim Model contains the 
insurgent aim variable and control variables and tests whether secessionist war is more 
likely to generate extensive mass killing than regime change war.  Second, the Insurgent 
Capacity Model is composed of insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious 
brethren and the government’s rival states, lootable resources, and control variables.  
This model examines whether ethnoreligious and rival external supports trigger state-
sponsored extensive mass killing, whereas rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources 
restrains mass killing.  Third, the Grievance Model consists of political and economic 
marginalization, armed conflict history, and control variables and determines whether 
these grievance-related variables exercise an influence on variation in mass killing.  
Finally, the Combined Model addresses all independent variables and controls as well.  
By comparing this model with the previous three models, I can find out whether the 
effect of an independent variable holds or changes when other independent variables 
are incorporated in the model.   
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5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in Table 5.1, the middle number of intentional civilian deaths ranges from zero 
to 3,280,050, the lowest number from zero to 1,205,200 and the highest number from 
zero to 5,354,900.  Twenty-eight civil wars (e.g., Mozambican war (1979-1992), Western 
Sahara war (1975-1983), civil war in Costa Rica (1948)) did not produce any intentional 
deaths, because 1) the government actually abstained from targeting civilians or 2) 
there was no evidence of the government’s deliberate killing of civilians.  The Chinese 
civil war (1946-1950) generated the highest number of fatalities (lowest: 1,205,200, 
middle: 3,280,000, highest: 5,354,900).  The averages of death numbers are about 
35,526 (lowest), 93,593 (middle), and 150,965 (highest), which are close to the number 
of deaths from La Violencia (1948-1958) in Colombia (lowest: 35,000, middle: 92,500, 
highest: 150,000).     
Out of 157 civil wars, 65 wars are secessionist.  Insurgent groups received 
external support from their ethnoreligious brethren in 59 civil wars and from the 
government’s rival states in 72 wars.  Insurgents rallied both ethnoreligious and rival 
supports in 42 wars.  In 33 civil wars, rebel groups exploited lootable resources.  Political 
competition score for 86 wars (out of 157) is 1 or 2, which signifies that embattled rulers 
suppressed or restricted political rights of their citizens.  In 60 civil wars, contending 
parties bore a history of intense armed conflict.  108 civil wars have GDP lower than 
average (1,411).  Furthermore, insurgents enjoyed a high level of civilian support in 57 
civil wars.      
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5.2. Insurgent Aim Model 
The Insurgent Aim Model tests whether state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive 
in secessionist wars than in regime change wars.  My results reveal that models 
containing all control variables (full models) do not capture the effect of insurgent aim 
on variation in mass killing.  In these models, insurgent aim is not statistically significant 
and its sign of the coefficient estimate is inconsistent, which suggests that whether 
insurgents seek regime change or independence/greater autonomy exercises little 
influence on variation in mass killing.  This outcome reflects that many regime change 
wars generated a large number of intentional civilian deaths, as exemplified by the 
Afghan civil war (1978-1989), the Angolan war (1976-1994) and the Vietnam War (1960-
1975).  As shown in Table 5.2, ELF and distance are not statistically significant in any full 
model.  Thus, I reran the analyses without these two variables (simplified models).  
Dropping ELF and distance boosts the effect of insurgent aim in negative binomial 
models based on middle and highest numbers.  The rest of the simplified models, 
however, do not detect the effect of insurgent aim on the extent of state-sponsored 
mass killing.  Thus, I conclude that in general, statistical analyses do not support my 
hypothesis with respect to the relationship between insurgent aim and state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing.  
In terms of control variables, the level of civilian support is statistically significant 
in all specifications.  When rebel groups enjoy a high level of civilian support, state 
leaders are likely to massacre the civilian population, which dovetails with my 
theoretical argument.  State military capacity represented by mountains and troop size, 
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the Cold War, and population size are statistically significant in negative binomial 
models.  The results of state military capacity are particularly noteworthy.  Table 5.2 
demonstrates that embattled rulers are likely to commit extensive mass killing when 
they possess a small number of armies and conflict zones are mountainous.  This 
indicates the inverse relationship between state military capacity and severity of state-
sponsored mass killing, which corresponds to Fearon & Laitin’s argument (2003) that 
confronting insurgency, weak states tend to inflict damage on civilians.   
As a robustness check, I re-estimated the Insurgent Aim Model without anti-
colonial wars.  Table 5.3 demonstrates that the Model without anti-colonial wars does 
not depart much from that with all civil wars.  In most of the specifications, dropping 
anti-colonial wars does not change the effect of insurgent aim on the scale of mass 
killing.  Only in the simplified negative binomial models based on middle and highest 
numbers, the influence of insurgent aim increases when anti-colonial wars are excluded.  
Therefore, based on the results without anti-colonial wars, I can reach the same 
conclusion that statistical analyses generally do not verify my expectation that 
secessionist wars are more likely to produce massive violence than regime change wars.  
 
5.3. Insurgent Capacity Model 
The Insurgent Capacity Model substantiates whether rebels’ support from their 
ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states instigates state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources inhibits it.  Table 5.4 
reports that in most of full models, ethnoreligious support is statistically significant and 
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its sign of the coefficient estimate is positive.  Even in the OLS model based on lowest 
numbers, p-value for ethnoreligious support is 0.151, which is close to the 0.1 threshold 
of statistical significance.  This suggests that models addressing all control variables 
capture the effect of ethnoreligious support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  
I also performed the analyses without ELF, mountain, troop size, and distance.  The 
simplified models also detect the effect of ethnoreligious support, which signifies that 
even when statistically insignificant controls are removed, ethnoreligious support still 
exercises an influence upon the scale of mass killing.  Furthermore, percentage changes 
in expected count derived from a negative binomial regression manifest the effect of 
ethnoreligious support.  When ethnoreligious support shifts from 0 to 1, the expected 
number of intentional civilian deaths increases by 214.1% for lowest number 
specification, 347.5% for middle number specification, and 380.9% for highest number 
specification, holding all other variables constant.26  Therefore, I conclude that statistical 
analyses corroborate my hypothesis with respect to the relationship between rebels’ 
external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and state-sponsored extensive mass 
killing.   
Ethnoreligious support tends to be rigid, which makes embattled rulers judge 
that their efforts to stem this support would not bear fruit.  Furthermore, support from 
co-ethnics or co-religionists helps insurgent leaders induce civilians to join the 
insurgency and deters the rebel leadership from mistreating civilians.  The tenacity of 
ethnoreligious support and strong civilian support for insurgents might propel the 
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 These rates are calculated based on full models.  The percentage change rates for simplified models do 
not diverge much from those for full models.  
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government to massacre civilian populations and fracture insurgents’ recruitment pool 
as a strategy for crippling rebel forces and forestalling the resurgence of rebellion.  For 
instance, during the Burundian civil war (1993-2003), Hutu insurgent groups received 
support from their co-ethnics in neighboring Rwanda (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005).27  
Rwandan Hutus, ex-soldiers and Interahamwe militias who fled Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide, backed the Burundian insurgents, fighting alongside them and supplying them 
with weapons (Lemarchand, 2009; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 
1998).  This kindred support can account for strong civilian support for the rebels.  
Insurgent leaders might convince their co-ethnics to join the armed struggle against 
Tutsis by stressing that Rwandan Hutu brothers would never abandon them; therefore, 
the rebels would be able to win the war.  Rwandan Hutu sponsorship might also 
constrain the insurgents from committing widespread abuses against the Hutu 
population.  Embattled Tutsi rulers were not able to stymie the activities of Rwandan 
Hutus who frequently operated outside Burundi, which propelled the government to 
project massive violence against its Hutu citizens.  It is estimated that combating Hutu 
insurgencies, Tutsi elites murdered 100,000 - 200,000 Hutu civilians (Valentino, 2004).   
Table 5.4 reveals that models containing all control variables capture the effect 
of rival support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  In most of full models, rival 
support is statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is positive.  In 
the negative binomial model based on highest numbers, p-value for rival support is .117, 
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 Hutu insurgents comprised the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), the National Forces of 
Liberation (FNL), the National Liberation Front (FROLINA), the Union of National Liberation (ULINA), and 
other minor groups (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005).   
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which is very close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.  Models excluding 
statistically insignificant control variables still detect the influence of rival support.  In 
the OLS specification with highest numbers and negative binomial specifications with 
middle and highest numbers, dropping those variables enhances the effect of rival 
support on severity of mass killing.  Furthermore, percentage changes in expected count 
also exhibit the influence of rival support.  When rival support moves from 0 to 1, the 
expected number of intentional civilian deaths increases by 174.3% (lowest number 
specification), 132.3% (middle number specification), and 125.8% (highest number 
specification), holding all other variables constant.28  Therefore, I conclude that 
statistical results substantiate my hypothesis germane to rebels’ support from the 
government’s rival states.   
Support from the government’s rival states tends to endure, even if the 
government exerts diplomatic and military efforts to vitiate this support.  Furthermore, 
rival states harbor strong desire for rebel victory, thus seeking to regulate insurgents’ 
behavior and to make civilians bolster the insurgency.  The rigidity of rival support and 
civilian support for insurgents might propel embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive 
mass killing and wipe out rebels’ recruitment pool.  The First Indochina war (1946-1954) 
illustrates this point.  Viet Minh guerillas enjoyed a high level of civilian support, which 
prompted French colonial forces to massacre Vietnamese civilians.  Rival support can 
explain why the Viet Minh rallied civilian support.  This insurgent group received 
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 These rates are calculated based on full models.  The rates for simplified models are 224% (lowest 
numbers), 174.8% (middle numbers), and 163.8% (highest numbers).  This indicates that when removing 
control variables that are not statistically significant, percentage changes in expected count rise by about 
40-50%.    
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significant support from communist China, France’s arch rival, which aspired to dislodge 
France from Indochina and eliminate (potential) capitalist threats (Zhai, 1993 & 2000).  
Mao Zedong sought to regulate Viet Minh’s military operations and implant his guerilla 
war doctrines into the Viet Minh, one of which was treating civilians well.  Chinese 
military advisors deployed in Vietnam helped the guerillas mobilize the masses, ensuring 
that Viet Minh insurgents build civilian support (Zhai, 1993 & 2000).   
Table 5.4 demonstrates that the effect of lootable resources hinges somewhat 
on model specifications.  None of the OLS models detects the effect of lootable 
resources on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Even dropping statistically 
insignificant controls does not boost the influence of lootable resources.  In contrast, in 
the negative binomial models, lootable resources exert some effect upon the extent of 
mass killing.  Of course, the p-values for lootable resources exceed the .1 threshold of 
statistical significance in full models based on middle and highest numbers.  The p-
values for those specifications are .145 (middle numbers) and .152 (high numbers), 
which is not far from the .1 threshold of statistical significance.  When excluding 
variables that are not statistically significant, the effect of lootable resources inflates.  
This suggests that only negative binomial analyses vindicate my expectations regarding 
rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources.  Resource wealth can spoil the rebel 
leadership.  Hence, when recruiting labor force and combatants, resource-rich 
insurgents eschew the distribution of their wealth and resort to coercive measures.  
Furthermore, rebel leaders might give free rein to resource producers, which clears the 
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way for rampant civilian abuses.  Rebels’ heinous behavior begets deep animosity 
toward the insurgents, which can inhibit embattled rulers from targeting civilians.  
As shown in Table 5.4, all models capture the effect of insurgents’ civilian 
support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  A high level of civilian support for 
insurgents is likely to propel the government to engineer extensive mass killing, which 
corresponds to my theoretical argument.  In some OLS and negative binomial models, 
population size and the Cold War are statistically significant and their signs of the 
coefficient estimate are positive, which indicates that 1) during civil war, countries with 
large populations are likely to have a large number of intentional civilian deaths and 2) 
civil wars in the Cold War era generated more extensive mass killing than those in the 
post-Cold War era.       
 As shown in Table 5.5, statistical analyses without anti-colonial wars diverge 
little from those with all civil wars.  Most specifications capture the effects of 
ethnoreligious support and rival support on the severity of state-sponsored mass 
killing.29  Only in negative binomial models, lootable resources exercise an influence on 
variation in mass killing.  Hence, when dropping anti-colonial wars, the Insurgent 
Capacity Model still confirms my hypotheses on ethnoreligious support and rival support 
and partly confirms my hypothesis on lootable resources.   
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 In the OLS and negative binomial specifications based on middle numbers, the p-values for 
ethnoreligious support are .105 (full model) and .103 (simplified model), which is very close to the .1 
threshold of statistical significance.   
95 
 
5.4. Grievance Model  
The Grievance Model examines how well political and economic marginalization, as well 
as armed conflict history, account for the scale of state-sponsored mass killing.  Table 
5.6 reveals that when injecting all control variables into an equation, political 
competition, a proxy for political marginalization, is statistically significant and its sign of 
the coefficient estimate conforms to my theoretical argument.  The models that exclude 
ELF, troop, mountain, and population also capture the effect of political marginalization 
on the extent of state-sponsored mass killing.30  In other words, removing statistically 
insignificant control variables does not suppress the effect of political marginalization. 
This suggests that political marginalization exerts an effect on variation in state-
sponsored mass killing.  Furthermore, percentage changes in expected count manifest 
the influence of political marginalization.  A one-unit increase in political competition 
score decreases the expected number of intentional civilian deaths by 19.4% (lowest 
numbers), 21.7% (middle numbers), and 21.8% (highest numbers).31  Therefore, 
statistical analyses confirm my hypothesis that the more severe political marginalization 
is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.  A high level of 
political marginalization breeds or exacerbates grievances among civilians, which can 
generate civilian support for insurgents.  Encountering this predicament, embattled 
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 In the OLS models, none of the control variables are statistically significant.  Some negative binomial 
models, however, manifest the influence of ELF, mountain, and population.  Therefore, I performed both 
OLS and negative binomial analyses using these three control variables.     
31
 These rates are computed based on full models.  The percentage changes for simplified models do not 
depart much from those for full models.   
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rulers might massacre civilians as a strategy for paralyzing insurgent combatants and 
forestalling future rebellion.   
  The results also report that in the models addressing all control variables, 
history of armed conflict is statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate 
is positive, which indicates that the full models capture the effect of armed conflict 
history on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Even when excluding control 
variables that are not statistically significant, the influence of armed conflict history 
persists.  Furthermore, when armed conflict history shifts from 0 (no conflict) to 1 
(minor conflict) or 1 to 2 (intense conflict), the expected number of civilian deaths rises 
sharply.  The rates of percentage changes for full models are 122.9% (lowest numbers), 
116.2% (middle numbers), and 113.7% (highest numbers).  The rates for simplified 
models are higher than those for full models (144.3% (lowest numbers), 130.2% (middle 
numbers), and 127.3% (highest numbers)).  Thus, based on statistical analyses, I can 
claim that history of intense armed conflict is likely to engender state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing.  Intense prior conflict helps insurgents kindle animosity toward 
the government, which can spawn or aggravate grievances against the status quo.  
Hence, civilians who supported the insurgent side during the previous conflict rally 
around the rebel leadership.  Combating popular insurgents, state leaders orchestrate 
extensive mass killing in an attempt to neutralize insurgent forces and to prevent 
insurrection from recurring.   
The second Kurdish insurgency in Iraq (1985-1988) illustrates how severe 
political marginalization and history of intense armed conflict can prompt the 
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government to unleash massive violence against civilian populations.  Confronting the 
insurrection, Saddam Hussein continued to suppress political rights of Kurds, excluding 
them from political realm, which aggravated grievances among the Kurdish population 
(Strakes, 2007; O’Ballance, 1996).  Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish 
insurgents engaged in an internecine war against the government, which helped them 
foment hostility and grievances against the Hussein regime (Strakes, 2007).  Sharp 
grievances drove Kurds to support Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) insurgents.  In a bid to cripple insurgent combatants and ward off 
future rebellion, the Iraqi government murdered 180,000-300,000 Kurdish civilians 
through poison gas attacks, summary executions, and starvation (Harff, 2003; 
Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004).   
Dissimilar to political marginalization and armed conflict history, the impact of 
economic marginalization on the extent of mass killing is not consistent across OLS and 
negative binomial specifications.  Table 5.6 reveals that in most of full models, GDP per 
capita representing economic marginalization is not statistically significant.  Only the 
negative binomial model with highest numbers captures the marginal effect of GDP on 
the scale of mass killing.  Hence, in full models, economic marginalization generally 
exercises little influence upon variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Dropping 
statistically insignificant control variables does not change the effect of GDP in OLS 
models.  In the negative binomial models, however, the removal of those variables 
boosts the impact of GDP on the scale of mass killing.  Therefore, based on the 
simplified negative binomial models, I can maintain that severe economic 
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marginalization is likely to engender state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil 
war.  Severe economic marginalization spawns or aggravates grievances, which can help 
insurgent leaders garner strong support from aggrieved populations.  This predicament 
can lead embattled rulers to project massive violence against civilians.  In a nutshell, the 
effect of economic marginalization depends on model specifications.  The OLS analyses 
disconfirm my hypothesis linking economic marginalization and the extent of state-
sponsored mass killing.  In contrast, the negative binomial analyses generally 
corroborate that severe economic marginalization is likely to instigate state-sponsored 
massive violence against civilians.  It is, however, premature to generalize this 
conclusion because economic marginalization can be represented by measures other 
than GDP per capita.  One can develop other indicators for economic marginalization 
and employ them for statistical analysis, which may account better for severity of state-
sponsored mass killing.  This suggests that the effect of economic marginalization on 
mass killing scale needs to be examined further.  
As seen in Table 5.6, all specifications capture the effect of civilian support on 
variation in mass killing, which indicates that a high level of civilian support for 
insurgents can generate state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war.  This 
gives leverage to my theoretical argument revolving around the positive relationship 
between civilian support for rebels and the severity of mass killing.  Similar to Insurgent 
Aim and Insurgent Capacity Models, some negative binomial specifications manifest the 
effect of the Cold War on variation in mass killing.  In some negative binomial 
specifications, distance between a war zone and the capital exert an effect on the scale 
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of mass killing, which bolsters Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) argument that states with 
inferior military capacity are likely to inflict damage on civilian populations. 
I re-estimated the Grievance Model without anti-colonial wars to observe 
whether the two outcomes display some consistency.  Table 5.7 reveals that the Model 
without anti-colonial wars does not depart much from that with all civil wars.  The 
removal of anti-colonial wars does not suppress the effects of political marginalization 
and armed conflict history on the scale of mass killing.  In other words, without anti-
colonial wars, specifications still detect the influence of these two variables.  In terms of 
economic marginalization, OLS models do not capture the effect of GDP on the severity 
of mass killing.  In the negative binomial models, dropping anti-colonial wars reduces 
the influence of GDP but not to the extent that the effect evaporates.32  Therefore, 
based on the analyses without anti-colonial wars, I can still conclude that the Grievance 
Model substantiates my hypotheses regarding political marginalization and armed 
conflict history and partly substantiates my hypothesis on economic marginalization.  
 
5.5. Combined Model  
Independent variable(s) in one model may sway those in other models.  For instance, 
variables relevant to grievances can influence the effects of rebels’ external support and 
lootable resources on variation in mass killing or vice versa.  To examine whether or how 
independent variables affect each other across the models, I estimated the Combined 
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 In the simplified negative binomial model with lowest numbers, the p-value for GDP is .109 and in the 
full negative binomial model with highest numbers, the p-value for GDP is .162.  Both values are close to 
the .1 threshold of statistical significance.   
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Model that addresses all independent variables and controls as well.  One can argue 
that incorporating fourteen variables runs the risk of distorting the outcomes.  Taking 
into account this claim, I also performed analyses without control variables that are not 
statistically significant.  By comparing Combined Model with Insurgent Aim, Insurgent 
Capacity, and Grievance Models, I can find out whether the effect of an independent 
variable holds or changes when other independent variables are injected in the model.33   
Table 5.8 reveals that OLS and negative binomial models capture the effects of 
ethnoreligious support, political competition, armed conflict history, and insurgents’ 
civilian support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Ethnoreligious support is 
statistically significant in all but the OLS specifications with lowest numbers.  Even in 
these two specifications, p-values for ethnoreligious support are close to the .1 
threshold of statistical significance.34 This indicates that in the Combined Model, 
ethnoreligious support exercises an influence on severity of mass killing.  Therefore, the 
Combined Model vindicates that insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren 
is likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  These findings conform to 
those of Insurgent Capacity Model, which suggests that a set of insurgent aim, political 
and economic marginalization, and armed conflict history does not generate significant 
change in the effect of ethnoreligious support.  OLS and negative binomial models 
generally detect the effect of political competition on variation in state-sponsored mass 
killing, which establishes the relationship between political marginalization and severity 
                                                 
33
 I juxtapose only Models with all control variables because each Model displays a different set of control 
variables that are statistically significant.   
34
 The p-value for ethnoreligious support is .129 in the model that contains all control variables and .153 
in the model excluding control variables that are not statistically significant in the Insurgent Capacity 
Model.  
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of mass killing.  Even in the negative binomial models that do not contain statistically 
insignificant controls, the p-values for political competition are very close to the .1 
threshold, which indicates that political competition exercises some influence upon the 
extent of state-sponsored mass killing.  Therefore, based on the Combined Model, I can 
claim that severe political marginalization is likely to engender state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing during civil war.  Comparing the Combined Model with the 
Grievance Model, I found that a set of insurgent aim, ethnoreligious and rival support, 
and lootable resources does not neutralize the effect of political marginalization.  Only 
in the simplified negative binomial specifications, adding this set of variables abates the 
influence of political marginalization, but not to the extent that the effect completely 
vanishes.  Furthermore, Table 5.8 reports that armed conflict history is statistically 
significant in most OLS and negative binomial models, which indicates that armed 
conflict history accounts for mass killing scale.35  In other words, the Combined Model 
corroborates that intense previous conflict is likely to instigate state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing during civil war.  The relation between armed conflict history and 
mass killing in the Combined Model displays similar patterns to that in the Grievance 
Model.  That is, when a series of variables pertaining to insurgent aim and capacity is 
injected in the model, the effect of armed conflict history holds.  Finally, all 
specifications capture the effect of civilian support for insurgents on variation in state-
sponsored mass killing.  As with Insurgent Aim, Insurgent Capacity, and Grievance 
Models, Combined Model indicates that a high level of rebels’ civilian support is likely to 
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 In the highest number OLS specification that addresses all control variables, the p-value for conflict 
history is .119, very close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.   
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prompt embattled rulers to unleash massive violence against their own citizens.  This 
suggests that incorporating other independent variables into the model does not sway 
the effect of civilian support for insurgents on mass killing scale.     
The Combined Model reveals that the effect of economic marginalization on the 
severity of mass killing is contingent upon model specifications.  All OLS models do not 
detect the impact of GDP on variation in mass killing.  In negative binomial models, 
however, economic marginalization accounts for the extent of mass killing.36  These 
outcomes correspond to those of the Grievance Model, which suggests that when 
injecting insurgent aim, ethnoreligious and rival support, and lootable resources into the 
model, most of negative binomial analyses still capture the influence of economic 
marginalization on the scale of mass killing.  In contrast, the Combined Model generally 
does not detect the effects of insurgent aim, rival support, and lootable resources on 
variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  In all OLS and negative binomial specifications, 
insurgent aim is not statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is 
negative, which indicates that this variable does not predict severity of mass killing.  In 
other words, the outbreak of state-sponsored extensive mass killing hinges little on 
whether insurgent groups seek secession or regime change.  These outcomes coincide 
with those of Insurgent Aim Model, which suggests that inserting other independent 
variables into the analysis does not promote the influence of insurgent aim on the scale 
of mass killing.  Table 5.8 also demonstrates that all specifications do not capture the 
effect of rival support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Hence, the 
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 In the negative binomial models based on lowest numbers, the p-values for GDP are .152 (full model) 
and .148 (simplified model), which is not far from the .1 threshold of statistical significance.   
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Combined Model does not confirm that rebels’ support from the government’s rival 
states is likely to instigate extensive mass killing committed by the government.  The 
Combined Model and the Insurgent Capacity Model exhibit different patterns in terms 
of rival support.  In the Insurgent Capacity Model, rival support exercises an influence on 
the extent of mass killing.  Adding insurgent aim and variables related to grievances 
suppresses the effect of rival support on mass killing scale.  In most specifications, 
lootable resources exert little effect on variation in mass killing.  Hence, the Combined 
Model disconfirms my hypothesis that rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely 
to constrain state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  In terms of OLS analyses, the 
Combined Model displays similar patterns as the Insurgent Capacity Model.  Negative 
binomial analyses in the Combined Model, however, diverge from those in the Insurgent 
Capacity Model in that the effect of lootable resources evaporates when a series of 
variables pertaining to insurgent aim and grievances is inserted in the model.  
As a robustness check, I re-estimated the Combined Model without anti-colonial 
wars.  Table 5.9 indicates that the Model without anti-colonial wars does not differ 
much from that with all civil wars.  Even when dropping anti-colonial wars, the effects of 
ethnoreligious support, political marginalization, and armed conflict history endure.37  
As shown in Table 5.9, economic marginalization is not statistically significant in all 
specifications.  In most of the negative binomial models, however, p-values for this 
variable almost reach the .1 threshold of statistical significance.  This suggests that 
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 In the OLS specifications based on middle and highest numbers, p-values for ethnoreligious support are 
close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.  Therefore, I conclude that without anti-colonial wars, 
the models generally capture the effect of ethnoreligious support on the scale of mass killing.      
104 
 
economic marginalization exercises some influence on the severity of mass killing only in 
negative binomial models.  The analyses do not capture the effects of Insurgent aim, 
rival support, and lootable resources on the severity of mass killing.  Therefore, 
juxtaposing the Combined Model using all civil wars and that without anti-colonial wars 
proves the robustness of the Model based on a comprehensive classification of civil war. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The statistical analyses detect the effect of civilian support on variation in state-
sponsored mass killing.  Significant civilian support for insurgents is likely to propel 
embattled rulers to engineer extensive mass killing.  This finding bears importance 
because I theorize that variables that generate staunch civilian support for insurgents 
can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  Insurgent Capacity, Grievance, and 
Combined Models generally capture the effects of ethnoreligious support, political 
marginalization, and armed conflict history on severity of mass killing.  Therefore, I 
conclude that the statistical results confirm my hypotheses germane to these variables.  
In other words, based on the outcomes, I can claim that insurgents’ support from their 
ethnoreligious brethren, severe political marginalization, and prior intense conflict can 
engender extensive mass killing perpetrated by the government.  Grievance and 
Combined Models detect the influence of economic marginalization on mass killing scale 
only in negative binomial specifications.  This suggests that model specifications 
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determine whether my hypothesis pertaining to economic marginalization is 
corroborated or not.     
In contrast, the statistical analyses do not substantiate my hypotheses with 
respect to rival support, lootable resources, and insurgent aim.  The Insurgent Capacity 
Model manifests the effect of rebels’ support from the government’s rival states, but 
when independent variables pertinent to insurgent aim and grievances are injected in 
the model, the effect of rival support evaporates.  In most of Insurgent Capacity and 
Combined Models, rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources does not account for 
variation in state-sponsored mass killing.  Insurgent aim generally exercises little 
influence upon severity of mass killing.  Therefore, the statistical analyses constrain me 
from arguing that 1) insurgents’ support from the government’s rivals and secessionist 
wars are likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing and 2) rebels’ 
exploitation of lootable resources are likely to inhibit extensive mass killing.   
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6 Case Studies 
The statistical analyses confirm my hypotheses germane to insurgents’ support from 
their ethnoreligious brethren, political marginalization, and armed conflict history.  The 
results partially substantiate my hypothesis on economic marginalization.  That is, the 
effect of economic marginalization is contingent upon which method is employed and 
which control variables are incorporated (or excluded).  In contrast, the statistical 
analyses do not substantiate my hypotheses with respect to insurgent aim, insurgents’ 
support from the government’s rival states, and rebels’ exploitation of lootable 
resources.  In this chapter, I conduct qualitative analyses to complement the 
quantitative studies.  I examine the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and the 
Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992).  By juxtaposing these two wars, I intend to find out 
which hypotheses case studies confirm, whether case analysis results correspond to 
statistical analysis results, and which alternative explanations case studies capture.   
 
6.1. Background 
The Algerian War of Independence erupted when decolonization movement was 
sweeping Africa and Asia.  After the First World War, Algerian nationalism arose and 
Muslim populations began to agitate for independence from French colonialists (Horne, 
2006; Heggoy, 1972).  Nationalist leaders attempted to persuade France to decolonize 
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their homeland through non-violent actions such as petition and lobbying (Horn, 2006; 
Heggoy, 1972).  The French, however, were unwilling to grant independence and 
ruthlessly repressed independence movement as the Sétif massacre exemplifies.  
France’s oppression radicalized Algerian nationalists and propelled them to shift their 
strategy to violence (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Fanon, 1988; Gillespie, 1976).  In 
November 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) launched an insurgency against 
France.  Combating superior French troops, FLN insurgents relied on guerilla warfare 
and urban terrorism (Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).  In response, France 
wielded brutal strategies.  Colonial rulers not only executed forced relocation and strict 
surveillance (quadrillage), but also engineered extensive mass killing through torture, 
indiscriminate bombings, and summary executions (Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972; 
Hutchinson, 1978; Gillespie, 1976).   
Massacring Arabs and Berbers rendered France a military victory, but a political 
loss (Gillespie, 1976).  Extensive mass killing fractured FLN’s civilian support bases and 
thus undermined rebel military capacity.  This egregious strategy, however, swelled 
sympathy and support for the FLN inside and outside Algeria (Gillespie, 1976; 
Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).  Therefore, the insurgents were able to sustain the 
war, which became intractable.  In 1958, Charles De Gaulle took power and transformed 
policy toward Algeria from harsh military repression to negotiation.  This shift infuriated 
pieds-noirs and some segments of the military.  They sought to derail De Gaulle’s efforts 
to achieve an honorable exit from Algeria.  The Secret Army Organization (OAS), for 
instance, unleashed bombing and assassination campaigns on both Muslim Algerians 
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and the metropole French and staged an aborted coup (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976; 
Heggoy, 1972).  Despite violent resistance from pieds-noirs and army dissidents, a series 
of negotiations with the FLN produced the Evian Accords that stipulated ceasefire, the 
recognition of the full sovereignty of Algeria, cooperative exchange between 
independent Algeria and France, and equal treatment of pieds-noirs (Horne, 2006).  In 
the 1962 referendums, the majority of French citizens and indigenous Algerians 
approved this treaty, and De Gaulle finally declared the independence of Algeria on the 
same year (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Heggoy, 1972).   
The Algerian War of Independence is considered as one of the bloodiest wars in 
the post-World War II era.  Thousands of FLN insurgents and French soldiers perished in 
battle (Horne, 2006; Polk, 2007).  Both sides targeted civilian populations.  France 
murdered 70,000-570,000 Muslim Algerians, while the FLN killed 70,000-235,000 pieds-
noirs and pro-French Muslims (Harkis) (Valentino, 2004; Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006).  
Even after the war ended, bloodshed continued in Algeria.  Post-independence elites 
sought revenge against pieds-noirs and Harkis.  The majority of these populations fled 
Algeria or lost their lives (Horne, 2006).   
The Peruvian civil war broke out when ideological confrontation between 
communism and capitalism engulfed the Third World.  Founded in the late 1960s, the 
Shining Path gained influence by promoting its own version of Marxism that focused on 
economic distress of indigenous peasants (McClintock, 1998; Gorriti, 1994).  In 1980, 
leaders of the Shining Path refused to participate in multiparty elections and initiated a 
rebellion against the government.  Prosecuting guerilla war, the insurgents succeeded in 
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wresting control of rural highlands and enforced their Marxist ideology in these 
‘liberated’ zones (Cunningham, 2007; Palmer, 1994).  The rebels’ rule was harsh.  
Leaders of the Shining Path did not tolerate any dissent but ruthlessly punished anyone 
who challenged or defied their authority and law (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998).  
In the mid-1980s, the Shining Path infiltrated urban areas and mounted terrorist attacks.  
By 1991, the Shining Path controlled central and southern Peru and deployed a large 
number of combatants in the outskirts of Lima (McClintock, 1998).   
At the onset of the war, governing elites perceived that the rebellion would not 
pose a grave threat to their rule.  As the Shining Path’s aggression escalated, however, 
the government jettisoned its lukewarm stance and combated the rebellion actively 
(Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994).  In 1982, President Belaundé 
designated Ayacucho and other rebel-active provinces as a ‘military emergency zone’ 
and restricted freedoms and civil rights of peasants in these regions (Cunningham, 2007; 
McClintock, 1998).  The government arrested and incarcerated anyone suspected of 
supporting the Shining Path.  Some detainees were subject to torture and rape.  
Government forces also perpetrated several massacres (McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 
1994).  This strategy, however, failed to subdue the insurrection.  Therefore, in 1989, 
the government changed its counter-insurgency strategies, endeavoring to distinguish 
rebel supporters from government-friendly or neutral civilians and to capture key 
insurgent leaders (Cunningham, 2007).  In 1992, Abimael Guzmán, a ringleader of the 
insurgency, was arrested, after which violence tapered off.   
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The Peruvian civil war inflicted sufferings on civilian populations.  Civilians 
trapped in the war were often subject to execution, torture, imprisonment, and other 
human rights abuses.  According to Rummel (1997b), the government murdered 8,000 – 
15,000 civilians.  The Shining Path has been accused of killing more civilians.  The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (2003) concluded that the rebels hold responsible for 
two-thirds of all civilian fatalities.        
 
6.2. Extensive Mass Killing 
To suppress FLN’s struggle for independence, French rulers resorted to reprehensible 
and brutal strategies.  The colonial authority implemented forced relocation and strict 
surveillance (quadrillage) in an attempt to sever the FLN from locals (Heggoy, 1972; 
Hutchinson, 1978; O’Ballance, 1967).  France dislodged indigenous populations from 
their villages and relocated them to designated camps with squalid conditions.  Between 
15 and 20% of the rural population in Algeria were uprooted from their homes (Heggoy, 
1972).  Anyone who entered abandoned villages were regarded as rebels and shot dead 
(Heggoy, 1972).  Simultaneously, France carved up entire Algeria into small units and 
garrisoned them (O’Ballance, 1967; Heggoy, 1972).  The French security machinery 
closely observed civilians residing in the unit to deter them from backing the FLN 
(O’Ballance, 1967; Heggoy, 1972).     
In conjunction with forced relocation and quadrillage, colonial rulers perpetrated 
extensive mass killing in a bid to neutralize the insurgents.  One of the killing methods 
was torture.  French troops lacked local knowledge that would help to detect and 
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capture or kill rebel combatants.  To extract information on the FLN quickly, French 
rulers routinized torture (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978; Polk, 2007).  They inflicted 
torture on any Algerians suspected of knowing something about the rebels.  Thousands 
of torture victims died in prison (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).  The 
French military also carried out indiscriminate air raids and summary executions.  It 
enforced the principle of collective punishment throughout Algeria (Horne, 2006; Fanon, 
2004).  When French troops suspected some residents in a village of helping the FLN, 
they killed all inhabitants and razed the whole village (Fanon, 2004; Gillespie, 1976; 
Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007).  The Battle of Algiers epitomizes extensive mass killing 
committed by France.  In 1956, FLN leaders initiated urban terrorism and expanded 
their battlefields to Algiers in an attempt to attract more international and domestic 
French attention.  FLN agents assassinated civilian and military administrators and 
exploded bombs in civilian locations such as cafés, nightclubs, and soccer stadiums 
(Horne, 2006; Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978).  To crush FLN’s urban terrorism, French 
soldiers besieged residential areas in which insurgents were suspected of hiding, which 
resulted in many civilian deaths.  Casbah, the old quarter of Algiers, was subject to 
intense bombings and summary executions (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978).  
Simultaneously, the French Army arrested and tortured suspected rebel supporters, 
many of who perished in torture chambers (Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007).  In 
the entire war period, torture, indiscriminate bombing raids, and summary executions 
by French forces produced the deaths of 70,000 – 570,000 Muslim civilians (Valentino, 
2004). 
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Why did colonial rulers employ extensive mass killing along with forced 
relocation and quadrillage?  The primary reason is that the FLN mustered vehement 
support from Muslim Arabs and Berbers.  In other words, staunch civilian support for 
the FLN propelled France to massacre indigenous Algerians.  In 1954, the FLN recruited a 
few hundred combatants from Muslims.  As the war proceeded, rebel recruitment 
thrived.  The number of insurgent combatants reached 40,000 in 1956 and 100,000 in 
1958 (Gillespie, 1976).  Noncombatant Muslims aided the FLN with shelter, supplies, and 
intelligence.  Urban Algerians exhibited solidarity with the insurgents by participating in 
strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations (Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).  Civilian 
support for the FLN hampered France’s efforts to spot and capture rebel combatants 
(Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).   
Combating popular FLN insurgents, French forces orchestrated extensive mass 
killing against local populations.  The first mass killing incident took place in 1955.  After 
the FLN attacked and killed pied-noir civilians near Philippeville (currently Skikda), 
colonial troops and pied-noir gangs retaliated by slaying about 12,000 Algerians.  Since 
then, France frequently unleashed relentless violence against Muslim Algerians, as the 
Battle of Algiers illustrates.  By massacring hostile populations, France sought to fracture 
FLN’s civilian support bases and cripple the guerillas (Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006; 
Fanon, 1988; Polk, 2007).  Further, by killing youths, children, and women, colonial 
rulers attempted to wipe out future rebel recruitment pool and forestall independence 
struggle from resurging.  In 1957, French rulers began to exercise forced relocation and 
close surveillance (quadrillage) to constrain Arabs and Berbers from backing the 
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insurgents.  These two strategies, however, failed to stem civilian support for the FLN 
(Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978; Gillespie, 1976).  Forced relocation uprooted peasants 
from their lands and plunged them into unemployment, which exacerbated their 
economic grievances (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978).  This policy also traumatized 
the displaced populations.  Therefore, resettlement camps became breeding grounds 
for rebel recruitment.  Quadrillage, strict monitoring through heavy military presence, 
involved frequent security checks and severe restriction of movement.  This exasperated 
local populations and spawned resentment against the French (Heggoy, 1972; 
Hutchinson, 1978).  The FLN clandestinely penetrated internment camps and villages 
and recruited supporters, which neutralized forced resettlement and quadrillage 
strategies (Hutchinson, 1978).  The limitations of forced relocation and quadrillage 
drove French rulers to maintain the extensive mass killing strategy.   
In Peru, the government’s counterinsurgency strategy was repressive and brutal 
(Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994).  When leaders of the Shining Path 
initiated rebellion in 1980, Belaúnde, then president, did not consider the Shining Path 
as a national security threat.  As violence intensified, he designated Ayacucho, a bastion 
of insurgency, as an emergency zone and deployed armed forces there.  The security 
apparatus exercised authority over this area and suspended civil rights of local 
populations (McClintock, 1998).  Landless peasants who formed most of the inhabitants 
were often subject to mistreatment.  Alan García, successor of Belaúnde, continued 
wielding military strategy against the Shining Path (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 
1998).  Government troops raided villages and executed or massacred individuals 
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suspected of insurgent collaborators.  Other human rights violations, including arbitrary 
detention, forced disappearance, and torture, were rampant (Cunningham, 2007; 
McClintock, 1998; Gorriti, 1992).  In 1989, however, government forces began to 
eschew somewhat indiscriminate violence and attempt to distinguish enemy civilians 
from friendly and neutral ones (Cunningham, 2007).  Simultaneously, the government 
paid more attention to the arrest of key rebel leaders (Cunningham, 2007).  In 1992, 
security forces succeeded in capturing Guzmán in Lima, which expedited the collapse of 
the Shining Path.  In other words, after Guzmán’s arrest, the war petered out.  Similar to 
the Algerian war, the Peruvian government’s strategy of subduing the Shining Path 
insurgency involved human rights violations.  Civilians suspected of collaborating with 
the rebels were subject to arbitrary incarceration, torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings.  
Rummel (1997b) estimated that during the war, the government murdered 
approximately 8,000 – 15,000 civilians.  Dissimilar to Algeria, however, embattled rulers 
in Peru abstained from projecting violence so massive as to annihilate suspected or 
potential insurgent supporters.  In other words, state-sponsored extensive mass killing 
did not occur during the Peruvian civil war.     
This is attributed mainly to the lack of widespread civilian support for the Shining 
Path.  In other words, the paucity of rebels’ civilian support inhibited Peruvian leaders 
from wiping out civilian populations.  Even though sympathizing with rebels’ cause, 
many indigenous peasants and urban residents were reluctant to join the insurgency, 
which impelled leaders of the Shining Path to exhibit extreme brutality.  Of course, the 
rebels’ ideology championed the use of violence to overthrow incumbent rulers and 
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institute a peasant-based communist society.  Lack of strong civilian support for 
insurgency also radicalized the rebel leadership and prompted it to wield indiscriminate 
violence against civilian populations.  By perpetrating atrocities, the Shining Path aimed 
to terrorize civilians and deter them from supporting the government or compel them 
to back the insurgency (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Smith, 1994a).  At the 
onset of the war, rebel leaders dispensed ‘people’s justice’ by liquidating political and 
economic elites such as landowners, businessmen, and government officials.  
Simultaneously, the insurgents targeted civilians suspected of collaborating with the 
government.  As the war progressed and civilian support for the insurgency did not 
multiply, rebel leaders turned to indiscriminate violence.  McClintock (1998) remarked 
that from 1980 to 1992, a large number of people killed by the Shining Path were 
unarmed civilians.  The rebels executed or massacred sympathetic peasants who 
objected to or violated insurgents’ stringent rule.  In Lima and other major cities, the 
rebels mounted terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of innocent civilians.  In 
addition, the Shining Path murdered nuns, priests, journalists, aid workers, teachers, 
and social activists (Cunningham, 2007).  The insurgents often perpetrated killings in a 
savage manner (McClintock, 1998).  Victims were decapitated, mutilated, or 
disemboweled.  Corpses were displayed in public.  Besides murder, the Shining Path also 
pillaged many rural villages and kidnapped numerous civilians for ransom (Poole & 
Renique, 1992; Gorriti, 1992).  Insurgents’ atrocities intimidated some civilians into 
buttressing the rebellion.  A large number of citizens, however, abhorred indiscriminate 
violence and came to harbor animosity toward the rebels (Taylor 2006; Palmer, 1994).  
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Even poor peasants jettisoned their sympathy for the insurrection and resisted the 
Shining Path (McClintock, 1998; Berg, 1994).   
Judging that this rebel organization did not enjoy extensive civilian support, state 
leaders tried to engage or utilize civilian populations.  The government offered various 
economic incentives that aimed to entice civilians to its side.  García, for example, 
increased economic aid to southern highlands, in which the insurrection originated and 
gained momentum.  He also sought to redress peasants’ grievance by refurbishing the 
previous land reform to their advantage (McClintock, 1998).  Furthermore, embattled 
rulers used local populations for military purposes.  The government mobilized peasants 
disaffected by the Shining Path and formed militias (rondas) (McClintock, 1998; Starn, 
1998).  The rondas who were familiar with battlefield conditions helped the government 
conduct military operations effectively.  Acting as an intermediary between Amerindian 
farmers and government forces, the militias also contributed to mitigating local 
animosity toward the government (Starn, 1998; Poole & Renique, 1992).   
 
6.3. Insurgent Aim 
Insurgent groups seek either secession or regime change.  Insurgents may aim to obtain 
independence or greater autonomy.  Rebels may aim to subvert the current government 
and seize political power.  I hypothesize that state-sponsored mass killing is more 
extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war.  In Algeria, FLN insurgents 
aimed to dislodge France from their homeland and achieve independence (Hutchinson, 
1978; Fanon, 1988).  Leaders of the FLN prosecuted war in both Algeria and French 
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mainland.  In November 1954, the FLN launched war in the Aurès, a mountainous inland 
area, and strove to spread violence into other regions.  By the end of that year, the 
Kabylie region populated by Berbers in which anti-French uprisings had erupted became 
a bastion of the FLN (Heggoy, 1972).  Later, the war diffused into Algiers, the capital of 
colonial Algeria.  Soon after the insurgency started, violence penetrated most of Algeria 
(Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).   
In conjunction with guerilla attacks in Algeria, the FLN leadership unleashed 
violence in metropole France.  The FLN extended its liberation struggle to the metropole 
in an attempt to 1) instill fear among the French public and impel French citizens to call 
for retreat from Algeria, 2) subjugate its rival group, the Algerian National Movement 
(MNA), and secure the status of the sole representative of Algerian people, and 3) elicit 
support from Algerian expatriates (Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978).  In August 1958, the 
FLN began conducting terrorist attacks in France.  Police and military personnel and 
facilities were attacked.  The rebels exploded oil refineries and storage tanks to 
sabotage the French economy (Gillespie, 1976; Hutchinson, 1978).  Several assassination 
attempts targeting politicians occurred (Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006).  The FLN also 
targeted fellow Algerians.  Its leaders perceived that the MNA hindered them from 
swaying the independence struggle.  Hence, FLN insurgents sought to fracture their rival 
by unleashing violence (Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960).  In Café Wars, FLN agents carried out 
rampant bombing attacks and assassinations targeting leaders and supporters of the 
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MNA.38  Simultaneously, FLN leaders intimidated and even brutally punished Algerians 
who refused to buttress the war of national liberation.  FLN agents ruthlessly killed pro-
French Algerians.  The FLN extracted money from the diaspora community, which often 
entailed violence.  500 francs a month in taxes were imposed on students, 3,000 on 
workers, and 50,000 and more on shop owners and businessmen (Horne, 2006).  The 
rebels inflicted harsh punishment on those who did not pay this tax (Clark, 1960).          
Although FLN leaders projected violence in both homeland Algeria and 
metropole France, they succeeded in building Arab and Berber support.  Appealing to 
common ethnoreligious heritage, FLN fostered Algerian nationalism (Heggoy, 1972).  
Insurgent leaders vowed to redress colonial grievances and injustices by establishing a 
democratic system based on Islamic principles, securing liberties, and implementing 
socialist economic reform (Heggoy, 1972; Clark, 1960).  Furthermore, FLN terrorist 
attacks compelled some indigenous populations to jettison their pro-French or neutral 
stance and support the independence struggle.  Waging a war against popular FLN, 
French forces massacred Arabs and Berbers in an attempt to wipe out insurgent civilian 
support bases (Horne 2006; Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972).   
In Peru, the Shining Path aimed to subvert current governing elites and to 
establish a peasant-based revolutionary regime (McClintock, 1998; Degregori, 1994).  In 
other words, this rebel organization sought regime change.  Shining Path insurgents 
initiated war in a central highland region of Ayacucho and expanded battlefields to 
other rural regions and cities including Lima.  Battling government forces, Shining Path 
                                                 
38
 The bitter conflict between FLN and MNA is called Café Wars because of the location of violence.  Both 
groups engaged in bombings and assassinations against each other in cafés.     
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leaders failed to build nationwide civilian support.  At the outset of the war, the peasant 
populations supported the Shining Path because it espoused the creation of a peasant-
based communist society.  As the war progressed, however, more peasants withdrew 
their support for the Shining Path because the rebel leaders enforced a strict and 
idiosyncratic variant of Marxism-Leninism (Gorriti, 1992; Isbell, 1994).  The insurgent 
leadership banned commercial activities on which small-scale farmers relied for their 
survival.  The rebels also implemented policies that disregarded or offended indigenous 
culture (Degregori, 1994).   
To make matters worse, Shining Path leaders failed to muster urban support.  
They perceived that in order to win the war, they needed to capture Lima, the capital, 
and other urban areas.  Thus, the insurgents endeavored to penetrate urban regions 
and gain support from urban residents (Smith, 1994b; McClintock, 1998).  Although 
some segments of workers and intellectuals backed the rebellion, many city dwellers did 
not join the Shining Path because the rebel leadership did not offer attractive incentives 
(Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994; Smith, 1994b).  Of course, the Shining Path 
championed equal distribution of wealth and eradication of poverty.  Shining Path 
leaders, however, were preoccupied with their ideology revolving around peasantry and 
did not formulate incentives or policies that dovetailed with interests of the urban 
population.  To recapitulate, while expanding battlefields, the Shining Path failed to 
institute nationwide support systems because 1) its leaders imposed a radical 
communist ideology and 2) they did not offer incentives that accommodated urban 
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interests.  The absence of widespread civilian support for the rebels restrained the 
government from obliterating civilian populations.     
In both Algeria and Peru, insurgent groups expanded battlefields.  Although 
pursuing independence, FLN insurgents prosecuted war in both their homeland and 
metropole France.  The Shining Path strove to control rural provinces as well as major 
cities.  FLN leaders succeeded in mustering support from both local Algerians and 
Algerian expatriates by nurturing nationalism and resorting to coercion.  This prompted 
French forces to project massive violence against Muslim Arabs and Berbers.  In contrast, 
leaders of the Shining Path failed to rally widespread civilian support because they had 
difficulty in making diverse populations converge on the rebel cause, which deterred the 
government from orchestrating extensive mass killing.  The two cases illustrate that 
secessionist war results in more extensive civilian killings than regime change war.  The 
Algerian war, however, does not correspond to my theoretical argument in that zones of 
violence were broad but insurgents garnered widespread civilian support.  Therefore, 
similar to the statistical analyses, I cannot conclude that case studies corroborate my 
hypothesis with respect to insurgent aim and state-sponsored extensive mass killing.       
 
6.4. Ethnoreligious and Rival Support  
Insurgent groups may obtain foreign support from their ethnoreligious brethren.  The 
rebels may be sponsored by the government’s rival states.  I suggest that ethnoreligious 
and rival supports generate strong civilian backing for insurgents, which propels 
embattled rulers to commit extensive mass killing.     
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During the Algerian War of Independence, the FLN received significant support 
from outside Algeria.  Clark (1960) claimed that without external support, FLN 
insurgents could have neither sustained the war nor attained national liberation.  
Neighboring Muslim Arab states vehemently backed the FLN.  Tunisia and Morocco that 
had fought France and gained independence in 1956 naturally sympathized with the 
violent struggle by Algerians, their ethnoreligious brethren.  Furthermore, at that time, 
Tunisia had a rivalry relationship with France.  After Tunisian independence, France’s 
desire for maintaining military presence within Tunisia ignited violent incidents between 
the two countries. Tension continued unabated until a complete French pullout in 1963 
(Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004).  Bourguiba in Tunisia and King Mohammed V in Morocco 
sponsored the FLN in various ways.  They provided safe sanctuaries to FLN insurgents.  
The FLN smuggled young recruits into Tunisia and Morocco and trained them while 
evading France’s crackdown (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  The presence of these safe 
havens enabled insurgent leaders to reenergize their combatants and prepare for 
operations inside Algeria.  From Tunisia and Morocco, FLN combatants infiltrated Algeria 
and launched numerous ‘hit and run’ attacks in spite of wire border fences built by 
France (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960).  The FLN also established political 
bases in these countries and utilized them to publicize and internationalize its war 
against imperialist France (Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  Furthermore, 
Bourguiba and King Mohammed V buttressed the Algerian war by channeling weapons 
to FLN combatants operating inside Algeria (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  Egypt, 
another neighboring Muslim Arab country, also backed the FLN.  Nasser, then Egyptian 
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President, who nationalized the Suez Canal and waged a war against France, Britain, and 
Israel agitated for pan-Arab nationalism.  Helping Algerians flush out French forces 
corresponded to his goal of eliminating colonial rule and promoting unity throughout 
the Arab world.  Thus, Egypt sponsored the FLN by supplying ammunitions and financial 
resources (Heggoy, 1972).   
External support was not confined to states.  Non-state actors also supported 
FLN’s war against France.  Algerian emigrants in France voluntarily or forcibly furnished 
the insurgents with a huge amount of cash.  The colonial authority estimated that the 
monthly contribution of the Algerian diaspora community amounted to 500 million 
francs, which was equivalent to 1,428,000 dollars (Clark, 1960).  Some non-Algerian 
individuals joined Algerians’ struggle for national liberation.  Frantz Fanon who 
formulated theory of anti-colonial revolution translated his theory into action.  During 
the war, he worked for the FLN as a psychiatrist, war strategist, and diplomat (Macey, 
2000; Fanon, 1988; Fanon, 2004).  The Jeanson network, a group of French communist 
militants, raised funds for the FLN and helped French army deserters and rebel agents to 
hide (Horne, 2006).     
Support from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algerian diasporas was rigid and 
consistent despite France’s efforts to sabotage this support.  French colonialists 
attempted to stymie the inflow of weapons and rebel combatants by beefing up border 
security and enforcing sea interdictions.  For instance, France constructed the Morice 
Line along the boundaries with Tunisia and Morocco, which consisted of electric fences, 
minefields, and radar alarm systems (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976).  Simultaneously, 
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French colonialists took aggressive actions that encroached on the sovereignty of 
Morocco and Tunisia.  In 1956, the French Air Force intercepted a Tunis-bound 
Moroccan plane carrying exiled FLN leaders and forced it to land in Algiers to arrest 
them (Horne, 2006).  In 1958, seeking revenge for FLN’s attacks from Tunisia, France 
raided Sakiet, a Tunisian village near the border with Algeria, which the insurgents used 
as a military base.  Daylight bombing and strafing razed this frontier village and killed 
Tunisian civilians as well as FLN fighters (Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960).  Reinforcing border 
security and mounting military attacks failed to deter Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt from 
sponsoring Algerian nationalists.  Furthermore, the French authority found it difficult to 
obstruct Algerian expatriates from bankrolling the FLN because financial transactions 
were often done in a clandestine and intricate manner.   
Significant support from Muslim Arab brothers and France’s rival state helped 
FLN leaders build civilian support.  At the outset of the war, indigenous Algerians were 
not enthusiastic about the rebel cause.  They assumed a wait-and-see attitude, 
reckoning that they would join the FLN if it had a higher chance of winning (Heggoy, 
1972; Clark, 1960).  The FLN took advantage of external support to convince hesitant 
civilians to buttress the struggle for independence.  Insurgent leaders conveyed the 
message that their Muslim Arab brothers and France’s arch enemy were consistently 
sponsoring them and thus they were able to defeat French forces.  The tenacity of this 
foreign support and civilian backing for the FLN propelled France to liquidate a large 
number of indigenous Algerians.   
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Contrary to FLN in Algeria, the Shining Path in Peru did not receive external 
support from its ethnoreligious brothers and the government’s rivals.  The Peruvian civil 
war reflects ethnic division of belligerents to a certain extent.  Amerindians and 
Mestizos accounted for the majority of the peasant population, whereas descendants of 
Spaniards and other European settlers occupied the upper echelons of the society.  
Shining Path leaders who were communists did not take advantage of ethnic inequality.  
Emphasizing class division and transnational solidarity of workers, Marxism-Leninism 
claims that ethnicity can be manipulated by the ruling bourgeoisie to impede proletariat 
unity (Lenin, 1969).  Thus, ethnicity should be despised and overcome.  Following this 
communist tenet, Shining Path leaders disregarded ethnic dimension of the war, which 
implies that they did not envisage receiving support from Amerindians or Mestizos in 
neighboring countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador (McClintock, 1998).  In addition, 
Amerindians and Mestizos living in Peru’s neighbors did not wield significant political 
power.  Therefore, even if they sympathized with the Shining Path’s communist 
revolution, they were not able to lend support to their co-ethnics in Peru.  During the 
war, the Peruvian government had hostile relations with the United States and Ecuador.  
Animosity toward Peru, however, did not lead these two countries to sponsor the 
Shining Path.  Leaders of the United States and Ecuador feared that rebel victory would 
galvanize the diffusion of communist revolution across South America.  Furthermore, 
Shining Path’s involvement in drug production and trafficking vexed the two countries 
and inhibited them from backing this group (Gonzales, 1992).  Illicit drug business also 
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generated enormous profits, which deprived the insurgents of the incentive to seek 
outside support (Gorriti, 1994).   
The absence of external support may account for why the Shining Path did not 
obtain widespread civilian support.  Some peasants, workers, and intellectuals 
dedicated themselves to the revolution.  Conversely, many civilians caught in war 
calculated which side they would take in order to ensure survival (Palmer, 1994).  To 
these ‘opportunistic’ civilians, the lack of external support might signal that rebel 
combatants did not have the capabilities of defeating stronger government troops.  
Hence, even if sympathizing with the rebel cause, these citizens were reluctant to back 
the Shining Path.  Furthermore, no foreign actors regulated or monitored rebels’ 
behavior, which removed an obstacle to rebels’ brutality against the civilian population.  
The Shining Path often unleashed violence against civilians in order to intimidate them 
into complying with the rebels.  Violence, however, eventually antagonized civilians 
further and stimulated defection to the government.  This led embattled rulers to 
abstain from extensive mass killing.            
Similar to statistical analyses, the two cases substantiate my hypothesis germane 
to ethnoreligious support for insurgents.  Case analyses also find support for rival 
support, which does not conform to quantitative results.  The FLN in Algeria received 
significant support from its Muslim Arab brothers (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algerian 
expatriates) and France’s rival state (Tunisia).  The rigidity of this support helped the 
insurgents mobilize Arab and Berber civilians for guerilla warfare, which triggered 
France’s extensive mass killing.  In contrast, the Shining Path in Peru did not obtain any 
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external support, which made civilians keep doubting rebels’ capacity.  Outside actors 
did not monitor the insurgents’ behavior, which paved the way for civilian abuses by the 
rebels.  Therefore, civilian support for insurgents was not broad, which restrained the 
government from engineering extensive mass killing.   
 
6.5. Lootable Resources 
Rebel organizations may extract or cultivate lootable resources and make enormous 
profits.  I posit that exploitation of these resources curtails civilian support for 
insurgents, which deters the government from engaging in extensive mass killing.  
During the Algerian war, the FLN did not exploit any lootable resource.  Although lacking 
lootable resources, the Algerian territory possessed abundant oil (Gillespie, 1972; Horne, 
2006).  In 1945, French oil corporations began searching the Saharan desert.  Shortly 
after the onset of the war, they discovered oil deposits at Edjelé and Hassi Messaoud.  In 
1958, the French authority started transporting oil from Hassi Messaoud to the 
metropole through a pipeline (Horne, 2006).  FLN’s sabotage on the pipeline, however, 
obstructed this oil shipment, preventing a large quantity of oil from reaching France 
(Gillespie, 1972).   
The presence of oil in the Saharan desert made France cling more to Algeria.  
French rulers believed that extracting oil would help to revitalize the domestic economy 
strained by the World War II and the Indochina War and thus to restore the lost glory 
(Gillespie, 1972; Horne, 2006).  Simultaneously, oil helped the FLN catalyze civilian 
support.  By claiming that independent Algeria would thrive due to oil resources, 
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insurgent leaders alleviated natives’ apprehension of life in the post-independence era 
and fostered nationalism, which engendered staunch local support for the insurgency 
(Gillespie, 1972).  Potential benefits of oil and popular support for the FLN steered 
French leaders to carnage against Muslim Algerians.       
In Peru, the Shining Path exploited coca, the raw material of the cocaine drug.  In 
the mid-1980s, the Shining Path exerted control over the Upper Huallaga Valley, a major 
coca-producing region in Peru (Rochlin, 2003; Cunningham, 2007).  Its leaders forged a 
strategic alliance with coca cultivators and drug traffickers.  The Shining Path collected 
‘revolutionary’ taxes from those who engaged in the drug industry.  In exchange for the 
taxes, Shining Path insurgents protected coca producers from coca eradication or drug 
interdiction campaigns conducted by the Peruvian and U.S. governments (Gonzales, 
1992).  It is estimated that the Shining Path earned between 20 million to 550 million 
dollars annually from the illicit drug production and trade (McClintock, 1998).   
The exploitation of coca, however, led to the abuse of civilian populations.   
Shining Path leaders wanted to maximize resource profits and use them to enhance 
their capacity.  Therefore, to promote coca production, rebel leaders gave free rein to 
coca cultivators and drug traffickers (Taylor 2006; Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994).  The 
Shining Path acquiesced in dismal working conditions and the abuse of civilians in coca 
fields.  Even the insurgents themselves inflicted harm on local populations (Taylor, 2006).  
As a result, although coca production and drug trade generated a significant amount of 
revenues, civilian abuse that was concomitant with resource exploitation made the 
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Shining Path lose civilian support.  This restrained embattled rulers from maximizing 
human rights violations and annihilating civilian populations.     
Examining the two wars lends partial support to my theoretical argument.  The 
Peruvian civil war conforms to my logic that links rebels’ exploitation of lootable 
resources to no extensive mass killing by state.  The Shining Path promoted the 
exploitation of coca, which led to rebels’ abuse of civilian populations.  This contributed 
to deterring governing elites from eradicating indigenous peasants and poor urban 
dwellers.  On the other hand, the Algerian war does not corroborate my theoretical logic.  
Of course, the FLN did not exploit lootable resources and French troops perpetrated 
carnage.  Massive violence against Arabs and Berbers, however, resulted from the 
presence of oil, not the absence of lootable resources.  The Algerian territory did not 
contain lootable resources, but was abundant in oil, a nonlootable resource.  Although 
the FLN did not extract oil and earn profits, this group capitalized on the presence of oil 
to foster nationalism.  Furthermore, oil made French leaders intransigent.  Both factors 
account for France’s massive violence against Muslim Algerians.  This suggests that the 
Algerian war offers alternative explanations for state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  
Therefore, I conclude that similar to statistical analyses, case studies do not confirm my 
hypothesis pertinent to rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources.     
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6.6. Political Marginalization 
I suggest that severe political marginalization breeds or exacerbates grievances and thus 
yields ardent civilian support for insurgents, which propels embattled rulers to 
orchestrate extensive mass killing.  In colonial Algeria, political discrimination was 
rampant during and before the independence war.  Colonizing Algeria, France 
systematically marginalized Arabs and Berbers from politics (Heggoy, 1972; Fanon, 
1988).  French rulers imposed an apartheid-style political system on Algeria, restricting 
political rights of indigenous populations and systematizing racial discrimination against 
them (Wall, 2001; Bonora-Waisman, 2003).  Under the colonial rule, Muslim Algerians 
played little role in administering their own affairs and their voices were disregarded or 
suppressed (Polk, 2007; Heggoy, 1972).  France did not allow indigenous populations to 
elect their representatives for central consultative assemblies.  Officials handpicked by 
the French authority represented the natives (Heggoy, 1972).  French military chiefs 
exerted firm control over native communes in which the majority of population was 
Arabs or Berbers.  Caïds, native administrative officials, were relegated to the role of 
assisting the French chiefs, possessing no significant power (Heggoy, 1972).  To inhibit 
indigenous participation in politics, French rulers enforced discriminatory citizenship 
laws that required Muslims to abandon their culture to acquire French citizenship 
(Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007; Horne, 2006).  After the end of the First World War, 
Algerians’ demands for redressing political marginalization gained momentum, which 
compelled French leaders to seek some political reforms (Gillespie, 1976).  The Lamine-
Gueye law of 1946, for instance, stipulated that all inhabitants of Algeria were entitled 
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to French citizenship.  The 1947 Statute created the Algerian Assembly in which Muslims 
had sizeable representation (Gillespie, 1976; Clark, 1960).  These reforms, however, 
failed to alleviate native Algerians’ discontent.  Although granting French citizenship to 
Muslims, France did not obliterate the discriminatory political system.  Votes held in the 
Algerian Assembly were often rigged to favor French colonialists and pieds-noirs 
(Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972).   
During the war, French rulers who viewed Algeria as an inalienable part of 
France were unwilling to relinquish substantial political power and to equalize Muslims 
and pieds-noirs (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978).  Of course, France promulgated 
several political reforms in an attempt to assuage embittered natives and sabotage 
FLN’s support bases.  The colonial authorities sought to implement the 1947 Statute 
that would concede Muslims a larger voice in the colonial government and enfranchise 
Muslim women (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  At the same time, colonial rulers 
attempted to induce more Arabs and Berbers into government job (Heggoy, 1972).  
These reforms, however, fizzled out and political marginalization continued unabated.  
To pieds-noirs and Jews, the execution of the reforms would advantage the Muslim 
population and undermine their political status.  Hence, they conducted intense 
lobbying to frustrate France’s attempts to mitigate political marginalization of Muslims 
(Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972).  Furthermore, the political incentives by France did not 
satisfy Arabs and Berbers.  The reforms aimed at assimilating native Algerians, not 
guaranteeing them significant political autonomy.  Continuing political marginalization 
exacerbated grievances among indigenous Algerians.  They perceived that political 
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marginalization would not subside under the French rule, which urged them to 
jeopardize their lives and join the FLN (Heggoy, 1972).  Therefore, French forces 
unleashed massive violence against Arabs and Berbers in an attempt to ruin insurgents’ 
civilian support bases and strangle the struggle for independence.    
In contrast, political discrimination did not prevail during the Peruvian civil war.  
Throughout the 1980s, Peruvian leaders did not marginalize a certain segment or the 
majority of citizens from political process.  The elites retained a democratic political 
system.  Presidential and parliamentary elections were held regularly and considered 
free and fair.  Opposition parties rarely disputed election results (McClintock, 1998).  
Those who criticized the government were given plenty of leeway.  In other words, even 
though confronting the Shining Path insurgency, the government refrained from 
imposing political restriction or repression (McClintock, 1998; Taylor, 2006).  Through 
elections, opposition parties publicized their alternative opinions or policies and 
competed for political power.  Civic organizations, labor unions, and churches operated 
with little restraints.  Even the government tolerated organizations sympathetic to the 
Shining Path.  In addition, racism entrenched in the Peruvian society was neither 
politicized nor institutionalized (Taylor, 2006; Degregori, 1994).  Throughout history, 
Amerindians were subject to racial discrimination.  Caucasians and even Mestizos 
disparaged them and denied them economic and social opportunities.  This 
socioeconomic discrimination, however, did not translate into systematic political 
discrimination.  This suggests that peasants and other citizens who leaned toward the 
Shining Path were guaranteed the right to participate in politics and to advance their 
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interests.  Therefore, the Shining Path did not identify political marginalization as a main 
cause of its communist revolution (McClintock, 1998).  In the 1990s, however, the 
democratic political system collapsed.  In 1992, President Fujimori staged a self-coup 
backed by the military and enforced authoritarian rule.  He did not prohibit dissident 
groups, but restricted their activities to a certain degree (Cunningham, 2007).     
 A low level of political marginalization constrained the Shining Path from gaining 
widespread civilian support.  Although the democratic system did not function perfectly 
and racism was rampant, ordinary citizens enjoyed political freedom and rights.  Political 
organizations that represented diverse voices operated with little fear of repression 
(McClintock, 1998).  Therefore, many citizens perceived that violence was not the only 
way to address Peru’s problems.  Free and fair elections provided the populace with the 
opportunity to judge incumbents and vent their discontents.  Without unleashing 
violence, citizens could advance their interests by supporting opposition parties, labor 
unions, or civic organizations (Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994).  The electoral system 
and alternative political outlets hampered the Shining Path’s attempts to expand its 
support bases.  The rebels obtained support only from some segments of peasants, 
workers, and intellectuals who believed that exercising political rights would be futile.  
Therefore, the government steered clear of massive violence against civilians.           
As with statistical analyses, comparison of the Algerian War of Independence 
and the Peruvian civil war confirms my hypothesis pertaining to political marginalization.  
In Algeria, the colonial authority suppressed political and civil rights of indigenous 
Algerians and maintained racial discrimination system.  This political marginalization 
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urged aggrieved Algerians to rally around the FLN, which instigated extensive mass 
killing by the French government.  On the other hand, Peruvian leaders did not impose 
extensive and ruthless restriction on political and civil rights of peasants, workers, and 
leftist intellectuals.  The presence of a sound electoral system and alternative 
organizations vitiated the Shining Path’s attempts to build widespread support, which 
deterred embattled rulers from orchestrating extensive mass killing.   
 
6.7. Economic Marginalization 
I maintain that severe economic marginalization spawns or aggravates grievances and 
thus generates strong civilian support for rebels, which can trigger state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing.  In Algeria, economic discrimination reigned before and during 
the independence war.  French colonial rule pauperized indigenous Arabs and Berbers, 
the majority of whom relied heavily on agriculture for survival.  In the 19th century, the 
colonial authority confiscated a large portion of fertile land and redistributed it to 
European settlers (Gillespie, 1976; Polk, 2007; O’Ballance, 1967).  This land grab was 
enforced in reprisals for anti-French resistance, and often entailed brutal force.  For 
instance, after subduing insurrection in Kabylie, France seized 453,000 hectares of 
Berbers’ land and flushed out local peasants (Polk, 2007; Gillespie, 1976).  The 
confiscation of arable land wreaked great havoc on indigenous populations.  Thousands 
of Arab and Berber peasants flocked to cities in search of work.  Often unemployed or 
engaging in low-wage jobs, they suffered from chronic poverty (Gillespie, 1976; Polk, 
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2007).  With land seizure, France instituted typical colonial economic system in which 
raw materials were exported to the metropole and value-added manufactured products 
were imported to Algeria (Gillespie, 1976).  This system was based on the exploitation of 
indigenous labor force, thus exacerbating Muslims’ living conditions (Fanon, 2004; 
Fanon, 1988).  In the 20th century, abject poverty of Arabs and Berbers did not abate.  In 
other words, the colonial rule continued impoverishing and marginalizing native 
populations, while benefiting pieds-noirs and Jews.  The French did not industrialize 
Algeria but sustained the exploitative economic system because of pieds-noirs’ 
resistance.  Wealthy European settlers who generated huge revenues from the colonial 
system believed that industrialization would damage their economic interests and 
enhance economic status of Muslims (Gillespie, 1976).  France also neglected the 
education of indigenous populations.  Up until 1954, their illiteracy rates were over 90% 
(Gillespie, 1976).  The paucity of education blocked Arabs and Berbers from acquiring 
public service and high-salary jobs, restricting them to agriculture and other physical 
labor positions (Gillespie, 1976).  Economic hardship was aggravated by a population 
explosion.  During the French occupation, the Muslim population in Algeria significantly 
swelled.  From 1876 to 1954, the number of Muslims increased by about 7 million, and 
an overwhelming majority of Muslims were young (Gillespie, 1976).  Rapid population 
growth strained economic resources and raised unemployment rates further.        
After the outbreak of the war, France proposed measures that aimed to alleviate 
the wretched conditions of indigenous Algerians and deter them from supporting FLN 
guerillas.  Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria, attempted to implement 
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economic reforms that included land redistribution, financial assistance, and the 
improvement of basic infrastructure.  To execute these reforms efficiently, he 
established Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) throughout Algeria (Clark, 1960; 
Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).  French Army officers exercised authority over the SAS, 
tasked with building local ties and addressing natives’ economic grievances.  Although 
marking some successes, the SAS program failed to eradicate economic marginalization 
of Muslims that was entrenched in the colonial society; therefore, economic 
marginalization persisted (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978).  SAS administrators often 
performed poorly because of 1) lack of coordination and funds and 2) their 
condescending or racist attitude toward the locals (Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).  
Furthermore, European settlers who aspired to retain their firm grip on power ardently 
defied SAS chiefs’ efforts to mitigate economic grievances of Muslim Algerians (Heggoy, 
1972).  Continuing economic marginalization galvanized civilian support for the 
nationalists.  Indigent Arabs and Berbers believed that they would continue to live in 
misery if France maintained its colonial presence, which propelled them to participate in 
the independence struggle.  Strong civilian support for the FLN drove French leaders to 
engineer extensive mass killing as a strategy for stifling the insurgency.   
Economic marginalization was also rampant in Peru.  When the war raged in the 
1980s, the majority of the population suffered from poverty.  In rural regions, severe 
land and income inequalities, the economic legacy of Spanish colonialism, persisted.  A 
small number of landlords, mostly descendants of European settlers, owned a large 
portion of arable land (hacienda) and monopolized profits from agricultural production 
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(Taylor, 2006; Smith, 1994a).  In contrast, peasants, mostly Amerindians and Mestizos, 
were subservient to these landowners and mired in chronic poverty.  Some past rulers 
attempted to address this problem.  In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, left-leaning 
president Velasco aggressively implemented agrarian reform programs, expropriating 
haciendas and distributing them to the peasant population (Smith, 1994a; Taylor, 2006).  
This reform, however, benefited only a fraction of the peasantry (some ex-hacienda 
workers) (McClintock, 1998; Smith, 1994a).  Most indigenous populations engaging in 
subsistence farming did not enjoy benefits from the agrarian reform.  Combating the 
Shining Path, the García government followed Velasco’s footstep and carried out land 
redistribution.  As with the previous reform, however, Garcia’s policy failed to mitigate 
economic marginalization of landless peasants (Smith, 1994a).  Economic plight was not 
restricted to rural highlands.  In the 1980s, severe economic crisis swept the entire 
country.  Inflation surged from 70 percent in 1982 to 1,722 percent in 1988 and 7,650 
percent in 1990 (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1994).  National debts soared and the 
government’s finances became moribund.  Not only peasants but also lower- and 
middle-class city dwellers were hit hardest by the economic turbulence.  More urban 
citizens were plunged into poverty (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1994).   
 Leaders of the Shining Path took advantage of economic marginalization to rally 
public support.  They claimed that only communist revolution would smash the 
economic status quo and redress economic grievances.  This message induced some 
peasants, workers, and leftist intellectuals to support the Shining Path.  Severe 
economic marginalization, however, did not lead to the expansion of rebel support 
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bases.  Many urban residents blamed the government for their economic hardship, but 
were reluctant or unwilling to join the Shining Path because of its peasant-based 
ideology and the presence of alternative organizations.  Shining Path’s ideology heavily 
influenced by Mao’s communism zeroed in on peasants, disregarding urban interests 
(Degregori, 1994; McClintock, 1998).  Diverse leftist groups struggled for lower- and 
middle-class citizens, which frustrated rebel attempts to build urban support.  Even in 
rural regions, severe economic plight did not stimulate massive support for the 
insurgency because the rebel leadership not only offended local indigenous culture, but 
also enforced extreme policies such as banning all commercial activities and the 
consumption of alcohol (Degregori, 1994).  The absence of widespread support for the 
rebels deprived the government of the incentive to perpetrate extensive mass killing.      
The case studies disconfirm my hypothesis with respect to economic 
marginalization, which differs somewhat from statistical analyses that lend partial 
support to this hypothesis.  Muslim Algerians and Peruvian peasants suffered from dire 
poverty.  In other words, both groups were marginalized in terms of economic well-
being.  In Algeria, severe economic marginalization produced strong civilian support for 
the independence war, which led the French to massacre native populations.  
Conversely, many impoverished citizens in Peru disengaged from the Shining Path 
because 1) they were able to advance their interests by participating in elections and 
joining alternative organizations and 2) rebel leaders enforced their own communist 
ideology based on an extreme and strict interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.  Therefore, 
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embattled rulers abstained from escalating human rights violations to large-scale mass 
killings.           
 
6.8. Armed Conflict History 
I theorize that a history of intense armed conflict helps insurgents foster grievances and 
build civilian support, which can steer the government to extensive mass killing.  In 
Algeria, before 1954, Arabs and Berbers had violently resisted French colonial rule.  In 
1832, two years after French troops occupied Algeria, Abd al-Qadir, a devout Muslim 
leader, launched an insurgency against France (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976; Polk, 2007).  
By fomenting religious fervor, he rallied tribes and religious brotherhoods from all over 
Algeria (Polk, 2007; Gillespie, 1976).  In an attempt to defeat superior French troops, al-
Qadir forces conducted guerilla warfare, taking advantage of steep mountains (Horne, 
2006; Polk, 2007).  The insurgents won numerous battles and threatened Algiers until 
1842.  After military setbacks, France implemented a troop surge and applied scorched-
earth tactics, which contributed to weakening insurgent forces (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 
1976).  In 1847, Abd al-Qadir ultimately capitulated and the rebellion ended (Polk, 2007; 
Horne, 2006).  This intense conflict generated about 300,000 total deaths.39   
After the Abd al-Qadir insurgency, anti-colonial violence erupted sporadically.  
For instance, in 1871, anti-French rebellion broke out in Kabylie and spread to other 
regions, but petered out the next year.  In 1945, anti-French demonstrations in Sétif 
                                                 
39
 I referred to COW for the number of total deaths in the war between Abd al-Qadir insurgents and 
France.   
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escalated into violent confrontations between Muslims and French forces.  The French 
Army squelched the clashes by massacring unarmed protestors (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 
1976).  After restoring order, French troops sought ruthless retaliation, carrying out 
summary executions and bombing Muslim villages (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 
1976).   
These previous conflicts helped FLN insurgents obtain support from indigenous 
populations.  Insurgent leaders admired Abd al-Qadir as the national hero and sought to 
recall his valiant struggle.  For instance, the insurgents adopted his white and green flag 
and hung his portrait in their headquarters (Horne, 2006).  The FLN also evoked the 
memory of the Sétif massacre.  By calling up previous anti-colonial resistance, the FLN 
leadership attempted to foment profound resentment toward the French and rekindle 
Muslim grievances against the colonial rule.  This attempt succeeded in galvanizing 
civilian support for the independence struggle, which incentivized French rulers to 
perpetrate carnage.   
In Peru, the Shining Path was established in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, a 
former university philosophy professor.  After inception, this communist organization 
focused its attention on universities (Cunningham, 2007; Taylor, 2006).  Shining Path 
leaders sought to disseminate their ideology and recruit university students.  After 
failing to reign in universities, the Shining Path began resorting to violence (Cunningham, 
2007).  In 1980, the rebel leadership boycotted elections and unleashed violence, which 
escalated into war.  This indicates that the war flaring up in the 1980s and early 1990s 
was the first armed conflict between the Shining Path and the government.  Even before 
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the Shining Path was founded, communist insurgency did not erupt.  Since communism 
emerged in the early 1920s, various communist parties had refrained from projecting 
violence against the government (McClintock, 1998).  They operated within the existing 
political system and some of them were even involved in electoral competition.       
 The absence of intense previous conflict might account for lack of extensive 
civilian support for the Shining Path.  In other words, a large number of peasants, 
workers, or political dissidents would have buttressed the Shining Path insurgency if 
communist revolution broke out in the past.  Previous armed conflict can be useful to 
foment hostility and grievances, agitate aggrieved populations, and draw support from 
them.  Hence, it can be claimed that the Shining Path failed to build widespread civilian 
support because this rebel group lacked fighting experience, a useful tool for mobilizing 
civilians.  In other words, the absence of prior armed conflict makes it very difficult for 
rebel leaders to generate civilian support significant enough to deliver a severe blow to 
the government.  This constrained embattled rulers from orchestrating extensive mass 
killing.          
Similar to statistical results, the study of the two cases substantiates my 
hypothesis pertaining to armed conflict history.  By capitalizing on past armed conflicts 
including the Abd al-Qadir insurgency, the FLN inflamed hostility against French 
colonialists and grievances against the status quo, which engendered civilian support for 
the insurgents.  This propelled colonial forces to massacre suspected or potential FLN 
supporters.  Conversely, communist insurgencies did not erupt in Peru before the 
Shining Path launched violence.  The absence of previous conflicts signifies that this 
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rebel group did not possess a useful tool for agitating populations against the 
government, which might explain why the insurgents did not obtain widespread civilian 
support and thus the government refrained from committing extensive mass killing.   
 
6.9. Summary   
In general, the case analysis results coincide with statistical ones (See Table 6.1 for 
summary.).  Examining the Algerian War of Independence and the Peruvian civil war 
corroborates my hypotheses germane to ethnoreligious support for insurgents, political 
marginalization, and armed conflict history.  The case studies do not support my 
hypotheses pertaining to insurgent aim and lootable resources, which also corresponds 
to the statistical analyses.  In terms of economic marginalization, conclusions from the 
qualitative analysis do not coincide with those from the quantitative analysis in that the 
case studies disconfirm my hypothesis on economic marginalization, while the statistical 
analyses partially confirm it.  With regard to insurgent aim, lootable resources, and 
economic marginalization, the case analysis captures some alternative explanations for 
state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  The Algerian war reveals that 1) secessionist 
insurgents can expand battlefields and construct civilian support systems and 2) the 
presence of precious natural resources itself can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass 
killing.  The Peruvian war demonstrates that severe economic marginalization does not 
translate into massive civilian support for insurgency when political rights are 
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guaranteed and rebel leaders impose a radical ideology, which restrains the government 
from orchestrating extensive mass killing.   
In terms of rival support, however, conclusions from the case analysis do not 
conform to those from the statistical one.  Analyzing the two cases confirms my 
hypothesis linking rival support for insurgents to state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  
Conversely, the statistical analysis based on a large number of civil wars disconfirms this 
hypothesis.    
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7 Conclusions 
7.1. Dissertation Summary  
Throughout history, warring parties contravened norms and laws of civilian protection 
and wreaked great havoc on civilian populations.  In the contemporary so-called 
‘civilized’ world, massive violence against civilians broke out in Ethiopia, Iraq, Indonesia, 
Sudan, Bosnia, and elsewhere.  Why do belligerents massacre civilians?  In this 
dissertation, I explored this question, focusing on the behavior of state leaders during 
civil war.  That is, I investigated conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil 
war commit extensive mass killing against their own populations.  State-sponsored mass 
killing is defined as the intentional killing of a large number of civilians perpetrated by 
the government.  The government comprises the security apparatus (e.g., military, 
police) and non-state actors abetted by governing elites (e.g., militias, vigilantes).  The 
perpetrators engage in direct killing such as execution, bombing, and beating and/or 
indirect killing such as food or aid blockade.      
Influential revolutionaries, such as Fanon, Mao, and Lenin, emphasized civilian 
support as a key element for the success of insurgency or revolution.  This implies that 
insurgents’ civilian support can affect the government’s strategies of defeating rebel 
combatants.  Extant literature on mass killing has not sufficiently taken into account 
civilian support for insurgents.  Some scholars (e.g., Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay 
(2004)) have argued that a high level of rebels’ civilian support can propel the 
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government to orchestrate mass killing.  These scholars, however, took civilian support 
as given, not addressing exogenous factors that generate or constrain civilian support 
for insurgents.  In other words, the existing literature overlooks that civilian support can 
be an intervening variable interposed between the exogenous factors and the extent of 
state-sponsored mass killing.  My dissertation fills this gap, theorizing and testing the 
linkage between factors that boost or stem civilian support for insurgents and extensive 
mass killing committed by the government during civil war.     
 I claim that secessionist war, insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious 
brethren and the government’s rival states, severe political and economic 
marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict catalyze civilian support for 
insurgents, which can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  Conversely, the 
rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources curtails civilian support for insurgency, which 
can inhibit the government from unleashing massive violence against civilians.  In 
secessionist war, violence tends to be localized, which makes it easier for insurgent 
leaders to build local support.  In contrast, insurgents who seek regime change tend to 
expand battlefields and to find it very difficult to make diverse populations rally around 
them.  Insurgent support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rivals 
can generate strong civilian support for the insurgency.  By emphasizing the rigidity of 
ethnoreligious and rival supports, rebel leaders can convince the civilian population of 
their ability to defeat government forces.  Furthermore, foreign supporters can monitor 
insurgents and constrain them from abusing local populations.  Severe political and 
economic marginalization and history of intense armed conflict breed or exacerbate 
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grievances against the government, which can drive aggrieved citizens to buttress the 
insurgency.  The exploitation of lootable resources can spawn greed among the rebel 
leadership, which restrains insurgent leaders from incentivizing civilians.  Furthermore, 
to maximize profits, rebels eschew reining in resource producers, which can pave the 
way for civilian abuses.  Therefore, civilians become reluctant or unwilling to support 
resource-rich insurgents.  Combating popular insurgents, state leaders might judge that 
non-mass killing strategies such as economic incentives and forced relocation would not 
deter civilians from backing the rebels, which can lead the incumbents to perpetrate 
extensive mass killing.  By massacring suspected or potential insurgent supporters, the 
government can wipe out insurgent support bases and thus cripple insurgent 
combatants.  Killing youths, children, and women can fracture insurgents’ future 
recruitment pool, which helps to stave off future insurgency.  In contrast, when rebels 
do not enjoy strong civilian support, embattled rulers might calculate that it is possible 
to stimulate mass civilian defection to the government by offering tangible and/or 
intangible incentives.  Therefore, the government abstains from projecting massive 
violence against civilians.     
In order to verify my theory, I performed statistical analysis and comparative 
case studies.  Both analyses reveal the positive relationship between civilian support for 
insurgents and severity of state-sponsored mass killing, which dovetails with my 
theoretical argument.  The statistical results and the cases of Algeria and Peru confirm 
my hypotheses germane to ethnoreligious support, political marginalization, and armed 
conflict history.  Therefore, based on the two analyses, I can claim that insurgent 
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support from their ethnoreligious brethren, severe political marginalization, and a 
history of intense armed conflict are likely to instigate state-sponsored extensive mass 
killing.  The outcomes about rival support and economic marginalization are ambivalent.  
Statistical analyses disconfirm my hypothesis that rebel support from the government’s 
rivals is likely to produce extensive mass killing, but case studies find support for this 
hypothesis.  Statistical results partially corroborate my hypothesis that severe economic 
marginalization is likely to generate extensive civilian killings, whereas case studies 
refute this hypothesis.  Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative studies do not 
substantiate my hypotheses pertinent to insurgent aim and lootable resources, which 
constrains me from arguing that secessionist war is likely to trigger state-sponsored 
extensive mass killing and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain 
massive violence.  Case studies locate some alternative explanations for state-
sponsored extensive mass killing.  The Algerian War of Independence illustrates that 1) 
secessionist violence is not necessarily localized and even in broad war zones, 
secessionist groups can muster strong civilian support and 2) the presence of valuable 
natural resources itself can incentivize the government to orchestrate carnage.  The 
Peruvian Civil War shows that harsh economic marginalization does not necessarily 
catalyze civilian support for insurgency.  When political rights are ensured and rebel 
leaders seek to materialize a radical ideology, abject economic conditions do not 
translate into widespread civilian support for insurgents, which dissuades the 
government from wielding massive violence against civilians.   
.    
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7.2. Theoretical and Policy Implications  
In my dissertation, I synthesize factors that engender civilian support for insurgents and 
the extent of mass killing perpetrated by the government.  I theorize about and test the 
relationship between these factors and the severity of mass killing.  My study has some 
theoretical implications.  First, as Lenin, Mao, and Fanon’s emphasis on civilian support 
implies, civilian support for insurgents can dictate the government’s strategies for 
subduing the insurgency.  My research affirms that massive civilian support for 
insurgents prompts embattled rulers to contravene international humanitarian law and 
engage in extensive civilian killings, which coincides with Sartre’s and Valentino, Huth, & 
Balch-Lindsay’s arguments.  Second, not all factors that can yield civilian support for 
insurgents trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  My analyses suggest that 
ethnoreligious support for insurgents, political marginalization, and armed conflict 
history explain and predict the extent of mass killing well.  Some of the analyses capture 
the effects of rival support for insurgents and economic marginalization on variation in 
state-sponsored mass killing.  In contrast, insurgent aim and rebels’ exploitation of 
lootable resources do not account well for the severity of mass killing.   
The results of my dissertation are relevant to policymakers.  Conducting both 
quantitative and qualitative studies, I find that ethnoreligious support for insurgents, 
severe political marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict can propel 
embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing.  Rival support for insurgents and 
economic marginalization account somewhat for the extent of mass killing.  
Furthermore, the presence or exploitation of precious natural resources can steer the 
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government to extensive civilian killings.  Based on these findings, I propose some 
policies for international policymakers to prevent civil war from culminating in carnage.  
Of course, sovereignty of a state should be respected.  Outside actors should refrain 
from breaching a state’ sovereignty and interfering with its domestic affairs.  
Nevertheless, if internal events are so egregious as to inflict enormous sufferings on the 
populace, humanitarian concern can be prioritized over state sovereignty.  Therefore, 
when civil wars manifest conditions that can give rise to state-sponsored massive civilian 
killings, third-party actors can intervene in these wars to shield civilians from the 
scourge of war.  
First, because transnational ethnoreligious or rival support for insurgents 
increases the risk of states’ employing massive violence against civilians, international 
actors need to stymie the externalization of the war.  In other words, UN, regional 
bodies, or major states should exert some efforts to dissuade rebels’ co-ethnics or 
religionists and the government’s rival states from intervening on the rebel side.  The 
international community can endeavor to address concerns of potential interveners or 
enforce arms embargoes or sea interdictions against the conflict state.  Second, my 
study suggests that alleviating political and economic marginalization reduces the risk of 
state-sponsored extensive mass killing.  Therefore, in order to weed out the possibility 
of the government’s atrocities, international policymakers need to reinforce human 
rights monitoring systems and encourage or compel state leaders to redress political 
and economic discrimination.  UN, regional organizations, or major states can engage in 
diplomacy and offer political or economic incentives.  If this strategy fails to induce 
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change, the third parties can ‘name and shame’ the ruling elites and impose some form 
of sanctions on them (e.g., overseas asset freezing, travel ban).  Third, my research 
implies that instituting durable peace after the end of war is essential to forestalling 
extensive mass killing from occurring in the future.  Thus, international policymakers 
need to pay close attention to post-war countries and keep them from sliding back to 
war.  UN and regional organizations can help these states revitalize their economy, 
install political systems that ensure freedoms and rights of all citizens, and expedite 
disarmament process.  These transnational bodies can also foster reconciliation 
between ex-warring parties and the restoration of mutual trust.  Finally, the presence of 
lucrative natural resources can escalate a war to the extent that international law is 
frequently violated and atrocities are rampant.  The international community needs to 
encourage the government to dispense (potential) resource revenues fairly.  If 
embattled rulers do not abandon their resource greed but intensify the war, UN, 
regional bodies, or individual countries can take measures that aim to hinder 
commercial activities revolving around the conflict-zone resources.  
 
7.3. Future Research Agenda 
In this section, I lay out a future research agenda derived from my dissertation.  State 
leaders embroiled in civil war can kill civilians through direct methods (e.g., shooting, 
bombing, beating) or through indirect methods (e.g., food or aid blockade, scorched 
earth policy).  Some rulers may engage more in direct killings, whereas others may 
resort more to indirect killings.  For instance, direct killing tends to be more conspicuous 
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than indirect killing.  Thus, democratic leaders who are sensitive to reputation may deny 
civilians food or items essential to human life, while desisting from shooting and 
bombing civilians.  It would be interesting to investigate conditions under which the 
government prefers wielding indirect violence or direct one.  The study of mass killing is 
pertinent to the study of ethnic cleansing and conflict severity.  When narrowing focus 
to ethnic group as a victim, the concept of mass killing is somewhat similar to that of 
ethnic cleansing.  Ethnic cleansing refers to the removal of a certain ethnic group from 
its territory.  State leaders dislodge members of an ethnic group by killing or expelling 
them, which indicates that ethnic cleansing has more extensive dimensions than mass 
killing.  Although ethnic cleansing merits attention, scholars have not addressed this 
subject in a systematic or sophisticated manner.  Therefore, it is worth exploring 
conditions under which ethnic cleansing transpires and ascertaining domestic and 
external factors that can prompt the government to eliminate citizens of certain ethnic 
origin.  Mass killing is also relevant to conflict severity in that the outbreak of extensive 
mass killing during civil war indicates the escalation of the war.  Only a fraction of earlier 
works on civil war tackles severity of civil conflict (e.g., Heger & Salehyan, 2007; Lacina, 
2006).  Scholars can examine conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil 
conflict project unbridled force, focusing on leaders’ militarism (leaders’ tendency to 
admire or glorify military force).  Previous military successes and military background 
instill militarism in the rulers, which can steer them to unfettered violence against 
insurgent combatants and supporters.  
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My analysis refutes the hypothesis that state-sponsored mass killing is more 
extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war.  One can restrict attention to 
secessionist war and examine conditions under which secessionist wars generate 
massive violence against local populations.  Tangible values of the disputed territory 
(e.g., natural resources, access to sea or neighboring states) may account for the 
government’s extensive civilian killings, as the Eritrean War of Independence and 
southern Sudanese insurgencies illustrate.  When secessionists aim at merging their 
home territory into neighboring countries, state leaders may project unfettered force 
against civilians (e.g., Somali insurgencies in Ethiopia).  To understand the causes of 
civilian killings, scholars can address not only secessionist war but also secessionist 
violence that does not reach the level of war.  Covering both minor conflicts and wars 
can help to capture the dynamics of violence against civilians.  With regard to regime 
change war, it would be interesting to investigate behavior of ‘new’ leaders (insurgents 
who succeed in subverting the government and seizing power).  Leadership change 
through war can entail revenge or accommodation.  Some new rulers seek ruthless 
retaliation against former elites and their supporters (e.g., killing and expulsion of Harkis 
and pieds-noirs in post-independence Algeria).  In contrast, other new leaders embrace 
former enemies and facilitate reconciliation (e.g., ANC leaders in post-apartheid South 
Africa).  Characteristics of past war may account for variation in leaders’ behavior.  For 
instance, if the war was so brutal to the extent to produce massive casualties, new 
leaders may seek revenge in order to build legitimacy among their followers or even 
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vent their personal anger.  If the war terminates with military victory and without peace 
agreement, new leaders may purge ex-leaders and their supporters from political realm.  
In this dissertation, I explore how insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious 
brethren and the government’s rival states can engender state-sponsored extensive 
mass killing.  Other types of rebels’ external support may account for the extent of mass 
killing.  For instance, agitating for global proletariat revolution, Marxist-Leninist 
ideologies emphasize transnational solidarity of oppressed peoples.  From this Marxist 
tenet, one can deduce that Marxist-based bond between insurgents and foreign 
supporters is rigid, which can propel embattled rulers to substitute massacring civilian 
populations for striving to curtail rebels’ outside support.  External support can be 
classified into direct support (troop support) and indirect support (non-troop support).  
The scale of state-sponsored mass killing may hinge on whether foreign support is direct 
or indirect.  One may argue that if foreign sponsors do not dispatch their troops but 
supply money and weapons, rebels rely entirely on local youths for combatants, which 
can prompt the government to engineer extensive civilian killings.  It would be 
interesting to examine whether indirect support for insurgents is more likely to trigger 
massive violence against civilians than direct support.   
The relationship between natural resources and mass killing also warrants 
attention.  My theoretical argument zeroes in on lootable resources such as diamonds, 
timber, and cocaine.  As the Algerian War of Independence illustrates, however, 
nonlootable resources such as oil, copper, and uranium can account for variation in 
state-sponsored mass killing.  These resources raise the stake of war, which can make 
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embattled rulers jettison their moral scruple and willing to exhibit brutality.  Precious 
nonlootable resources can spark secessionist demands and the government may 
attempt to preserve territorial integrity by eliminating local populations.  It would be 
interesting to establish plausible linkages between nonlootable resources and the 
extent of mass killing.  In addition, type of nonlootable resources that insurgent groups 
exploit may determine whether the government perpetrates atrocities or not.  For 
instance, the effect of mineral resources (e.g., gold, copper) on the severity of mass 
killing may diverge from that of oil.  Agricultural and non-agricultural resources may 
exert different effects on the scale of the government’s violence.  Scholars can 
categorize natural resources in various ways and ascertain what types of natural 
resources that the rebels exploit account for the government’s extensive civilian killings.  
 Finally, my study addresses the relationship between factors that breed or 
exacerbate grievances and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing during civil war.  
Here, I zero in on political and economic grievances.  Other sources of grievance, 
however, may explain and predict the severity of mass killing.  For instance, cultural 
discrimination or persecution infringes upon victims’ identity and exacerbates 
grievances against the government, which can produce strong civilian support for 
insurgents.  Encountering this predicament, embattled rulers might resort to extensive 
civilian killings in an attempt to suppress insurgents and ward off future insurgency. 
Culture plays a crucial role in politics as Marxist-influenced theorists stress.  Gramsci 
(1992) formulated the concept of cultural hegemony, which suggests that the 
bourgeoisie class consolidates their grip on power by imposing their beliefs, perceptions, 
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and values on the proletariat class.  In a similar vein, Fanon (2004 [orig. 1961]) argued 
that colonialists seek to wipe out indigenous cultures and implant their own culture as a 
strategy for perpetuating their rule.  Both Gramsci and Fanon called for cultural 
liberation for the success of proletariat or anti-colonial revolution.  Due to the influence 
of realism and rational choice approach, scholars who study war and violence have not 
paid much attention to culture.  Therefore, it is worth analyzing the relationship 
between cultural grievances and the scale of the government’s civilian killings during 
civil war.  Cultural grievances result from religious persecution, language restriction or 
banning, forced name change, among others.  Researchers can investigate which 
sources of cultural grievances account well for the outbreak of extensive mass killing.  
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                                   Table 4.1: Differences Between the Two Wars 
 
                                     Algerian War of Independence     Peruvian Civil War         
 
Number of deaths               70,000-570,000                           8,000-15,000 
Region                                    North Africa                                South America 
Cold War                                       Yes                                     Yes (& post-Cold War) 
Ethnic conflict                              Yes                                                  No 
Insurgent goal                       Independence                            Regime change 
War outcome                               Win                                                Lose 
 
 
 
 
                                        Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
              Variable                            Obs             Mean              Std dev           Min             Max 
 
    Death number (lowest)          157           35,526.19        135,381.3         0             1,205,200   
    Death number (middle)         157            93,593.23       344,691.3          0            3,280,050   
    Death number (highest)        157            150,964.7       566,196.8          0            5,354,900    
    Insurgent aim                           157              .414                   .494                0                    1 
    Ethnoreligious support           157              .376                   .486                0                    1   
    Rival support                            157              .459                     .5                  0                    1  
    Lootable resources                 157               .21                    .409                0                    1     
    Political competition              157              3.535                2.723               1                    10         
    GDP per capita                        157            1,411.036        2,199.608         48             22,236.9    
    Armed conflict history           157               .873                 .939                 0                     2 
    Civilian support                       157               .363                 .482                 0                     1  
    ELF                                            157                .512                 .287              .005                .925  
    Mountain                                157               34.159             28.876             0                     100  
    Distance (log)                         157                5.362              2.275               0                   9.337 
    Troop size (000)                     157             423.694          1,502.633          0                12,500 
    Population (log)                     157                9.004               1.509           5.252             13.546 
    Cold War                                 157                  .65                   .479                0                       1 
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Table 5.2: Insurgent Aim Model 
 
 
                                                                                        OLS                                                                      Negative Binomial  
 
                                       Lowest                          Middle                     Highest                       Lowest                      Middle                     Highest                            
  
Insurgent aim       -.446          -.005         -.411           .124         -.214         .239           .432         .532         .782          .89†         .874        .957†          
                                (.669)        (.599)        (.731)         (.655)       (.741)       (.662)        (.548)      (.489)       (.582)       (.497)      (.598)      (.509) 
Civilian support   3.121***  3.278***  3.469***  3.657***  3.708*** 3.869***  1.52*** 1.533*** 1.487*** 1.481*** 1.52*** 1.511** 
                                (.624)        (.617)         (.46)          (.675)       (.691)       (.682)        (.406)       (.416)      (.423)       (.424)      (.436)      (.437)   
ELF                         -.774                             -.713                            -.785                          -.659                          -.031                        1.434 
                               (1.06)                          (1.157)                        (1.173)                        (.955)                        (.902)                        (.904)  
Mountain               .005            .005          .007           .007          .008          .008           .012         .016*        .018*     .019**       .02*      .019** 
                                (.011)          (.01)         (.011)        (.011)       (.012)        (.011)       (.009)       (.007)        (.009)     (.007)      (.009)      (.007) 
Troop                     .0001          .0001        .0001        .0001         .0001       .0001       -.0002       -.0002     -.0003*   -.0003†   -.0003*  -.0003* 
                               (.0002)       (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)    (.0002)      (.0002)   (.0002)    (.0002)   (.0002) 
Distance                  .241                              .284                             .247                            .081                            .052                         .037 
                                (.147)                            (.161)                          (.163)                         (.129)                         (.136)                      (.138) 
Population               .18             .214           .183           .23             .208         .244          .332†       .359*         .501**  .514**     .547**   .549** 
                                 (.205)         (.201)        (.224)        (.22)          (.227)       (.222)        (.184)      (.184)        (.185)     (.178)      (.187)     (.177) 
Cold War               -.123          -.105          -.118         -.108          -.121        -.104          .478         .528           .969†     1.023*    1.173*    1.22* 
                                 (.621)         (.621)        (.678)       (.678)         (.688)       (.686)        (.492)      (.472)        (.512)     (.488)       (.52)      (.498) 
 
N                                157            157            157           157            157            157           157          157            157         157          157         157 
 
 
Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths 
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
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Table 5.3: Insurgent Aim Model without Anti-Colonial Wars 
 
 
                                                                                        OLS                                                                      Negative Binomial  
 
                                       Lowest                          Middle                     Highest                       Lowest                      Middle                     Highest                            
  
Insurgent aim       -.066        .29           -.039           .386           -.18          .552           .573         .734         .909         1.112*    1.002       1.192*          
                                 (.69)      (.642)        (.753)         (.701)       (.762)       (.708)        (.568)      (.512)       (.611)       (.525)      (.631)      (.541) 
Civilian support   3.21***  3.362***  3.608***  3.789***  3.812*** 3.971*** 1.597*** 1.58*** 1.618***  1.59***  1.669*** 1.642** 
                                (.66)       (.655)         (.72)          (.715)       (.728)       (.722)        (.427)       (.442)      (.454)       (.457)      (.472)      (.473)   
ELF                         -1.24                         -1.149                         -1.224                          -.935                         -.223                         -.032 
                              (1.108)                       (1.208)                       (1.223)                        (1.01)                        (.963)                        (.967)  
Mountain              .001          .003          .003           .005          .004          .006           .01          .017*        .017†      .019**     .018*        .02** 
                              (.011)        (.01)         (.012)        (.011)       (.012)        (.011)       (.009)       (.007)        (.009)      (.007)      (.009)       (.007) 
Troop                    .0001       .0001         .0001        .0001        .0003        .0001       -.0002     -.0002      -.0003†    -.0003†   -.0003*    -.0003† 
                             (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)    (.0002)     (.0002)    (.0002)    (.0002)     (.0002) 
Distance                .276†                          .312†                          .285†                          .129                            .103                         .089 
                              (.155)                          (.169)                          (.171)                         (.123)                         (.131)                      (.134) 
Population            .131          .16            .128           .168          .151          .183          .332†       .348†         .455*     .492**     .494*       .524** 
                              (.212)        (.209)       (.232)        (.228)       (.234)         (.23)        (.187)       (.192)        (.191)     (.186)       (.195)       (.185) 
Cold War              -.017        -.063         -.024          -.092         .005         -.046           .44          .539           .897†     1.004*     1.091*     1.189* 
                              (.643)        (.641)       (.701)        (.699)       (.709)       (.706)        (.494)       (.479)        (.521)     (.499)       (.531)        (.52) 
 
N                             143           143            143           143            143           143           143           143            143         143          143           143 
 
 
Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths 
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
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Table 5.4: Insurgent Capacity Model 
 
                                                                 
          OLS                                                                                      Negative Binomial  
                                                   
                                                    Lowest                     Middle                     Highest                          Lowest                   Middle                  Highest 
                                                                              
Ethnoreligious support    .927       .907         1.253†     1.254†    1.342†       1.34†          1.144**  .958*      1.498**  1.408**   1.57*** 1.51*** 
                                           (.643)     (.634)        (.697)      (.688)      (.705)         (.695)          (.631)    (.415)       (.431)      (.411)       (.443)     (.417) 
Rival support                   1.257*   1.339*      1.387*     1.474*     1.361†      1.446*        1.009*   1.175**    .843†     1.011*      .814         .97* 
                                           (.639)     (.629)       (.693)       (.683)      (.701)          (.69)            (.605)   (.441)       (.493)      (.471)       (.52)       (.491) 
Lootable resources         -.376       -.447         -.362        -.41         -.593         -.648           -.918†   -1.259**   -.857      -1.235*     -.88        -1.243* 
                                           (.71)       (.694)        (.771)      (.753)       (.779)        (.76)           (.543)     (.484)       (.588)      (.498)       (.615)     (.511) 
Civilian support               2.59*** 2.833*** 2.847*** 3.14***   3.127*** 3.402***     .981*     .998*       1.199*    1.229*     1.29**    1.326** 
                                          (.636)      (.607)        (.69)        (.658)       (.698)        (.665)          (.429)    (.439)        (.471)      (.486)      (.496)      (.509) 
ELF                                    -.644                         -.605                           -.63                              -.767                         -.214                       -.074           
                                          (1.06)                       (1.149)                      (1.162)                           (.792)                       (.808)                      (.831)       
Mountain                         .005                           .007                           .006                               .006                          .01                           .011           
                                          (.01)                          (.011)                         (.011)                            (.008)                       (.008)                      (.009)          
Troop                               .0001                         .0001                         .0001                            -.0001                      -.0001                     -.0002         
                                        (.0002)                       (.0002)                       (.0002)                         (.0002)                     (.0002)                    (.0002)       
Distance                          .166                            .206                             .19                                .098                          .127                         .135            
                                         (.13)                           (.141)                          (.143)                            (.105)                       (.109)                      (.112)         
Population                      .335†        .389*         .36           .403*        .373          .41*             .226        .208†         .31†      .227†        .327†     .228† 
                                          (.2)           (.186)       (.217)       (.202)         (.22)        (.204)           (.161)     (.124)        (.167)    (.133)       (.171)     (.137) 
Cold War                         .254          .251          .365          .322           .321         .276              .991*     .777†       1.484** 1.322*    1.658**  1.519** 
                                        (.641)        (.625)        (.695)       (.678)        (.703)      (.684)           (.454)      (.444)       (.484)    (.463)       (.502)      (.476) 
  
 N                                     157             157           157            157           157          157              157           157           157        157          157          157 
 
Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths 
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0, ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
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Table 5.5: Insurgent Capacity Model without Anti-Colonial Wars 
 
                                                                 
     OLS                                                                                          Negative Binomial  
                                                   
                                                    Lowest                     Middle                     Highest                          Lowest                   Middle                  Highest 
                                                                              
Ethnoreligious support    .86         .832            1.173       1.169        1.304†       1.3†             1.097*   .951*        1.468**  1.414**   1.545**  1.519*** 
                                           (.663)     (.656)          (.719)       (.711)        (.724)       (.716)           (.437)     (.431)         (.45)      (.462)       (.462)      (.432) 
Rival support                   1.205†    1.361*        1.347†     1.507*      1.347†      1.507*          1.08*    1.211**     .941†     1.057*      .922†      1.022* 
                                           (.667)      (.658)         (.724)       (.713)        (.729)        (.718)          (.468)     (.458)        (.515)      (.489)       (.543)      (.51) 
Lootable resources         -.589       -.615           -.574        -.572         -.824         -.824           -1.109*  -1.359**   -1.086†  -1.339**  -1.126†   -1.351** 
                                           (.724)      (.706)         (.786)       (.764)        (.792)         (.77)           (.547)     (.489)         (.591)     (.503)       (.616)      (.516) 
Civilian support              2.731*** 2.923***  3.024***  3.248***  3.258*** 3.472***    1.038*    1.049*     1.289**  1.281*     1.398**   1.378* 
                                          (.636)       (.659)        (.745)        (.714)        (.751)        (.719)          (.446)     (.464)         (.49)       (.513)      (.517)       (.538) 
ELF                                   -1.013                          -.931                            -.943                              -1.05                        -.511                        -.387          
                                         (1.016)                          (1.2)                          (1.209)                           (.837)                        (.871)                      (.903)       
Mountain                        .0002                            .002                             .002                               .003                          .006                         .006           
                                         (.011)                           (.011)                          (.012)                            (.008)                        (.009)                      (.009)          
Troop                               .0001                          .0001                           .0001                            -.0001                       -.0002                     -.0002         
                                        (.0002)                        (.0002)                        (.0002)                          (.0002)                      (.0002)                    (.0002)       
Distance                           .233                            .262†                            .255                                .16                           .195†                       .207†           
                                         (.144)                          (.156)                          (.158)                             (.104)                       (.108)                       (.111)         
Population                       .242         .321†         .259           .327           .273          .336             .207         .184          .27            .2           .279          .199 
                                         (.208)       (.193)        (.226)        (.209)        (.228)         (.21)            (.164)      (.128)       (.169)      (.137)      (.173)       (.141) 
Cold War                          .233         .207           .323           .25              .32           .247              .991*      .839†      1.459**   1.384** 1.621**   1.582** 
                                         (.658)       (.642)        (.714)        (.695)        (.719)          (.7)             (.464)      (.452)       (.493)      (.472)       (.51)        (.485) 
  
 N                                      143            143            143           143            143           143               143          143           143         143          143           143 
 
Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths 
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0, ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
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Table 5.6: Grievance Model  
 
 
                                                                                    OLS                                                                                              Negative Binomial 
                                                  Lowest                     Middle                      Highest                          Lowest                         Middle                   Highest 
                                                                                       
Political competition     -.265*    -.239*       -.328**     -.295*      -.318**     -.285*        -.216**    -.168*      -.244**   -.214**    -.245**    -.225** 
                                           (.108)    (.106)        (.117)        (.114)       (.119)        (.116)         (.076)       (.075)       (.082)      (.079)       (.085)       (.081) 
GDP                                  -.0000   -.00002     -.00003    -.00005    -.00002     -.00004      -.0001      -.0002*     -.0002     -.0002** -.0002†    -.0002** 
                                          (.0001)   (.0001)     (.0002)     (.0001)     (.0002)      (.0002)      (.0001)    (.00009)    (.0001)   (.00007)   (.0001)     (.00007) 
Conflict history                .619*      .68*          .684*       .742*         .644†        .708*        .802***    .893***   .771***   .834***    .76**       .821** 
                                          (.308)     (.297)        (.333)       (.322)         (.339)       (.328)       (.222)        (.218)       (.239)       (.238)       (.248)       (.246) 
Civilian support              2.85*** 3.023***  3.184*** 3.404***  3.448*** 3.665***  1.528*** 1.681*** 1.832*** 2.075*** 1.949*** 2.202*** 
                                         (.612)      (.589)        (.662)       (.638)         (.674)       (.649)       (.377)       (.413)        (.398)       (.417)       (.413)        (.42) 
ELF                                    -.31                           -.232                            -.309                          -1.108                        -.794                          -.651           
                                        (1.065)                      (1.153)                        (1.174)                        (.752)                         (.751)                        (.763)        
Mountain                        .011                           .014                              .014                            .005                           .005                           .005           
                                         (.01)                          (.011)                           (.011)                         (.007)                         (.008)                        (.008)       
Troop                              .0001                         .0001                           .0001                        -.00004                      -.0002                        -.0002         
                                       (.0002)                       (.0002)                        (.0002)                       (.0002)                       (.0002)                      (.0002)       
Distance                          .128         .122          .164           .148            .15           .132          .166†        .092         .236**      .196*       .253**      .229* 
                                        (.131)       (.123)       (.142)        (.133)        (.144)       (.135)         (.092)      (.094)        (.091)      (.095)       (.093)        (.097) 
Population                      .167                          .162                              .178                             .16                             .223                           .227           
                                        (.196)                        (.212)                           (.216)                          (.152)                         (.153)                        (.158)         
Cold War                        -.253         -.35         -.364          -.517         -.357         -.511          .651         .459          .986†        .784        1.095*       .901† 
                                        (.652)       (.623)      (.706)         (.675)        (.719)       (.687)        (.473)       (.47)          (.512)      (.477)       (.531)       (.482) 
 
N                                        157          157         157             157            157           157           157           157            157           157         157            157 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
                                                                              
 
 
162 
 
Table 5.7: Grievance Model without Anti-Colonial Wars  
 
 
                                                                                   OLS                                                                                                       Negative Binomial 
                                                  Lowest                     Middle                      Highest                          Lowest                         Middle                   Highest 
                                                                                       
Political competition     -.275*     -.259*        -.335**    -.312**     -.327**    -.304**     -.249**   -.208**      -.27**    -.236**    -.269**   -.243** 
                                           (.107)     (.105)         (.116)       (.113)        (.118)       (.115)        (.078)       (.079)        (.084)      (.082)      (.087)       (.083) 
GDP                                  .00009    .0001        -.00005    -.00003     -.00002    -.00001      -.0001      -.0002       -.0002     -.0003*   -.0002      -.0003* 
                                          (.0002)   (.0002)       (.0002)    (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0001)     (.0001)     (.0002)    (.0001)    (.0002)     (.0001) 
Conflict history                .726*       .776*         .815*       .859*         .792*        .84*          .825***   .929***    .831**   .896***   .831**      .887*** 
                                           (.32)        (.312)        (.346)       (.337)        (.352)       (.343)        (.233)        (.228)       (.246)       (.24)       (.253)        (.245) 
Civilian support              2.889*** 3.017***  3.243*** 3.429***  3.47***  3.653***  1.589*** 1.693*** 1.947*** 2.09***  2.085*** 2.223*** 
                                         (.637)        (.609)         (.69)        (.656)        (.701)        (.67)         (.392)        (.426)       (.408)      (.425)      (.421)        (.429) 
ELF                                    -.668                           -.601                           -.654                          -1.214                         -.882                        -.736           
                                        (1.085)                        (1.173)                       (1.193)                         (.78)                            (.77)                         (.78)        
Mountain                        .007                              .011                            .011                            .004                            .003                          .003           
                                         (.01)                            (.011)                          (.012)                          (.007)                         (.008)                       (.008)       
Troop                              .0001                          .00005                        .00005                        -.00005                      -.0001                       -.0001         
                                       (.0002)                         (.0002)                       (.0002)                        (.0002)                       (.0002)                     (.0002)       
Distance                          .207         .195              .25           .226            .24           .215          .217*        .159†        .296**    .272**     .318***   .306** 
                                        (.142)       (.132)          (.153)       (.142)        (.156)       (.145)        (.089)       (.091)        (.088)       (.09)        (.089)       (.091) 
Population                      .101                              .087                            .099                            .151                             .166                         .153           
                                        (.205)                           (.217)                          (.221)                          (.157)                           (.16)                        (.163)         
Cold War                         .028          .05            -.183          -.208         -.152        -.179          .811†         .632         1.026†     .796        1.088†      .873† 
                                        (.666)       (.641)         (.721)        (.693)        (.733)       (.705)        (.491)        (.499)        (.549)      (.513)      (.574)        (.52) 
 
N                                       143           143             143            143           143           143            143           143            143          143          143           143 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1  
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Table 5.8: Combined Model  
 
                                                                                   OLS                                                                                                 Negative Binomial  
                                                       Lowest                     Middle                           Highest                           Lowest                     Middle                             Highest      
                                                                                                                                        
Insurgent aim                      -.453        -.53            -.39            -.53            -.264         -.427              -.334        -.689        -.279         -.647             -.234          -.599 
                                              (.686)       (.656)        (.738)        (.705)         (.751)        (.717)              (.57)        (.516)       (.615)       (.565)            (.631)         (.578)  
Ethnoreligious support      .998          .923          1.354†     1.309†         1.415†      1.367†          1.175*     1.107*     1.535**    1.534**       1.612**    1.624** 
                                              (.686)       (.643)        (.705)        (.691)         (.718)        (.703)             (.493)      (.493)         (.51)         (.504)           (.52)          (.513) 
Rival support                        .862         .704           .911           .762            .916          .756                .347        .483          .359           .456              .398          .464 
                                              (.648)       (.628)        (.698)        (.675)          (.71)         (.687)             (.475)      (.487)       (.498)         (.504)          (.512)        (.513) 
Lootable resources           -.399         -.516          -.321         -.459          -.528          -.67                 -.282       -.619        -.415          -.815           -.482         -.878† 
                                              (.73)         (.711)        (.785)        (.765)         (.799)        (.778)             (.561)      (.551)       (.574)         (.517)          (.591)        (.523) 
Political competition        -.206†       -.19†        -.265*         -.241*        -.254*       -.229†             -.17*      -.119         -.176*        -.124          -.172*         -.125 
                                             (.112)        (.109)         (.121)       (.117)         (.123)        (.119)             (.074)      (.075)       (.077)         (.076)          (.08)          (.077) 
GDP                                    -.0001      -.00006      -.0001       -.0001         -.0001       -.0001             -.0002    -.0002      -.0002*     -.0002*       -.0002*      -.0002* 
                                            (.0001)      (.0001)      (.0002)     (.0001)       (.0002)      (.0002)           (.0001)   (.0001)      (.0001)     (.0001)        (.0001)     (.00009) 
Conflict history                   .53†           .615*        .567†        .656*          .532           .629†             .615**    .711**     .623**       .698**       .638**       .708** 
                                             (.31)          (.298)        (.334)        (.321)          (.34)          (.326)            (.223)      (.223)       (.236)         (.236)        (.243)         (.242) 
Civilian support                2.586***  2.787***  2.848***  3.089***   3.115***  3.357***        1.29**   1.297**   1.634***  1.623**     1.753***   1.753** 
                                            (.635)         (.614)        (.683)        (.66)          (.695)         (.671)             (.438)      (.478)       (.464)         (.498)        (.482)         (.508)   
ELF                                     - .323                             -.343                            -.389                                 -.951                         -.703                              -.606 
                                          (1.089)                          (1.172)                        (1.193)                                (.762)                       (.752)                            (.765) 
Mountain                          .008                                .011                            .011                                     .005                         .006                               .006 
                                           (.01)                               (.011)                         (.011)                                   (.008)                      (.008)                            (.008) 
Troop                                .0002                              .0001                          .0001                                   .0001                     -.00004                          -.0001 
                                         (.0002)                            (.0002)                       (.0002)                                (.0002)                     (.0002)                         (.0002) 
Distance                           .158              .178           .185          .202             .16            .179                 .157         .117          .206†        .18†           .217†         .201† 
                                         (.147)           (.141)         (.158)        (.152)         (.161)        (.154)               (.102)     (.102)        (.112)       (.109)         (.117)        (.112) 
Population                        .24                                   .26                               .286                                    .141                           .199                               .2 
                                         (.204)                               (.22)                             (.223)                                   (.16)                         (.158)                           (.159) 
Cold War                         -.048            -.177           -.061        -.239          -.068          -.259                  .91*        .906†       1.316**   1.269**      1.462**   1.391** 
                                         (.671)           (.648)         (.722)        (.697)         (.735)        (.709)                (.46)       (.471)         (.49)        (.476)          (.507)       (.485) 
 
N                                        157               157             157           157             157            157                   157           157          157           157             157           157 
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                          Table 5.9: Combined Model without Anti-Colonial Wars  
 
                                                                                   OLS                                                                                                 Negative Binomial  
                                                       Lowest                     Middle                           Highest                           Lowest                     Middle                             Highest      
                                                                                                                                        
Insurgent aim                      -.03          -.053           -.021        -.062           .168          .062               -.079        -.468          .024         -.343          .072         -.283 
                                               (.7)          (.666)        (.754)         (.717)         (.763)        (.726)            (.581)        (.539)      (.611)        (.572)        (.623)       (.582)  
Ethnoreligious support     .732           .643          1.111        1.055          1.204        1.147               .93†       .882†       1.312*      1.302*      1.402**   1.392* 
                                             (.674)        (.659)        (.726)        (.709)          (.735)       (.718)             (.509)      (.518)        (.523)       (.531)        (.534)        (.54) 
Rival support                      .725           .645          .743            .689            .777          .712                .443        .551           .435          .496          .469            .5 
                                             (.676)        (.651)        (.728)          (.7)            (.737)        (.709)             (.493)      (.505)        (.501)       (.508)        (.51)         (.511) 
Lootable resources           -.532         -.683          -.406         -.586           -.642          -.82                 -.47       -.804         -.477         -.813          -.519         -.847 
                                             (.736)        (.712)        (.792)        (.765)         (.802)        (.775)             (.586)      (.584)        (.617)       (.581)        (.632)        (.584) 
Political competition        -.233*       -.223*        -.293*       -.273*        -.282*       -.263*            -.202**   -.16*         -.201*      -.156*        -.196*      -.156† 
                                             (.113)        (.109)         (.121)       (.117)         (.123)        (.119)             (.077)      (.078)        (.08)          (.08)          (.082)        (.081) 
GDP                                    .00006      .00007      -.0001       -.00008       -.00008    -.00007           -.0001    -.0001      -.0002      -.0002        -.0002      -.0003 
                                            (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0002)      (.0002)       (.0002)      (.0002)           (.0002)   (.0002)      (.0002)     (.0002)      (.0002)      (.0002) 
Conflict history                  .662*         .73*          .722*         .786*          .702*        .773*              .677**    .773**     .733**       .812**      .756**       .831** 
                                             (.325)       (.315)        (.35)           (.339)          (.354)       (.344)              (.232)      (.233)       (.239)       (.239)         (.244)         (.243) 
Civilian support                2.632***  2.778***  2.899***  3.088***    3.125***  3.308***     1.309**   1.294**   1.688***  1.665**     1.82***   1.806*** 
                                            (.676)         (.65)        (.728)          (.699)          (.737)        (.708)            (.453)      (.495)       (.471)         (.508)        (.485)         (.514)   
ELF                                      -.578                            -.613                              -.636                                -1.121                        -.92                              -.841 
                                           (1.119)                        (1.204)                           (1.219)                              (.799)                       (.788)                            (.8) 
Mountain                           .006                              .009                               .008                                   .004                         .004                               .004 
                                           (.011)                           (.011)                             (.012)                                (.008)                      (.008)                            (.008) 
Troop                                 .0001                          .00007                           .00005                                .0000                     -.00008                          -.0001 
                                          (.0002)                         (.0002)                          (.0002)                               (.0002)                     (.0002)                         (.0002) 
Distance                             .195            .207          .228          .234             .209           .217                 .198*       .15          .247*         .213*          .259*        .237* 
                                           (.154)          (.146)       (.166)        (.157)         (.168)         (.159)              (.101)      (.101)      (.107)         (.106)         (.111)        (.108) 
Population                         .173                              .181                               .206                                   .165                         .188                                .18 
                                          (.209)                             (.225)                            (.228)                                 (.163)                      (.157)                            (.157) 
Cold War                           .181             .142          .071        -.007              .111           .018               1.071*     1.09*      1.409**    1.362**     1.526**    1.457** 
                                          (.688)           (.664)        (.74)        (.715)            (.75)         (.723)               (.477)     (.492)       (.505)        (.501)          (.52)         (.508) 
 
N                                        143               143            143           143              143            143                   143         143          143            143            143           143 
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                                      Table 6.1: Comparison of case and statistical analyses 
 
       Variables                                           Case analysis                 Statistical analysis 
               
     Insurgent aim                                     Disconfirmed                   Disconfirmed   
     Ethnoreligious support                     Confirmed                        Confirmed 
     Rival support                                      Confirmed                        Disconfirmed          
     Lootable resources                            Disconfirmed                   Disconfirmed 
     Political marginalization                   Confirmed                        Confirmed 
     Economic marginalization                Disconfirmed                   Partially confirmed 
     Armed conflict history                      Confirmed                        Confirmed 
      
166 
 
Appendix 
 
 
List of Civil Wars (1945-2007) 
 
 
Location War Begin End Type Region 
Afghanistan Communist-Mujaheddin war 1978 1989 intrastate Asia 
Afghanistan Mujaheddin factional war 1989 2001 intrastate Asia 
Algeria Algerian war of independence 1954 1962 extrastate Africa 
Algeria Algerian Revolutionaries war 1962 1963 intrastate Africa 
Algeria Algerian Islamic Front war 1992 1999 intrastate Africa 
Angola Angolan-Portuguese War 1961 1974 extrastate Africa 
Angola First MPLA-UNITA war 1976 1994 intrastate Africa 
Angola Second MPLA-UNITA war 1998 2002 intrastate Africa 
Argentina Argentine military war 1955 1955 intrastate Americas 
Argentina Argentine Leftists war 1975 1977 intrastate Americas 
Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh war 1991 1993 intrastate Europe 
Bolivia Gov-MNR war 1952 1952 intrastate Americas 
Bosnia Bosnian-Serb rebellion 1992 1995 intrastate Europe 
Burundi First Tutsis-Hutus war 1972 1972 intrastate Africa 
Burundi Second Tutsis-Hutus war 1993 2003 intrastate Africa 
Cambodia Khmer Rouge war 1971 1975 intrastate Asia 
Cambodia Khmer insurgency 1979 1991 intrastate Asia 
Cambodia Second Cambodia civil war 1993 1997 intrastate Asia 
Cameroon French-Cameroon war 1957 1958 extrastate Africa 
Chad First Chad (FROLINAT) rebellion 1966 1971 intrastate Africa 
Chad Habre-FROLINAT & Deby war 1980 1990 intrastate Africa 
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Chad Deby-Togoimi (MDJT) war 1998 2000 intrastate Africa 
Chad Fifth Chad (Déby-rebels) war 2005 2006 intrastate Africa 
Chile Chilean coup 1973 1973 intrastate Americas 
China Chinese civil war 1946 1950 intrastate Asia 
China Taiwan Revolt 1947 1947 intrastate Asia 
China Tibetan Khamba rebellion 1956 1959 intrastate Asia 
China Cultural Revolution 1967 1968 intrastate Asia 
Colombia La Violencia 1948 1958 intrastate Americas 
Colombia Eighth Colombian war 1989 present intrastate Americas 
Congo (DRC) First DRC (Zaire) War 1960 1963 intrastate Africa 
Congo (DRC) CNL/Mulele insurgency 1963 1965 intrastate Africa 
Congo (DRC) Shaba war 1978 1978 intrastate Africa 
Congo (DRC) Mobutu-Kabila war 1996 1997 intrastate Africa 
Congo (DRC) Africa's World War 1998 2002 intrastate Africa 
Congo (ROC) Gov-Sassou Nguesso war 1997 1997 intrastate Africa 
Congo (ROC) Nguesso-Ninjas war 1998 1999 intrastate Africa 
Costa Rica civil war 1948 1948 intrastate Americas 
Croatia Croatia-Krajina war 1995 1995 intrastate Europe 
Cuba Cuban revolution 1958 1959 intrastate Americas 
Dominica Gov-leftist war 1965 1965 intrastate Americas 
El Salvador FMLN insurgency 1979 1992 intrastate Americas 
Ethiopia First Ogaden war 1963 1964 intrastate Africa 
Ethiopia Eritrean war of independence 1972 1991 intrastate Africa 
Ethiopia Second Ogaden war  1976 1980 intrastate Africa 
Ethiopia Tigrean war 1982 1991 intrastate Africa 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation war 1999 1999 intrastate Africa 
Ethiopia Anyuaa-Nuer war 2002 2003 intrastate Africa 
Georgia Gov-Gamsakhurdia war 1991 1992 intrastate Europe 
Georgia Abkhazia Revolt 1993 1994 intrastate Europe 
Greece communist war 1944 1949 intrastate Europe 
Guatemala First Guatemalan war 1966 1971 intrastate Americas 
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Guatemala Second Guatemala war 1978 1984 intrastate Americas 
Guinea Conté-opposition war 2000 2001 intrastate Africa 
Guinea Bissau Military war 1998 1999 intrastate Africa 
India Indo-Hyderabad War 1948 1948 extrastate Asia 
India Naxalite Rebellion 1970 1971 intrastate Asia 
India Indian Golden Temple war 1984 1984 intrastate Asia 
India Kashmir insurgency 1990 2005 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia independence war 1945 1946 extrastate Asia 
Indonesia South Moluccas war 1950 1950 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia Indonesia-Darul Islam war 1953 1953 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia Indonesian Leftists war 1956 1962 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia West Papua War 1965 1978 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia East Timorese war 1975 1979 extrastate Asia 
Indonesia First Aceh war 1989 1991 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia Moluccas Sectarian war 1999 2000 intrastate Asia 
Indonesia Second Aceh war 1999 2004 intrastate Asia 
Iran Overthrow of the Shah 1978 1979 intrastate Middle East 
Iran Anti-Khomeini coalition war 1979 1984 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq Iraq-Shammar war 1959 1959 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq First Iraqi Kurds War 1961 1975 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq Second Iraqi Kurds war 1985 1988 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq Shiite and Kurdish war 1991 1991 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq Kurds internal war (PUK-KDP) 1994 1995 intrastate Middle East 
Iraq Third Iraqi Kurds war 1996 1996 intrastate Middle East 
Ivory Coast Southern gov-northern rebels war 2002 2004 intrastate Africa 
Jordan Black September war 1970 1970 intrastate Middle East 
Kenya British-Mau Mau war 1952 1956 extrastate Africa 
Laos Pathet Lao War 1960 1973 intrastate Asia 
Laos Hmong rebellion 1976 1979 intrastate Asia 
Lebanon Chamoun-opposition war 1958 1958 intrastate Middle East 
Lebanon Complex war 1975 1990 intrastate Middle East 
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Liberia Doe-Taylor war 1989 1990 intrastate Africa 
Liberia Complex war 1992 1996 intrastate Africa 
Liberia Taylor-LURD war 2002 2003 intrastate Africa 
Madagascar Third Franco-Madagascan war 1947 1948 extrastate Africa 
Malaysia Malayan Rebellion 1948 1957 extrastate Asia 
Moldova Dniestrian independence war 1991 1992 intrastate Europe 
Morocco Moroccan independence war 1953 1956 extrastate Africa 
Morocco Western Sahara war 1975 1983 extrastate Africa 
Mozambique Mozambique-Portuguese war 1964 1975 extrastate Africa 
Mozambique FRELIMO-RENAMO war 1979 1992 intrastate Africa 
Myanmar First Burmese war 1948 1960 intrastate Asia 
Myanmar Second Burmese war 1967 1980 intrastate Asia 
Myanmar Third Burmese war 1983 1988 intrastate Asia 
Myanmar Pro-democracy protest 1988 1988 intrastate Asia 
Namibia South Africa-SWAPO war 1975 1988 extrastate Africa 
Nepal First Maoist insurgency 2001 2006 intrastate Asia 
Nicaragua Sandinista Rebellion 1978 1979 intrastate Americas 
Nicaragua Contra War 1982 1990 intrastate Americas 
Nigeria Biafra war 1967 1970 intrastate Africa 
Nigeria Nigeria-Muslim war 1980 1981 intrastate Africa 
Nigeria Jukun-Tiv war 1991 1992 intrastate Africa 
Nigeria First Christian-Muslim war 1999 2004 intrastate Africa 
Oman Dhofar rebellion 1973 1975 intrastate Middle East 
Pakistan Pakistan-Bengal war 1971 1971 intrastate Asia 
Pakistan Baluchi separatists war 1973 1977 intrastate Asia 
Pakistan Waziristan war 2004 2006 intrastate Asia 
Palestine/Israel Al Aqsa Intifada 2000 2003 extrastate Middle East 
Papua New 
Guinea Bougainville secession war 1989 1992 intrastate Asia 
Paraguay civil war 1947 1947 intrastate Americas 
Peru Shining Path war 1982 1992 intrastate Americas 
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Philippines Huks rebellion 1950 1954 intrastate Asia 
Philippines First Philippine-Moro war 1972 1981 intrastate Asia 
Philippines Philippines-NRA war 1972 1992 intrastate Asia 
Philippines Second Moro war 2000 2006 intrastate Asia 
Poland Ukrainian secessionist war 1945 1947 intrastate Europe 
Romania Romanian Revolution 1989 1989 intrastate Europe 
Russia First Chechnya war 1994 1996 intrastate Europe 
Russia Second Chechnya war 1999 2003 intrastate Europe 
Rwanda First Rwanda war 1963 1964 intrastate Africa 
Rwanda Rwandan genocide 1994 1994 intrastate Africa 
Rwanda Third Tutsis-Hutus war 1997 2001 intrastate Africa 
Sierra Leone Gov-RUF war 1991 2000 intrastate Africa 
Somalia First Somalia war 1988 1991 intrastate Africa 
Somalia Second Somalia war 1991 1997 intrastate Africa 
Somalia Third Somalia war 2006 2008 intrastate Africa 
South Africa ANC-Inkatha war 1987 1994 intrastate Africa 
Soviet Union Ukrainian Partisans war 1945 1947 intrastate Europe 
Soviet Union Forest Brethren war 1945 1951 intrastate Europe 
Sri Lanka First Sri Lanka-JVP war 1971 1971 intrastate Asia 
Sri Lanka First Sri Lanka Tamil war 1983 2002 intrastate Asia 
Sri Lanka Second Sri Lanka-JVP war 1987 1989 intrastate Asia 
Sudan First South Sudan war 1963 1972 intrastate Africa 
Sudan Second South Sudan war 1983 2005 intrastate Africa 
Sudan SPLA division (Dinka-Nuer) war 1991 1992 intrastate Africa 
Sudan Darfur war 2003 2006 intrastate Africa 
Syria Hama war 1981 1982 intrastate Middle East 
Tajikistan Gov-UTO war 1992 1997 intrastate Asia 
Tanzania/Zanzibar Zanzibar Arab-African War 1964 1964 intrastate Africa 
Thailand Communist insurgency 1972 1973 intrastate Asia 
Tunisia Franco-Tunisian war 1952 1954 extrastate Africa 
Turkey PKK War 1984 1999 intrastate Middle East 
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Uganda First Uganda war 1966 1966 intrastate Africa 
Uganda Obote-NRA 1980 1986 intrastate Africa 
Uganda Holy Spirit Movement war 1986 1987 intrastate Africa 
Vietnam French-Indochina War 1946 1954 extrastate Asia 
Vietnam Vietnam war (phase 1) 1960 1965 intrastate Asia 
Yemen South Yemeni secessionist war 1994 1994 intrastate Middle East 
Yemen Sunni-Shia war 2004 2007 intrastate Middle East 
Yemen (north) Imamate war 1948 1948 intrastate Middle East 
Yemen (north) Republican-Royalist war 1962 1969 intrastate Middle East 
Yemen (south) YSP leftist war 1986 1986 intrastate Middle East 
Yugoslavia Croatian independence war 1991 1992 intrastate Europe 
Yugoslavia Kosovo independence war 1998 1999 intrastate Europe 
Zimbabwe Rhodesia-ZANU/ZAPU war 1972 1979 intrastate Africa 
Zimbabwe Matabeland war 1983 1987 intrastate Africa 
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